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Abstract 
 
Do locally hired teachers benefit pupils’ school achievements more than governmental employed 
teachers? This is the question to examine in this paper. Although social experiment results have shown 
that the marginal product in terms of test score is positive and significant when pupils are taught by 
PTA teachers, it is not yet known about the “relative” effectiveness between government teacher and 
locally hired teachers. This paper is going to find whether the PTA teacher ratio (the ratio of locally 
hired PTA teachers against total number of teachers in one primary school) has statistically significant 
explanatory power on pupil test score, after controlling various factors.  
 
In Republic of Kenya (below referred as Kenya), there are two types of teachers teaching in public 
primary schools. One is those teachers employed by the government and the other is those hired by the 
local school community, named “PTA teacher”. Although wage level for PTA teachers in public 
primary schools in Kenya is one fourth of that of government teachers, school outcomes of pupils 
taught by locally hired contract teachers are higher than those of pupils taught in controlled group 
schools, according to the result of social experiment (Duflo et al. 2012).  
 
This paper will examine, by using nationally representing observational data, to estimate the relative 
effect of PTA teachers on school outcome. In the end, by using Propensity Score Matching Estimation 
method, the result shows that the effect of PTA teacher ratio is positive and significant on school test 
score in all three subjects for lower standard grade pupils except Kernel and Radius matching and in 
Kiswahili subject for all seven different matching algorisms, though the magnitude of coefficient is 
relatively small. Although background mechanism of this finding is not solely determined, this paper 
is to assume that the effort level of PTA teacher in teaching tends to be higher than that of 
governmental teachers, based on several reasons.  
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1．Introduction  
For the concerns of education policy, the “contract” teacher or locally hired teacher has become one of 
the substantial topics in education sector. As Millennium Development Goals (below referred as 
MDGs) declares high priority on the Universal Primary Education (below referred as UPE) putting it 
as Goal Two, UPE has been perceived as one of the most important issues by the international 
community.
1
 Since then, the gross enrollment rate for primary education has increased drastically in 
developing countries; however supply of education input was not kept up with the pace. One of the 
issues is to supply school teachers.  
 
In order to tackle with high demand of primary school teachers within the limited budget, various 
developing countries were to introduce the system of “contract teachers” whose contracts are fixed and 
shorter term and with lower qualifications in general than governmentally hired teachers and with 
lower salaries (Duthilleul 2005). For example, in West African countries where many countries had 
started to introduce the “contract teacher” policy in national scale, over 50 percent of primary school 
teachers are contract teachers on average of 12 West African countries, either employed by the 
government or by the parents with government subsidies. Those teachers are employed primarily 
because of the shortage of teachers and of the relatively high salary of government teachers, whose 
average salary in Sahel countries remained at 6.4 times the GNP per capita, while in the rest of Africa 
it was about 4.4, in Asia about 2.9, in Middle East and North Africa about 2.3 and in Latin America 2.3 
times the GNP per capita (Duthilleul 2005).  
 
There are two types of contract teachers; one is hired by the government with fixed term contract and 
the other is hired by the local community surrounding the school. The former type of teachers is well 
observed in Western African countries. For example, in Senegal about 50.2 percent of total teachers 
                                                   
1 The MDG Goal Two says, “Ensure that by 2015 all children, particularly girls, children in difficult 
circumstances, and those belonging to ethnic minorities, have access to and complete free and compulsory 
primary education of good quality.” 
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and in Niger 41.5 percent of total teachers are composed of “contract teachers” hired by the 
government in 2003 (Duthilleul 2005). This paper is to focus solely on the latter type of teachers, called 
“PTA teachers”. As for PTA teachers, it is said there are advantages not only because of less cost, but 
also that it may result in stronger accountability towards the school community if the direct employer 
is located at the school level.  
 
It is the motivation of this paper, in addition to the importance of educational policy concern, to 
contribute to the academic research which has paid attention to the incentive of teachers. The 
academic research about education outcome is shifted from the educational inputs to analysis of 
incentives and institutional conditions of teaching and learning. Relevant to teacher incentives and 
monitoring effects by school communities, one of those policies coming under the spot light is 
“contract teacher” policy, which is to hire locally available teachers whose contract is in general “short 
term”, “not fixed” wage rate and directly hired and monitored by the school communities.  
 
2. Preceding Studies 
2.1 Social Experiment Result  
In spite of the significant meaning of contract teachers in developing countries, not many preceding 
studies have examined the effect of “contract teachers” on school outcome. It is true that many studies 
have focused on incentives and institutional conditions of teaching and learning, such as “teacher 
performance pay” contract, or “teacher monitoring” effect as well as “community monitoring effect” 
on school outcome. However, publications which solely deal with locally hired “contract teacher” 
effect is scarce. The table in Appendix 1 shows a part of previous studies and estimation results for 
“contract teacher” effect on school outcome in developing countries. While some are using 
experimental data and others use observational data, motivation is the same as to estimate the effect of 
“contract teacher”. Firstly, by using experimental data, there are three literatures.  
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i) Duflo et al. (2012) showed the result of randomized social experiment in Kenya from 
2005 to 2006, in Western Province. The result is that the marginal product of contract 
teachers is positive and significant for pupils’ test score assigned by PTA teachers. 
ii) Bold et al. (2012) introduced a similar evaluation study to Duflo et al. (2012), however 
their contribution is i) expanding the area from one region to eight regions. In addition, ii) 
they used two separate implementation method by the Ministry of Education Science and 
Technology (MoEST) and by the International NGO (INGO) and compared the result. In 
the end, the program impact is positive and significant on pupil test score. 
iii) Sundaraman et al. (2010) showed the impact of hiring additional “contract teachers”, and 
their main findings is marginal product of contract teachers is positive and significant on 
pupils school outcome.  
 
From these social experiment results, the effect of adding one locally hired teacher is significantly 
positive on school test score, however it is not yet known if locally hired teachers can raise test score 
better than governmental teachers, even if the marginal product is positive and significant. To this 
question, following literature introduces the relative effect of PTA teachers.  
 
2.2 Observational data research 
The Sundaraman et al. (2010) study shows the result of estimation using observational data, 
comparing the effect of governmental teachers versus locally hired teachers. In short, by using pupil 
level and school level panel observational data, it concluded that they cannot reject the null hypothesis 
that existing contract teachers are as effective as government teachers in improving student learning 
outcomes. On the other hand, Bourdon, J. et al. (2006), by using observational data for Niger with 
Propensity Score Matching Estimation, the estimated effect of contract teacher is positive and 
significant in grade 5
th
 for Math, French and combined score, but not significant for the 2
nd
 grade 
pupils in any subjects. Therefore, it is still remained uncertain whether the existing PTA teacher is 
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more effective to school achievement or not, and if so, in which grade and subject, they are more 
effective to the outcome.  
 
In this paper, the objective is to find the relative effect of “existing” PTA teachers on pupils’ school 
outcome, not to measure the marginal effect of “newly” hired teacher. Therefore we use non 
experimental data. It is worth noting there is a clear difference between newly hired teacher by 
experimental programs and existing PTA teachers paid by school communities in terms of contract and 
payment scheme which is likely to affect motivation of teachers. Firstly, in setting of social experiment, 
in order to secure randomness, recruitment of local community teacher should be perfectly 
independent from school community characteristics; therefore the decision to recruit has to be 
exogenous. On the other hand, as for existing PTA teachers, it is endogenous decision for the school 
community to hire PTA teachers. This paper will focus more on school outcome by existing PTA 
teachers who are supported by parents’ contributions or school community contributions to 
supplement the governmental teachers. Hence we use non experimental data.  
 
In addition to preceding literature, contribution of this paper is as follows:  
1) In addition to Bold et al. (2012), it is estimated by using more nationally representing data and 
increased number of samples from 192 primary schools (Bold et al. 2012) to 2216 primary 
schools.  
2) As for preceding literatures in Kenya, there is no study to estimate the relative effect of PTA 
teachers hired by local community.  
 
2.3 PTA teacher ratio and concerns 
Due to data limitation, it is not possible to identify whether pupils are taught by PTA teachers or not; 
however it is possible to identify the ratio of PTA teachers and school average test score. Therefore, 
this paper puts a certain assumption that if PTA teachers are more effective to raise pupil test score 
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than government teachers, then the higher ratio of PTA teachers might have the positive effect on pupil 
education outcome, after controlling class size and pupil teacher ratio. The validity of this assumption 
is discussed more detailed in the section 5. Another concern remained unsolved is whether the PTA 
teacher ratio does not always represent PTA teachers’ actual teaching practice. It is because data does 
not tell who and which subject is taught by PTA teacher. Therefore, in following estimation, cases 
where PTA teachers are likely to teach are specified. In detail, it will be explained in section 6.  
 
In order to estimate precisely the effect of PTA teacher ratio, it is necessary to control other school or 
village characteristics where higher PTA teacher ratio is observed. Therefore, the following section 
explains about who are PTA teachers in the context of Kenya.  
 
3. Characteristics of PTA Teachers in Public Primary Schools in Kenya 
As for the qualification, government (TSC) teachers and PTA teachers differ. In order for teachers to 
be certified by TSC, one needs to have “academic qualifications”, ranging from P4 (the lowest grade 
and graduates of primary schools) to Diploma. If non-graduate primary school teacher wishes to be a 
teacher, they need to acquire a relevant degree or qualification from a recognized institution 
(UNESCO 2010). There are 25 public and 8 private colleges for training primary school teachers. 
These provide pre-service teacher training courses which take two years.  
 
As for the number of teacher, although PTA teachers are not offered “legitimate status” to teach in 
public primary schools, the number of PTA teachers in Kenya is not small. One survey under 
“Community Teachers Research Project” conducted in 2009 reported that out of all teachers in 
surveyed schools, 17 percent of teachers were hired under PTA contract and another report says, “on 
average, 1 out of 5 teachers is employed by parents” (UWEZO 2010).  
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In terms of salary, although the wage level of PTA teacher differs among schools, one report estimated 
that the average payment for PTA teachers was 4,151 Kenya Shillings, which is one fourth of the 
average salary 19,372 Kenya Shillings of TSC teachers. The source of the salary for PTA teachers 
differs from school to school. It might be paid from the collected fund by local community members 
or from the school capitation grant provided by the central government (Nishimura et al. 2009; World 
Bank 2009). Therefore, it is not yet clear where the source of salary has come from, however it is clear 
that decision to allocate the pooled fund is left with the school community. It is reasonable to assume 
that PTA teachers would work hard, since PTA teacher wage is determined by the school community, 
while that of TSC teachers is managed by the MoEST, the central government. 
 
4. Conceptual Framework and Hypothesis  
It is not possible for us to observe “PTA teacher effort level” from the current dataset, however often 
pointed out that contract teacher have superior performance in terms of teaching effort level, for 
example, attendance rate or teaching activities. Duflo et al. (2012) shows that contract teachers are 
27.8 percentage points more likely to be found in a classroom during random visits than government 
teachers. Sundaraman et al. (2010) also shows significantly lower level of absence compared to 
government teachers. These superior performances are due to combination of factors, such as “being 
from local area and feeling more connected to the community, living much closer to the school and 
therefore having lower marginal costs of attendance, or the superior incentives from being on annually 
renewable contracts without the job security of civil-service tenure” (Sundaraman et al., 2010).  
 
In this paper, it is not possible to decompose the relative importance of these factors; however, as a 
concept, there are possible explanations as below why PTA teachers tend to have better incentive to 
work harder than TSC teachers.  
i) Less monitoring on TSC teachers: 
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Government teachers (TSC teachers) are not as closely monitored by principles, that is, the 
Central Government, the Ministry of Education Science and Technology (MoEST), as PTA 
teachers monitored by the school surrounding communities. In Kenya, country is divided into 
eight administrative regions (known as provinces). Each province has a Provincial Director of 
Education Office. In each province, there are districts, and in total 158 districts exist in the entire 
land. The work of primary school teachers are principally monitored by each district, the District 
of Education Office. However, due to the large number of schools, district education officers are 
not well checking the work of each primary school teacher. On the other hand, PTA teachers are 
working harder because they are under direct monitoring by the school community. 
 
ii) Accountability of usage of schools fund:  
Before introducing the Free Primary Education policy, public primary schools were in charge of 
collecting school fees from parents and were entitled to decide how to spend the collected money. 
In that time, schools were obliged to make efforts to be accountable to payers, that is, parents of 
pupils. However after introducing the FPE (Free Primary Education) policy, schools need to be 
more accountable to the district level of education officers as well as to the Central Government 
where the capitation fund has allocated to each school (Sasaoka et al. 2007). In this way, while the 
Free Primary Education has succeeded in assisting low income parents to send their children to 
school, however it happened to deprive the interest of parents to manage schools or incentive to 
monitor schools (Sawamura 2004a).  
 
iii) Future Job opportunity for PTA teachers: 
Moreover, the job opportunity for PTA teachers to become registered government teachers is open 
after teaching and when they go to school. Though quantitative information is not found, in 
qualitative study, it reveals that a PTA teacher works hard to be a registered TSC teacher (Ito 2011). 
Also, new graduates of teacher training colleges often work for several years as PTA teachers and 
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obtain positions as civil service teachers (Duflo et al. 2009). In the system of registration, it holds 
the opportunity open for non-graduate teacher to become a registered teacher.  
 
iv) Wage payment system: 
The difference in teaching effort level can be also explained by the clearly different payment 
system as well. It is often observed that in developing countries, hiring, salaries and promotion are 
decided by educational qualifications and seniority, with less scope for performance than 
developed countries (Chaudhury et al. 2006). In Kenya, the wage for TSC teachers is determined 
by school education history of teachers, not by their performance (Sawamura 2004b). Moreover, 
not only the wage level, but also decisions regarding hiring, firing, and transferring teachers in 
Kenya have long been made centrally by the Ministry of Education. It is famous that Kenyan 
public school teachers have strong civil service and union protection and are difficult to fire 
(Glewwe et al.2010). On the other hand, if PTA teacher is hired by the community decision, it’s 
more likely for PTA teacher’s performance to be reflected in the wage. To put this in more 
simplified manner, borrowing from Sawada (2000), it is assumed the linear function of wage as 
below for both TSC and PTA teachers.   
1) W = 𝑎1 + 𝑎2  𝑂𝐸  
“OE” stands for “observable effort” by the community and note that a case of 𝑎1 > 0 and 
𝑎2 = 0 represents a fixed wage contract, while 𝑎2 > 0 is a piece rate contract. Though the 
payment scheme for each PTA teachers are not certain, it is clear that TSC teachers have the fixed 
wage contract, where wage function (1) has 𝑎2 = 0, in other words, wage level does not depend 
on the level of “OE”. From this condition, TSC teachers would make less effort to teach, since 
𝑎2 = 0 and it does not change wage level. On the other hand, it is assumed that PTA teachers are 
more likely to make efforts than TSC teachers, because wage is endogenously determined by the 
“observed effort”.   
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v) Based on those various reasons mentioned above, it is reasonable to assume PTA teachers have 
better incentive to make more efforts in teaching than that of TSC teachers. However, it is 
remained uncertain how effectively PTA teachers can teach with their higher effort level. In other 
words, since there are no variables to estimate the ability of PTA teachers, it is not yet known if 
the level is efficient or not. In short, if test score Y of the i
th
 pupil in j
th 
school can be written as  
2)  𝑌𝑖𝑗 = 𝐹(𝑋𝑖𝑗   𝑍𝑗   𝐸𝑗   𝑎𝑗  𝑒𝑗  )   
where Y is a function of school observed characteristics Z, pupil and household characteristics X, 
Environment (Village) characteristics E, 𝑎𝑗 is the total ability of PTA teachers at j
th
 school and 𝑒𝑗 
is the total effort level of PTA teachers. Although it is not possible to estimate the level of effort and 
ability for PTA teachers directly, the ratio of PTA and TSC teachers are observable in dataset. In this 
paper, under the simplest assumption, PTA teacher represents higher effort level with lower ability 
in teaching, while TSC teacher represents lower effort level with higher ability in teaching as table 1 
below. Therefore, under this simplified assumption, by looking at the coefficient of PTA teacher 
ratio, it is possible to estimate which marginal effect, ability or effort level, would bring stronger 
impact on test score.  
Table 1 Simplified category of PTA teacher and TSC teacher ability and effort level  
 Ability Level Effort Level 
High TSC teacher PTA teacher 
Low PTA teacher TSC teacher 
If the coefficient of PTA teacher ratio is positive and significant, it means that the effort level has 
stronger impact on pupil education outcome than that of ability. If the coefficient of PTA teacher 
ratio is negative and significant, it can interpret that the ability is stronger impact than that of effort 
level.  
 
5. Identification Strategy 
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In order to estimate the impact of PTA teacher on school outcome, there are two different estimations 
made in this paper. First is to estimate the impact of whether at least one teacher exists in school or not. 
Second, since the impact of the average treatment on the treated (below referred as TOT) is 
heterogeneous among schools as following section presents, in the second estimation, the outcome 
(TOT) will be regressed on PTA teacher ratio, so as to see if the ratio of PTA teacher has explanatory 
power on heterogeneous variation of TOT.  
 
5. 1 Propensity Score Matching Estimation Concept 
Now, 𝑌0𝑗 denotes the average test score outcome in j
th
 school where there is no PTA teacher, while 
𝑌1𝑗  denotes the average test score outcome in j
th
 school where there is at least one PTA teacher. To 
define the average treatment effect on the treated (TOT), it is derived as follows: 
(1) 𝑇𝑂𝑇 ≡ 𝐸(𝑌1𝑗 − 𝑌0𝑗 |𝐷𝑗=1)  
= {𝐸(𝑌1𝑗 |𝐷𝑗=1) −  𝐸(𝑌0𝑗 |𝐷𝑗=0)} − {𝐸(𝑌0𝑗|𝐷𝑗 = 1) − 𝐸(𝑌0𝑗|𝐷𝑗 = 0)} 
The observable difference in test score between treated and controlled group in the second equation of 
left hand side denoted as 𝐸(𝑌1𝑗 |𝐷𝑖=1) −  𝐸(𝑌0𝑗 |𝐷𝑗=0), which is not precisely estimating TOT, since 
this includes the selection bias term of 𝐸(𝑌0𝑗|𝐷𝑗 = 1) − 𝐸(𝑌0𝑗|𝐷𝑗 = 0). In order for us to estimate the 
𝑇𝑂𝑇 ≡ 𝐸(𝑌1𝑗 − 𝑌0𝑗 |𝐷𝑖=1), we need to know the value of counterfactual 𝐸(𝑌0𝑗|𝐷𝑗 = 1). By putting the 
Conditional Independence Assumption  {  Y0𝑗, Y1𝑗  }  ⊥ D𝑗| 𝑋𝑗 , equation (1) can be rewritten  
(1)′   𝑇𝑂𝑇 ≡ 𝐸(𝑌1𝑗 − 𝑌0𝑗 |𝐷𝑗=1)  
= {𝐸(𝑌1𝑗 |𝑋𝑗, 𝐷𝑗=1) −  𝐸(𝑌0𝑗 |𝑋𝑗, 𝐷𝑗=0)} − {𝐸(𝑌0𝑗|𝑋𝑗 , 𝐷𝑗 = 1) − 𝐸(𝑌0𝑗|𝑋𝑗, 𝐷𝑗 = 0)} 
= {𝐸(𝑌1𝑗 |𝑋𝑗, 𝐷𝑗=1) −  𝐸(𝑌0𝑗 |𝑋𝑗, 𝐷𝑗=0)} 
The second term of right hand side equation of (1)′  𝐸(𝑌0𝑗|𝑋𝑗, 𝐷𝑗 = 1) − 𝐸(𝑌0𝑗|𝑋𝑗, 𝐷𝑗 = 0) 
become zero, since Conditional Independence Assumption (below referred as CIA) assures that the 
PTA teacher existence is independent from the outcome of school test score average, conditioned on 
𝑋𝑗.  
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However, if there are many covariates, such strategies may not be feasible nor impractical, since the 
dimension of X could be very high. Therefore as Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) explained, an 
alternative approach is based on the propensity score, the conditional probability of receiving 
treatment given covariates. They had proved that if the treatment assignment is “strongly ignorable” 
given covariates X, then it is strongly ignorable given any balancing score b(X), and the propensity 
score is defined as one of the balancing score. As a result, adjusting solely for differences in propensity 
score between the treated and control units removes all biases under the CIA, and reduces a potentially 
high-dimensional matching problem to a single-dimensional problem. In the formula, under the CIA, 
the outcome of Y is independent distribution from 𝐷𝑗 if the propensity score is similar, that is, 
{  Y0𝑗, Y1𝑗  }  ⊥ D𝑗| 𝑃(𝑋𝑗)  
In the end, the average treatment effect on the treated (TOT) can be derived with the estimated 
Propensity Score as follows; 
(1)′′   𝑇𝑂𝑇 ≡ 𝐸  {𝐸(𝑌1𝑗|𝑃(𝑋𝑗), 𝐷𝑗=1) − 𝐸(𝑌0𝑗|𝑃(𝑋𝑗), 𝐷𝑗=0)| 𝐷𝑗=1} 
 
5.2 Advantages and Concerns in using PSM Estimation 
There are several reasons the PSM estimation is preferred in this paper to the traditional regression 
analysis, though CIA is not perfectly satisfied. Even so, it is still more preferable to use PSM than 
OLS. One reason is that PSM estimation does not require functional form to be linear. Because of 
nature of relationship between educational inputs and school achievement, it is more appropriate to 
assume nonlinear functional form.  
 
In addition, as the second point, in order to estimate consistent parameter by PSM method, it requires 
good number of variables which exist for both treated and controlled group. In this paper, because of 
the characteristics of the dataset, aiming to cover most of important variables to estimate pupil school 
outcome, it is reasonable to judge that number of variables are not too small to estimate the propensity 
score appropriately.  
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In addition, according to Khandker (2010), given two broad provisions, the bias in PSM program 
estimates can be low. First, it is preferred to use the same data source for treatment and controlled 
group, which ensures the observed characteristics are measured similarly. Regarding this point, the 
dataset satisfies that both treated and controlled groups were drawn from the same dataset. As for the 
second point, it is preferable to use the representative sample survey of nonparticipants as well as 
participants. In this point, the survey constructing the data is well corresponded since the UWEZO 
takes the nationally representing survey scheme.  
 
In the end, from a part of descriptive statistics table below, it is obvious that characteristics of villages 
and educational inputs differ greatly between PTA teacher zero school and PTA teacher none zero 
school. The difference is clear in school test score and other village and regional characteristics. In 
terms of Kiswahili and English average test score difference, the null hypothesis that mean between 
two groups is zero is rejected. Hence, PSM estimation is more sensible to compare across treated and 
matched control units by using the Propensity Matching Score.  
Table 2 Descriptive Statistics for PTA teacher zero school and for PTA teacher none zero 
school 
 
(1) PTA Teacher RATIO=0 (2) PTA Teacher RATIO>0 
School Level Variable Sample(#) Mean Std. Dev.   Sample(#) Mean Std. Dev. 
Ho: diff = 0 
(P-value)      
School Average Kiswahili Score 414 4.032 0.718 1802 3.941 0.710 0.0191 
School Average English Score 414 4.000 0.714 1802 3.909 0.686 0.0169 
School Average Numeracy Score 414 6.311 1.252 1802 6.321 1.127 0.8804 
Village Level Variable 
       
Village has electricity infra 414 0.528 0.499 1802 0.403 0.490 0.0000   
Village has concrete paved roads 414 0.207 0.406 1802 0.136 0.343 0.0002 
Household Level Variable 
(School Average) 
       
Parents who paid tuition 414 0.409 0.388 1802 0.438 0.362 0.1509   
Mother Education History  414 0.797 0.332 1802 0.808 0.318 0.5397 
 
5.3 Estimation of Propensity Score 
In order to find appropriate propensity score, it requires variables which would affect the likelihood of 
having at least one PTA teacher as well as variables which influence the outcome. The propensity 
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score is estimated as follows. First, let us assume that the latent variable of 𝐷𝑗 ∗ can be written as 
below: 
(2)𝐷𝑗 ∗= 𝑋𝑗𝐵 +   𝜇𝑗    
When the latent variable 𝐷𝑗 ∗ is greater than 0 then 𝐷𝑗 denotes 1 and when 
 𝐷𝑗 ∗ is equal to or smaller than 0 then 𝐷𝑗 denotes 0. 𝑋𝑗 includes a vector of followings: 1) average 
household and pupils characteristics attending on j
th
 school, 2) j
th
 school characteristics and 3) village 
characteristics where j
th
 school is located as well as 4) a vector of district dummy, existing one 
hundred twenty one districts in the dataset. 𝜇𝑗 is a vector of error term, by assumption E( 𝜇𝑗) =
0 and Var (𝜇𝑗) = 𝜎
2 . The descriptive statistics of those variables from 1) to 4) are attached in the 
Appendix 1 and probit estimation result is found in Appendix 2. The error term of 𝜇𝑗 is assumed to 
follow the Normal Distribution. Then, the propensity score can be written  
𝑃(𝐷𝑗 = 1|𝑋𝑗) = Φ(𝑋𝑗𝐵/𝜎)  
 
5.4 Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (TOT) 
After estimation of Propensity Score, the predicted value of Propensity score is used to estimate the 
TOT by matching treated schools and none treated schools. There are different matching criteria used 
to assign the treated and none treated schools. In this paper, seven different methods of matching were 
tested to see the robustness as follows: 
i) Nearest neighbor Matching: The each treated school is matched to none treated schools which 
have the 1
st
, 2
nd
 and 4
th
 nearest or closest propensity score obtained.  
ii) Radius Matching: There is a possibility that the matched propensity is very different from the 
nearest one of those treated school. Therefore, the radius matching limits propensity score 
within a certain range to be matched.  
iii) Kernel Matching: In order not to use only small number of controlled group schools as 
matched schools, the kernel matching can use a weighted average of all nonparticipants to 
construct the counterfactual match for each participant.  
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5.5 Heterogeneous Impact of PTA teacher ratio on the outcome 
The following histograms are the TOT distribution of Numeracy, English and Kiswahili test score. By 
looking at the TOT distribution among treated schools, it is widely distributed from negative to 
positive point. If PTA teacher has only positive impact on test score at any school, it is assumed that 
TOT can be always positive. However, it does not hold true. Rather the impact of at least one PTA 
teacher existence is heterogeneous among treated schools.  
 
 
Hence, as Lin et al. (2009) explores the heterogeneity feature of the effectiveness of the treatment, in 
order to examine the causes of this heterogeneous impact on the treated, TOT is regressed on PTA 
teacher ratio so as to see if heterogeneous impact can be explained by the PTA ratio or not. Followed 
by preceding studies of education production function, the outcome of production function can be 
written by equation (3). For the j
th 
school, Y, the education outcome of Numeracy, English and 
Kiswahili, can be written as function of school and village characteristics Z, school averaged pupil and 
household characteristics H, district dummy variables E and 𝐷𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑗 is PTA ratio value for the j
th
 
school, ranging from a value of 0 to 1 if all teachers are PTA teachers.  
(3)𝑌𝑗 = 𝐹(𝐻𝑗  𝑍𝑗   𝐸𝑗   𝐷𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑗  )                                    
By linearizing and adding a stochastic term, the equation (3) can be rewritten as follows. 
 (4)𝑌𝑗 = 𝐻𝑗𝛽 + 𝑍𝑗𝛾 + 𝐸𝑗𝛼 + 𝐷𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑗𝛿 +   𝜇𝑗                                     
by assumption, E( 𝜇𝑗) = 0 and Var (𝜇𝑗) = 𝜎
2 .  
 
From the left, Figure 1 Histogram for TOT of English for one to one nearest matching estimation 
In the middle, Figure 2 Histogram for TOT of Kiswahili for one to one nearest matching estimation 
From the right, Figure 3 Histogram for TOT of Numeracy for one to one nearest matching estimation 
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Now, it is our interest to estimate the coefficient of PTA teacher ratio, that is, 𝛿 for the PTA ratio 
effect on outcome, TOT. Therefore the estimation model of (4) should be rewritten as below: 
(5) 𝐸  {𝐸(𝑌1𝑗|𝑃(𝑋𝑗), 𝐷𝑗=1) − 𝐸(𝑌0𝑗|𝑃(𝑋𝑗), 𝐷𝑗=0)| 𝐷𝑗=1} = H𝑗ε + 𝑍𝑗η + 𝐸𝑗λ + 𝐷𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑗𝜔 +   𝜇𝑗  
 
6. Data 
6.1Nature of Data 
This paper uses dataset available through website of UWEZO Kenya, which is a part of Twaweza, “an 
independent East African initiative” supported by donors, such as the World Bank and others 
(UWEZO East Africa 2012). For education individual data, UWEZO dataset contains the largest 
national assessment results conducted in three Eastern African countries of Tanzania, Kenya and 
Uganda, “350,000 children in over 150,000 households across the three countries were tested in their 
ability to perform basic numeracy and literacy tasks at the Standard 2 level” (UWEZO East Africa 
2012).
2
  
 
In Kenya, there are two surveys conducted by UWEZO Kenya in September to October in 2009 and in 
February to March in 2010. Both 2009 and 2010 UWEZO assessments adopted survey methods that 
produced a nationally representative random sample of the target population.
3
 In total, 2009 and 2010 
UWEZO Kenya has covered following number of schools, villages, households and children.
4
 
However, due to the large number of missing values in 2009 dataset, this paper chooses to use 2010 
dataset for estimation. 
                                                   
2
 Other surveys conducted to test the education achievement in eastern African regions, such as SACMEQ I, II, 
and III, those surveys do not have much samples as UWEZO. 
3
 Those samples are children of primary school age up to and including children aged 16. Though there are some 
districts not surveyed in 2009 (88 districts) and in 2010 (36 districts), the random sample selection method was 
maintained as follows: First, all the surveys have followed a three stage random sampling process, 1) selection of 
districts (strata) by simple random selection, with each district given an equal probability of selection; 2) 
selection of enumeration area (typically villages) with probability proportional to population size and 3) 
selection of households in each enumeration area by systematic sampling. 
4
 The dataset which was available from the website slightly differ in number of samples from what the report 
says. For example, the dataset available from website contains 179,370 samples for individuals, 3,565 villages 
surveyed and 3,448 schools were surveyed in UWEZO Kenya dataset 2010. As for UWEZO Kenya dataset 2009, 
it contains 106,273 samples for individuals, 2,160 villages and 2,160 primary schools surveyed. 
- 16 - 
 
Table 3 2009 and 2010 UWEZO Kenya Surveyed Samples 
Survey Round Districts Schools Villages Household Pupils 
2009 (Sep/Oct) 70 2,029 2,029 33,760 79,693 
2010 (Feb/Mar) 122 3,474 3,628 55,843 131,971
5
 
   (Source: UWEZO East Africa at Twaweza, 2012 August) 
 
6.2 Descriptive Statistics and Variables 
From UWEZO dataset 2010, the effective sample size for this estimation is 2,216 public primary 
schools. The descriptive statistics is attached in Appendix 2.  
1) Independent Variables  
Test score of Kiswahili, English and Numeracy which were tested at time of household survey. Score 
of Kiswahili and English is rated from 1 to 5 while Numeracy is rated from 1 to 8 as follows: 
Kiswahili; 1; Nothing, 2; Able to read Letter, 3; Words, 4; Paragraph, and 5; Story  
English; 1; Nothing, 2; Able to read Letter, 3; Word, 4; Paragraph, and 5; Story 
Numeracy; 1; Nothing, 2 ;Able to count 1-9, 3; Able to count 10-99, 4; Able to count greater than 
10-99, 5; Able to calculate addition, 6; Able to calculate subtraction, 7; Able to calculate multiplication, 
and 8; Able to calculate division. 
 
In order to control other effects than PTA teacher ratio, following variables are selected as controlling 
variables, based on preceding estimations for education production function.  
 
2) Class size, Pupil Teacher Ratio (PTR) and PTA teacher ratio Variables 
It is our interest to estimate the effect of PTA teacher ratio, which is closely related with pupils per 
class size and pupils per government teacher. Therefore, it is essential to control these two effects to 
TOT, otherwise PTA teacher ratio is likely to estimate the effect of large class size or large number of 
                                                   
5
 Initially, the surveyed dataset has 179,411 samples of individuals. After grouping samples who have been to 
those surveyed public primary schools and grade less than 8
th
 (this is the highest grade of public primary schools 
in Kenya), the sample size has reduced to 65,541. Due to the large number of missing values, the effective 
samples are 30,633 individuals and 2,216 primary schools. 
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pupils per one teacher. That is because the motivation for public primary schools to hire a PTA teacher 
is to compensate the shortage of TSC (government) teachers. To control the effect of high pupil 
teacher ratio (PTR), there are two variables: one is pupil teacher ratio (PTR) and the other is pupil TSC 
(government) teacher ratio. The former is to control the effect of teacher shortage in general after they 
hire PTA teachers, while the latter variable is specifically controlling the shortage of government 
teacher. Since both are highly correlated, this paper chooses to select the pupils TSC teacher ratio as 
control variable. That is because if otherwise, the PTA teacher ratio variable is only to capture the 
effect of government teacher shortage. In addition to pupil TSC teacher ratio, the variable for class size 
is included. As those above variables are skewed to the left, they were converted to logarithm and used 
in the estimation, which histogram is available in Appendix 3. 
 
3) Household and Pupil Variables 
As in preceding studies, the socio-economic index based on family possessions is included as control 
variables (Bourdon, J. et al., 2007), household decision to invest in children is closely related with the 
household socio-economic characteristics. As proxies for wealthiness of a household, the asset 
variables were used, such as Type of house and possession of telephone. Also, there might be a 
resource allocation issue about who to be invested most if the number of children is large. There is no 
variable for the number of siblings; however as the proxy variable, total number of household 
members is used to control the effect of resource competition. In addition, the effect of mother’s 
education whether they have graduated primary school or not is controlled, since it directly affects 
living standards of children as well as indicates socio economic status of family. In order to control 
preference over children education, the variable if parents pay tuition or extra fee to school is added. 
 
As for pupil characteristics, though it is impossible to control the innate ability directly, variables 
included are age, age squared and their school grade, since the older they are, it becomes much easier 
to take good score, since the test level is set for Standard grade two level. However, the effect of 
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getting “old” is none linear to school outcome, therefore the squared term is added. To control the 
physical health which directly affects the school outcome, the number of meal in one day that pupil 
can take is also controlled.  
 
4) School Input Variables 
In the early study of education production function, Heyneman and Loxley (1983) explained that “the 
poorer the national setting in economic terms, the more powerful this (school inputs and teacher 
quality) effect appears to be”. Since this “H-L effect” has been widely recognized and supported by 
several preceding studies, it is necessary to control the supply side information in estimating pupils 
school outcome. This paper includes three variables for school inputs. 1) Dummy variable if school 
has learning supplement materials or not. 2) Dummy variable if the classroom is suitable for learning 
space or not. These two variables are to capture the primary condition of learning space and materials. 
3) Dummy variable if school is fenced or not, since the security in some areas in Kenya are still 
remained fragile especially after the large scale of post-election violence in 2008. The variable 
indicates if school is careful in surrounding security incident or not.  
 
5) Village and District Variables 
Since there are large disparities between regions in Kenya, environmental factors are important to be 
controlled. In order to control the similarity at the district level, one hundred twenty one district 
dummy variables are added. It is very likely that the characteristics of the district area is similar each 
other therefore, it is possible to see if PTA teacher ratio still has explanatory power on the outcome, 
after controlling the district level similarities. As for village where school is located, the dummy 
variable if roads are paved by concrete is added. Also, dummy variable is selected to show if village 
has an electricity infrastructure or not. Those variables are proxy variable to control the access and 
ease of transportation to villages.  
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7. Result and Interpretation  
In this section, it is divided into three. First, it shows the result of probit estimation, which is to 
construct the propensity scoreecond, the average treatment effect on the treated (TOT) is reported for 
different matching algorism. At last, heterogeneity of TOT will be regressed on PTA teacher ratio and 
other controlling variables so as to find if PTA teacher ratio can explain the heterogeneous impact on 
the treated with statistical significance. 
 
7.1 Probit Estimation Result 
First, the probit model is used to generate a propensity score that assesses a school or village’s 
likelihood of hiring at least one PTA teacher. Table in Appendix 4 shows the estimation result that 
variables of village characteristics and school inputs are statistically significant. For example, whether 
village has electricity infra or not is negative and the size of class as well as supplementary materials 
in school are negative and significant. This means that PTA teacher is likely to be hired where villages 
do not have electricity or have less educational input such as learning supplementary materials, in 
addition to less number of pupils in one class after controlling the TSC teacher shortage. In terms of 
government teacher shortage, it is obvious that PTA teacher is likely to be hired where pupil 
government teacher ratio (PTR) is high in school, indicating positive and one percent statistical 
significance.  
 
On the other hand, none of the average household and pupil characteristics variables become 
statistically significant. From this result, though it seems less important to include household and 
individual characteristics in the estimation of propensity score, it is essential to do so since the 
propensity score must be calculated on the basis of all observed covariates X that jointly affect 
participation and the outcome of interest, that is, the school average test score. 
 
7.2 Average treatment on the treated 
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In addition to the CIA, in order to make PSM estimation appropriately, it is necessary to confirm that 
the common support exists and overlapping condition is satisfied. The histogram in Appendix 3 is to 
compare the distribution of Propensity Score for both treated and controlled for Kiswahili and English 
as an example. The shape of distribution does not look similar between treated and controlled; 
however the propensity score of the treated group is mostly covered by the distribution area of the 
controlled group. In the end, total effective samples become 1887 for all standard grade estimation and 
to 1720 for standard grade below three pupils.  
 
The following table 4 presents TOT for seven different matching algorithms by subject, Numeracy, 
English and Kiswahili and two different grade groups. 95 percent of confidence intervals are estimated 
using bootstrapped standard errors (500 replications). With different matching algorithms, in 
nearest matching estimation one to one, one to two and one to four as well as kernel normal 
matching estimation, it is consistent for Numeracy subject, estimated TOT is positive and 
statistically different from zero. In other subjects, TOT does not become statistically 
significant by any matching criteria. In spite of the significance in Numeracy, that magnitude 
is relatively small. For example in the nearest one to one matching estimation, the impact of 
the treatment on outcome is 0.29 score higher on school average than those controlled schools 
with similar characteristics. Also in the 95 percent confidence interval, the minimum value of 
TOT includes negative value in the nearest matching estimation.  
 
There are possible explanations why the treatment effect on the treated is weak in Numeracy 
and not significant in any other subjects. One of the reasons could be that TOT only shows the 
effect of whether one PTA teacher exists or not. It does not specify the level of treatment, since 
treatment dummy is 1 even if ten PTA teachers exist in a school or only one PTA teacher exits 
in a school. In short, it is natural that the PTA teacher effect on outcome should differ, 
depending on level of treatment, that is, ratio of PTA teachers. However this TOT estimation 
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does not differentiate the impact of it.6 Hence, it is more sensible to find the relative effect, 
that is, PTA teacher ratio on outcome in the next estimation.  
                                                   
6 In separate estimation, TOT was estimated by different group of PTA teacher ratio. Schools with 
PTA teacher are divided into 5 groups from the highest PTA teacher ratio to the lowest ratio group. 
Then, in each group, the matching was done with the controlled group. As a result, TOT is positive 
and significant in the highest PTA teacher ratio group in Numeracy. The detailed estimation result 
is available from author.  
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Table 4 Treatment effect on the treated (TOT)) with different matching criteria 
 
7.3 Heterogeneous Impact of the treatment 
[Nearest Matching: N=1] Coef. Std. Error z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]
Kiswahili 0.099094 0.0839997 1.18 0.238 -0.065542 0.2637304
English 0.1086848 0.0795833 1.37 0.172 -0.047296 0.2646652
Numeracy 0.2979102 0.1441951 2.07 0.039 0.0152931 0.5805274
Kiswahili Std<=3 -0.090576 0.0939274 -0.96 0.335 -0.27467 0.0935186
English Std<=3 0.0085987 0.0915486 0.09 0.925 -0.170833 0.1880306
Numeracy Std<=3 0.0266911 0.1609512 0.17 0.868 -0.288768 0.3421497
[Nearest Matching: N=2] Coef. Std. Error z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]
Kiswahili 0.0630791 0.0774228 0.81 0.415 -0.088667 0.2148249
English 0.0715681 0.0678459 1.05 0.291 -0.061408 0.2045436
Numeracy 0.2328433 0.1235065 1.89 0.059 -0.009225 0.4749115
Kiswahili Std<=3 -0.032194 0.0920423 -0.35 0.727 -0.212594 0.1482054
English Std<=3 0.0131391 0.082894 0.16 0.874 -0.14933 0.1756083
Numeracy Std<=3 0.1024195 0.1588129 0.64 0.519 -0.208848 0.4136871
[Nearest Matching: N=4] Coef. Std. Error z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]
Kiswahili 0.0630791 0.0774228 0.81 0.415 -0.088667 0.2148249
English 0.0715681 0.0678459 1.05 0.291 -0.061408 0.2045436
Numeracy 0.2328433 0.1235065 1.89 0.059 -0.009225 0.4749115
Kiswahili Std<=3 -0.032194 0.0920423 -0.35 0.727 -0.212594 0.1482054
English Std<=3 0.0131391 0.082894 0.16 0.874 -0.14933 0.1756083
Numeracy Std<=3 0.1024195 0.1588129 0.64 0.519 -0.208848 0.4136871
[Kernel Epanechnikov] Coef. Std. Error z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]
Kiswahili -0.003638 0.0534219 -0.07 0.946 -.1083428    .1010673
English 0.005942 0.0484326 0.12 0.902 -.0889843    .1008682
Numeracy 0.1304541 0.0911568 1.43 0.152 -.04821    .3091182
Kiswahili Std<=3 -0.055638 0.0663704 -0.84 0.402 -.1857211    .0744459
English Std<=3 -0.023244 0.0594192 -0.39 0.696 -.1397037    .0932153
Numeracy Std<=3 0.0627457 0.1130825 0.55 0.579 -.1588919    .2843833
[Kernel normal Matching] Coef. Std. Error z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]
Kiswahili 0.099094 0.0834914 1.19 0.235 -0.064546 0.2627341
English 0.1086848 0.0795895 1.37 0.172 -0.047308 0.2646774
Numeracy 0.2979102 0.1410998 2.11 0.035 0.0213597 0.5744607
Kiswahili Std<=3 -0.090576 0.1014663 -0.89 0.372 -0.289446 0.1082946
English Std<=3 0.0085987 0.0886113 0.1 0.923 -0.165076 0.1822737
Numeracy Std<=3 0.0266911 0.164207 0.16 0.871 -0.295149 0.348531
[Radious 0.05] Coef. Std. Error z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]
Kiswahili -0.007359 0.0489946 -0.15 0.881 -0.103387 0.0886686
English 0.003339 0.048436 0.07 0.945 -0.091594 0.0982719
Numeracy 0.125088 0.0897142 1.39 0.163 -0.050749 0.3009247
Kiswahili Std<=3 -0.05563 0.0689579 -0.81 0.42 -0.190784 0.0795254
English Std<=3 -0.022831 0.0643576 -0.35 0.723 -0.14897 0.1033076
Numeracy Std<=3 0.0599964 0.1143695 0.52 0.6 -0.164164 0.2841564
[Radius 0.1] Coef. Std. Error z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]
Kiswahili -0.032346 0.0476492 -0.68 0.497 -0.125737 0.0610445
English -0.02563 0.0446959 -0.57 0.566 -0.113232 0.0619727
Numeracy 0.0599805 0.0794656 0.75 0.45 -0.095769 0.2157303
Kiswahili Std<=3 -0.083115 0.066229 -1.25 0.209 -0.212921 0.046692
English Std<=3 -0.051569 0.0616157 -0.84 0.403 -0.172333 0.0691958
Numeracy Std<=3 0.0479331 0.1038951 0.46 0.645 -0.155697 0.2515637
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As it was briefly explained in the previous section showing the histogram of TOT, the treatment effect 
has differed greatly from school to school. In some schools, TOT is negative, while others present 
positive outcome. To analyze this heterogeneous effect on outcome, TOT will be regressed by the PTA 
teacher ratio. This estimation is to find if the magnitude of TOT for each treated school can be 
explained by the PTA teacher ratio. The following table 5 is only to report the estimated coefficient of 
PTA teacher ratio by different matching algorism. There are seven different matching algorisms used 
for the estimation of TOT and detailed estimation result is attached in Appendix 5. From table 7 to 20 
in Appendix 5, in column (1) is the result of TOT regressed merely by PTA teacher ratio. From column 
(2) to (7), it adds following variables to column (1) estimation as independent variables accordingly: 
column (2) village variables, column (3) education resource variables, column (4) average household 
socio economic characteristics for pupils variables, column (5) average pupil characteristics variables, 
column (6) average of age and age squared for pupils as well as log of pupils per classroom and pupil 
teacher ratio in school and lastly column (7) estimation includes one hundred twenty one district 
dummies.  
 
In summary of the result from table 7 to table 20, after column (5), controlling the household and pupil 
characteristics on school average, the estimated coefficient of PTA teacher ratio is always positive and 
significant effect to TOT. Also, as the number of variables becomes increased from column (1) to (6), 
it is observed that the magnitude of coefficient has become larger in all estimation result. This means 
that after controlling various factors which would affect TOT, the explanatory power of PTA teacher 
ratio has become more distinctive. However, once it adds one hundred twenty one district dummies in 
column (7), the statistical significance of PTA teacher ratio is observed only in the standard grade 
below three pupils except Kernel and Radius matching algorism. Only Kiswahili subject, it is 
consistently observed positive and significant in seven algorism. 
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Table 5 PTA teacher ratio coefficient 
 
It is natural that there is a difference in the statistical significance and magnitude of PTA teacher ratio 
between the school average and lower standard grade average of TOT, since it is said that PTA teacher 
tends to teach lower grade pupils where the largest enrolled pupils exist. In order to compensate the 
teacher shortage, PTA teachers are often assigned to teach lower standard grade pupils. In this sense, if 
effort level in teaching of PTA teachers is higher than those of ability level, then it should be more 
apparent in lower grade pupils test score. Therefore, the statistical significance and sign of PTA ratio is 
understandable. On the other hand, in terms of magnitude, for example if PTA teacher ratio increases 1 
percent, then the test score of Kiswahili is increased 0.0095 point, based on the result of nearest one to 
one neighbor matching. In spite the fact that the test score ranges from 1 to 5 in Kiswahili and the 
Kiswahili English Numeracy Kiswahili English Numeracy
Nearst Matching 1 to 1 matching
PTA teacher ratio 0.2722 0.3047 0.8297 0.955 0.6457 1.1477
[1.02] [1.22] [1.97]** [2.95]*** [2.11]** [1.97]**
Nearst Matching 1 to 2 matching
PTA teacher ratio 0.3061 0.2451 0.6752 0.9238 0.6316 1.0439
[1.47] [1.21] [1.88]* [3.28]*** [2.54]** [2.07]**
Nearst Matching 1 to 4 matching
PTA teacher ratio 0.3806 0.2939 0.7192 0.7149 0.4113 0.8392
[2.05]** [1.67]* [2.28]** [2.86]*** [1.82]* [1.90]*
Kernel Matching
PTA teacher ratio 0.2389 0.069 0.4182 0.5171 0.2319 0.6444
[1.57] [0.47] [1.60] [2.22]** [1.10] [1.56]
Kernel Normal
PTA teacher ratio 0.2722 0.6457 0.8297 0.955 0.6457 1.1477
[1.02] [2.11]** [1.97]** [2.95]*** [2.11]** [1.97]**
Radius 0.05
PTA teacher ratio 0.2229 0.0527 0.3838 0.4907 0.2065 0.612
[1.46] [0.36] [1.46] [2.11]** [0.98] [1.47]
Radius 0.1
PTA teacher ratio 0.1561 -0.0015 0.2639 0.4149 0.1865 0.5968
[1.03] [-0.01] [1.01] [1.78]* [0.89] [1.45]
All Grades Standard Grade below 3
Robust standard errors are used for estimation and the estimated t-values are in parentheses. *, **, and *** are indicated to show p-value
to reject null hypothesis with p<0.1, p<0.05, p<0.01 respectively.
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percentage of PTA ratio does not increase by 1 percent, rather it increases in larger percentage point by 
adding one PTA teacher, the magnitude of 0.009 point increase by PTA ratio one percent increase is 
relatively small. 
 
As for other control variables, the coefficient of log of pupil government teacher ratio is statistically 
significant and positive in column (7) for the nearest neighbor one to one, one to two and one to four 
matching as well as for kernel normal matching algorism as it shows in Appendix 5 table from 7 to 20. 
This is a counter intuitive sign, since the large number of pupils per one government teacher should 
negatively affect the test score of pupils. However, it is understandable, if the independent variable is 
TOT, not actual average test score of each school. TOT was estimated by matching with similar 
characteristics of controlled schools. Therefore, if the shortage of government teacher is serious, that is, 
the value of log of pupil government teacher ratio is large, and still there is no PTA teacher to 
compensate the shortage in control schools, that leads to assume that the value of TOT is likely to be 
large, since TOT is a test score difference between control and treated schools. On the other hand, if 
the shortage of government teacher is not serious, then TOT value is not assumed to be large. In this 
way, by the value of log of pupil government teacher ratio, the difference between the treated and 
controlled is likely to differ. As the value of log of pupil government teacher ratio becomes larger, the 
outcome difference between the treated and controlled schools would become larger.  
 
In order to confirm this finding, following section is to estimate the effect of PTA teacher ratio in 
shortage of teacher. If the interaction term of PTA teacher ratio and shortage of teacher dummy is 
positive and statistically significant, then it means that the PTA teacher ratio effect to TOT is more 
distinctive in those schools where teachers are short than those schools where sufficient teachers exist. 
The dummy variable of shortage of teacher is made by the log of pupil teacher ratio. If the pupil 
teacher ratio is higher than the average, the dummy takes 1 and otherwise, zero. 
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7.4 PTA teacher and their roles in primary schools 
Table 6 shows the coefficient of PTA teacher ratio and of interaction term as well as the result 
of joint test that the sum of total effect is zero. There are several findings from table 6. First, 
1) All the estimation result except Numeracy of lower standard grade pupils has showed that 
the interaction term of coefficient of PTA teacher ratio and Teacher shortage dummy is 
positive and significant. This is consistent through all estimated TOT by seven different 
matching algorisms.7 Moreover, 2) as for the coefficient of PTA teacher ratio, none of the 
estimation result has become negative and significant except radius 0.1 matching, after 
controlling the shortage of teachers. This means that PTA teacher ratio does not have 
negative effect on TOT, even in schools where teachers are sufficient. Third, 3) although it is 
not statistically significant, signs of some PTA teacher ratio coefficients are negative. However, 
based on the result of joint hypothesis test, the total effect of PTA teacher ratio to TOT is 
statistically different from zero with less than one percent significance, except Numeracy of 
lower standard grade pupils in. Even in Numeracy of lower standard grad pupils, TOT 
estimated by nearest matching and kernel normal matching algorisms are statistically 
different from zero with five percent significance. In this way, it can be inferred that PTA 
teacher ratio itself has positive effect on TOT without specifying type of schools.  
                                                   
7 Nearly the same finding was confirmed in the estimation of “government” teacher shortage. 
In the separate estimation, the interaction term of PTA teacher ratio and shortage of 
“government” teachers was replaced with the shortage of teachers. The finding is that in any 
cases, the interaction term is not negative and statistically significant. Also, even if the 
negative value of coefficient of interaction term was estimated, the joint test result rejects 
with the statistical significance the null hypothesis that sum of coefficient of PTA teacher 
ratio and the shortage of teacher is zero.  
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Table 6 
Kiswahili English Numeracy Kiswahili English Numeracy
Nearest Neighbor Matching (one to one)
PTA Ratio and Teacher shortage Dummy 0.9228 1.0117 1.5553 1.1075 0.9613 1.0575
[2.55]** [2.98]*** [2.76]*** [2.35]** [2.18]** [1.25]
PTA Teacher Ratio 0.2427 0.2617 0.6489 0.049 -0.0778 0.2947
[0.78] [0.89] [1.35] [0.13] [-0.21] [0.42]
Teacher shortage Dummy -0.1263 -0.1515 -0.238 -0.4069 -0.2945 -0.379
[-1.25] [-1.62] [-1.48] [-2.98]*** [-2.33]** [-1.57]
F statistics 20.22 27.72 27.63 11.84 7.69 4.55
P value (Ho: PTA Ratio+Interaction Term
=0)
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0006 0.0056 0.0331
PTA Ratio and Teacher shortage Dummy 1.1517 1.1854 1.6532 1.4304 1.3776 1.6069
[3.79]*** [4.09]*** [3.30]*** [3.50]*** [3.80]*** [2.19]**
PTA Teacher Ratio 0.0618 0.0315 0.4197 0.0096 -0.1258 0.0891
[0.26] [0.14] [1.00] [0.03] [-0.43] [0.14]
Teacher shortage Dummy -0.2053 -0.1931 -0.2383 -0.4113 -0.3306 -0.4057
[-2.46]** [-2.47]** [-1.74]* [-3.54]*** [-3.26]*** [-1.97]**
F statistics 27.78 31.65 30.23 24.37 22.5 10.29
P value (Ho: PTA Ratio+Interaction Term
=0)
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0014
Nearest Neighbor Matching (one to four) 
PTA Ratio and Teacher shortage Dummy 1.0816 1.088 1.6199 0.9924 1.1061 1.0643
[3.95]*** [4.28]*** [3.60]*** [2.75]*** [3.38]*** [1.67]*
PTA Teacher Ratio 0.0896 0.0334 0.3833 -0.0425 -0.2845 0.0883
[0.40] [0.16] [0.99] [-0.15] [-1.05] [0.16]
Teacher shortage Dummy -0.2119 -0.1942 -0.2639 -0.3237 -0.2866 -0.3143
[-2.76]*** [-2.77]*** [-2.10]** [-3.12]*** [-3.13]*** [-1.75]*
F statistics 35.14 38.86 35.52 14.23 12.67 6.4
P value (Ho: PTA Ratio+Interaction Term
=0)
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 0.0004 0.0115
Kernel Matching 
PTA Ratio and Teacher shortage Dummy 0.7672 0.7802 1.0017 0.9981 1.0058 0.5489
[3.57]*** [3.91]*** [2.74]*** [3.04]*** [3.40]*** [0.93]
PTA Teacher Ratio -0.1254 -0.2423 0.0173 -0.188 -0.3692 0.1258
[-0.70] [-1.45] [0.06] [-0.71] [-1.48] [0.25]
Teacher shortage Dummy -0.1933 -0.1729 -0.213 -0.3131 -0.2583 -0.2137
[-3.15]*** [-3.12]*** [-2.10]** [-3.37]*** [-3.13]*** [-1.31]
F statistics 17.85 16.26 13.77 11.62 9.11 2.67
P value (Ho: PTA Ratio+Interaction Term
=0)
0.0000 0.0001 0.0002 0.0007 0.0026 0.1028
PTA Ratio and Teacher shortage Dummy 0.9228 1.03 1.5553 1.1075 0.9613 1.0575
[2.55]** [2.22]** [2.76]*** [2.35]** [2.18]** [1.25]
PTA Teacher Ratio 0.2427 -0.0958 0.6489 0.049 -0.0778 0.2947
[0.78] [-0.25] [1.35] [0.13] [-0.21] [0.42]
Teacher shortage Dummy -0.1263 -0.3237 -0.238 -0.4069 -0.2945 -0.379
[-1.25] [-2.47]** [-1.48] [-2.98]*** [-2.33]** [-1.57]
F statistics 20.02 27.72 7.47 11.84 7.69 4.55
P value (Ho: PTA Ratio+Interaction Term
=0)
0.0000 0.0000 0.0064 0.0006 0.0056 0.0331
PTA Ratio and Teacher shortage Dummy 0.671 0.7118 0.8611 0.8999 1.0065 0.5085
[3.14]*** [3.59]*** [2.38]** [2.75]*** [3.42]*** [0.86]
PTA Teacher Ratio -0.2595 -0.3653 -0.265 -0.3227 -0.4457 0.1216
[-1.46] [-2.21]** [-0.88] [-1.23] [-1.80]* [0.24]
Teacher shortage Dummy -0.196 -0.18 -0.2364 -0.3199 -0.2731 -0.2112
[-3.20]*** [-3.24]*** [-2.34]** [-3.46]*** [-3.33]*** [-1.30]
F statistics 7.35 5.45 5.77 5.81 7.03 2.34
P value (Ho: PTA Ratio+Interaction Term
=0)
0.0068 0.0197 0.0165 0.0161 0.0081 0.1265
Radius (0.05) Matching
PTA Ratio and Teacher shortage Dummy 0.7223 0.7331 0.9182 0.9939 0.9805 0.4886
[3.37]*** [3.68]*** [2.51]** [3.05]*** [3.33]*** [0.82]
PTA Teacher Ratio -0.1404 -0.2541 -0.0122 -0.2027 -0.3767 0.1113
[-0.78] [-1.52] [-0.04] [-0.77] [-1.52] [0.22]
Teacher shortage Dummy -0.1877 -0.1658 -0.2025 -0.3106 -0.2515 -0.205
[-3.06]*** [-2.98]*** [-2.00]** [-3.36]*** [-3.06]*** [-1.26]
F statistics 14.97 12.78 11.11 11.13 8.25 2.1
P value (Ho: PTA Ratio+Interaction Term
=0)
0.0001 0.0004 0.0009 0.0009 0.0041 0.1478
All Grades Standard Grade below 3
Nearest Neighbor Matching (one to two)
Kernel Normal Matching
Radius (0.1) Matching
Robust standard errors are used for estimation and the estimated t-values are in parentheses. *, **, and *** are indicated to show p-value to reject null
hypothesis with p<0.1, p<0.05, p<0.01 respectively.
- 28 - 
 
8. Policy Implication and for further analysis 
Based on the above result, the policy implication is summarized as below: 
1. The empirical result of this paper supports that the impact of at least one PTA teacher exists in 
school is effective to the test score in Numeracy for all grade pupils, however in other subject, in 
English and Kiswahili, the impact is not statistically different from zero. Also, the magnitude of 
TOT in Numeracy is relatively small and 95% confidence interval includes the negative value of 
TOT. Therefore, though the subject of Numeracy is exceptional, this is rather consistent result 
from the Sundaraman et al. (2010) which uses the observational data, concluding that it cannot 
reject the null hypothesis that the PTA teacher effect to the school outcome is the same as 
governmentally hired teacher effect on test score.  
2. On the other hand, after being matched with seven different matching criteria, the PTA teacher 
ratio effect on TOT, difference of test score between the treated and matched none treated schools 
is statistically significant in the lower grade in all three subjects on average. This result is 
intuitively understandable, for younger grade pupils tend to be taught by PTA teachers in Kenya 
public primary schools. The largest number of enrolled pupils is the pupil in the first grade. 
Therefore, to tackle with the large number of pupils, PTA teachers tend to teach lower grads. If 
there should be positive effect of PTA teacher ratio on outcomes, it should be found in the 
education outcome of lower grade pupils.  
3. Regarding the implication of the finding, although the higher PTA teacher ratio has statistically 
significant explanatory power to TOT in lower grades, it does not mean that all teachers have to be 
replaced with PTA teachers. Rather, this result leads an important implication that government 
hired teachers need to put more efforts on teaching, since the result of estimation shows that if 
pupils are in lower grades, the ratio of government teacher should be less than PTA teacher, though 
they are paid better and “certified” by the national education system. This result is well reflecting 
one of the problems that Kenya public primary schools have faced. It is often criticized that the 
primary education is so much oriented toward the entrance exam of secondary school and the 
score of final exams at the 8
th
 grade for which many governmental primary school teachers have 
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put the highest priority in teaching higher grade pupils in the school (Ito et al. 2011). Results on 
the national primary school leaving exam (KCPE) determine what secondary schools, if any, 
enroll graduating primary school students, and this is one of the highest concerns of headmaster of 
primary schools (Glewwe et al. 2010). However teaching in younger grade should not be 
substituted because of following reasons, therefore the well-designed mechanism for government 
teachers to be motivated for making as much efforts as PTA teachers do is necessary. 
4. First, it is because of the repetition rate and dropout rate. They are both high in rural primary 
schools in Kenya, especially for those pupils who do not attend the nursery schools before 
entering the primary schools. This is partly because those pupils without going to nursery schools 
could not catch up with school learning in the middle of grades. This is also one of the reasons 
why there is a high correlation found between dropout pupils and pupils who had not enrolled in 
nursery schools. In this sense, for those pupils still in the lower grades, it is crucial for them to 
learn better, especially where the school is located in disadvantaged area in terms of educational 
resources and living infrastructure.  
5. Also, it is pointed out that after the FPE policy, number of enrolled pupils who had not been able 
to come to school has newly joined schools. Therefore that leads parents with higher preferences 
on education decided to leave public primary schools to join private ones, since they worried 
about the deteriorated education quality with those pupils who had never been enrolled in schools 
(Sasaoka 2007). From these facts, it is essential to control the education quality, even after the FPE 
has been introduced. Otherwise, the FPE policy is going to create another disparity between 
household which could afford to access better quality of education and those who do not.  
6. Concerning the background mechanisms why PTA teacher ratio has positive effect on TOT, it 
cannot be determined solely. However, it is partly because teaching in lower grades does not need 
high pedagogical input; rather other factors are more important. For example, Banerjee et al. 
(2010) shows that village volunteer teachers who were only trained by a week training of 
pedagogical technique for basic reading skills, those volunteer teachers have effectively increased 
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1.7 percent more likely to read at least letters for those who had not been able to read. This shows 
that not only the pedagogical technique, rather other factors effect on raising score in the early 
time of learning.  
7. For further study, it requires not only to find the mechanism for PTA teacher to maintain the 
incentive to teach, rather it is also essential to search better institutional mechanism for 
government teachers to have better incentive. 
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Appendix 1 Chart of Preceding Studies 
The Quantitative Analysis of Impact of locally hired contract teachers 
Author Year Country 
(Area) 
Data Outcome Variable of Interest Identification 
Strategy 
Control Variables Result 
Duflo et al. 
(2012) 
2005- 
2006 
Kenya, 
Western 
Province 
Experimental 
Data 
End line Test 
Score for 
Grade one for 
subject of 
Math, 
Literacy and 
Total score 
Treatment Dummy (If PTA 
teacher is assigned or not)  
Ordinary Least 
Squares Estimation 
 No control 
Variables 
 School size, Share 
of female among 
TSC teacher, Girl, 
Age, Baseline Test 
Score 
1) With control or without control variables, Treatment 
Dummy in Math and total score is statistically significant 
with 1 percent and in Literacy; it is statistically significant 5 
percent. 
2) After one year, the statistical significance fell down to 10 
percent in Total score and Literacy and it vanished in Math.  
Bold et al. 
(2012) 
2010  Kenya, 
eight 
Provinces 
Experimental 
Data 
End line Test 
Score for 
Grade one, 
two and three 
pupils for 
combined 
total score 
 Treatment Dummy (If PTA 
teacher is assigned or not) 
 Month (Length) of 
Treatment 
Ordinary Least 
Squares 
Estimation 
 
Instrument Variable 
Estimation 
 No Control 
Variables 
 Baseline Score 
 School Fixed 
Effect 
1) Without control Variable, Treatment Dummy and Length of 
Treatment become statistically significant with 10 percent.  
2) By adding baseline score, the Treatment Dummy and 
length of Treatment becomes positive and 5 percent 
significant. 
3) In School Fixed Effect, the Treatment Dummy and Months 
of Treatment are both positive and statistically significant 
with 5 percent on outcome.  
Sundarama
n et al. 
(2010) 
2005- 
2006 
India (AP 
state) 
Experimental 
Data 
End line Test 
Score from 
Grade one to 
five in 
Numeracy, 
Language and 
Combined 
score 
 Treatment Dummy (If 
contract teacher is assigned 
or not 
Ordinary Least 
Squares Estimation 
 No Control 
Variables  
 Household, School 
and Pupil 
characteristics  
1) Compared to the baseline score, the Treatment dummy is 
statistically significant with 1percent for Numeracy, 
Literacy and Combined tests with or without controlled 
variable. 
Observational 
Data 
 Treatment Dummy (If 
Contract teacher exist or 
not) 
Panel School Fixed 
Level  
 School Fixed 
Level 
 Household level 
and classroom 
level controls 
1) Without any control variables in school level fixed effects, 
or with all control variables in school fixed effects, in either 
case, the null hypothesis that difference between contract 
teacher and regular teacher is zero cannot be rejected  
 Treatment Dummy (if pupil 
is taught by Contract 
teacher or not) 
Panel Pupil Fixed 
Level 
 Pupil Fixed Level 
 
1) Without any control variables, with pupil level fixed 
effects, with pupil fixed effects and all control variables, 
the null hypothesis that difference between contract teacher 
and regular teacher is zero cannot be rejected 
Bourdon, J. 
et al. (2006) 
2000- 
2001 
Niger Observational 
Data 
(PASEC data) 
Outcome is 
test score of 
Math and 
French 
 Treatment effect on treated 
by estimating the average 
difference between classes 
taught by contract teacher 
and classes by regular 
teacher, conditioned that 
conditional independence 
holds true. 
Propensity score 
matching (classes 
taught by contract 
teachers and taught 
by regular teachers) 
 1) In grade 5th, the difference between the score of classes 
with a contract teacher with counterfactual outcome of the 
same classes is positive and significant for French, Math 
and Combined test score. The author concludes that 
contract teacher program is positive for grade 5.  
2) On the hand, in the second grade, the difference is not 
statistically significant in any of subjects. 
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Appendix 2 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Dependent Variables
Average Test Score of Kiswahili 2216 3.958214 0.712659 1 5
Average Test Score of English 2216 3.926845 0.692587 1 5
Average Test Score of Numeracy 2216 6.319342 1.151761 1 8
Independent Variables
Household and Individual Characteristics
Total Number of family (School average) 2216 6.726254 2.331877 2 85
Sex of Household Head (School average, 1 is Male) 2216 0.789774 0.27704 0 1
Type of House(School average, 1 is the lowest quality and 5 is the finest quality) 2216 2.283702 1.400782 1 5
Possession of telephone (School average, Dummy) 2216 0.651886 0.314935 0 1
Number of meal in one day (School average) 2216 2.73166 0.409718 1 3
Age (School average) 2216 10.81903 1.346922 6 16
Age square (School average) 2216 125.3273 29.31611 36 256
Boy (School average, Dummy) 2216 0.510334 0.210786 0 1
Mother Age (School average) 2216 36.25552 4.857104 20 72
Mother Education History (School average, Dummy 1 if graduated of primary) 2216 0.806514 0.321416 0 1
Grade in School (School average) 2216 4.359844 1.192257 1 11.5
Parents paid tuition (School average, Dummy) 2216 0.433179 0.367398 0 1
School Characteristics
Supplement for school material is available  at classroom (Dummy) 2216 0.762184 0.425842 0 1
Classroom is suitable for learning (Dummy) 2216 0.672383 0.46945 0 1
School is fenced (Dummy) 2216 0.671931 0.469616 0 1
PTA Teacher Dummy (At least one PTA teacher exist in school) 2216 0.813177 0.389857 0 1
PTA Teacher ratio 2216 0.190611 0.152874 0 0.857143
Log Pupil Teacher Ratio for TSC teacher 2216 3.773858 0.460016 2.371578 6.539586
Log Pupils per classroom 2216 3.644802 0.400623 1.904238 6.263398
Village Characteristics and District Dummy
Electricity Infra is available in village (Dummy) 2216 0.427347 0.494805 0 1
Road is tarmac in village (Dummy) 2216 0.14982 0.356975 0 1
Percent of Unemployment (District Level) 2216 0.06072 0.051004 0.010581 0.403876
Level of Unemployment rate (1 is the lowest and 4 is the highest) 2216 2.374097 1.089841 1 4
Province Dummy (Central Province) 2216 0.111913 0.315331 0 1
Province Dummy (Coast Province) 2216 0.081227 0.273246 0 1
Province Dummy (Eastern Province) 2216 0.192238 0.394148 0 1
Province Dummy (Nairobi Province) 2216 0.000903 0.030035 0 1
Province Dummy (North Eastern Province) 2216 0.056408 0.23076 0 1
Province Dummy (Nyanza Province) 2216 0.102437 0.30329 0 1
Province Dummy (Rift Valley Province) 2216 0.319495 0.466386 0 1
Province Dummy (Western Province) 2216 0.135379 0.342205 0 1
Descriptive Statistics for School Level Estimation
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Descriptive Statistics in Common support samples for school average of all grade pupils
H0: Diff=0
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. (P-value)
Dependent Variables
Average Test Score of Kiswahili 1887 3.965652 0.7120691 1494 3.949017 0.7104351 393 4.028894 0.7156284 0.0478
Average Test Score of English 1887 3.932993 0.6921375 1494 3.916178 0.6868616 393 3.996919 0.709092 0.0396
Average Test Score of Numeracy 1887 6.330878 1.152425 1494 6.331772 1.129941 393 6.327476 1.235683 0.9476
Independent Variables
Household and Individual Characteristics
Total Number of family (School average) 1887 6.660244 1.657696 1494 6.704518 1.657934 393 6.491936 1.648056 0.0237
Sex of Household Head (School average, 1 is Male) 1887 0.7865646 0.2800994 1494 0.7891543 0.273554 393 0.7767199 0.3038674 0.4337
Type of House(School average, 1 is the lowest quality and 5 is the finest quality) 1887 2.294128 1.396627 1494 2.261457 1.379914 393 2.418326 1.453531 0.0475
Possession of telephone (School average, Dummy) 1887 0.6531852 0.3169442 1494 0.6509788 0.3136704 393 0.6615729 0.3293685 0.5556
Number of meal in one day (School average) 1887 2.72451 0.4167904 1494 2.728774 0.4136835 393 2.708302 0.4285461 0.3864
Age (School average) 1887 10.81892 1.34425 1494 10.84613 1.329278 393 10.71548 1.39661 0.0865
Age square (School average) 1887 125.3029 29.31103 1494 125.8955 29.02604 393 123.0502 30.30221 0.0868
Boy (School average, Dummy) 1887 0.5078172 0.2130589 1494 0.5114376 0.2084027 393 0.4940544 0.229661 0.1501
Mother Age (School average) 1887 36.25061 4.769957 1494 36.26247 4.792234 393 36.20555 4.690057 0.8333
Mother Education History (School average, Dummy 1 if graduated of primary) 1887 0.7985971 0.3283746 1494 0.801531 0.3259465 393 0.787444 0.3376368 0.4494
Grade in School (School average) 1887 4.355303 1.177131 1494 4.361513 1.169916 393 4.331696 1.205389 0.6551
Parents paid tuition (School average, Dummy) 1887 0.4344641 0.3705932 1494 0.441563 0.3650651 393 0.4074774 0.3902008 0.1047
School Characteristics
Supplement for school material is available  at classroom (Dummy) 1887 0.7657658 0.4236315 1494 0.7389558 0.439351 393 0.8676845 0.3392654 0.0000
Classroom is suitable for learning (Dummy) 1887 0.6645469 0.4722738 1494 0.6532798 0.4760851 393 0.7073791 0.4555458 0.0433
School is fenced (Dummy) 1887 0.6693164 0.470584 1494 0.6740295 0.4688933 393 0.6513995 0.4771347 0.3964
PTA Teacher Dummy (At least one PTA teacher exist in school) 1887 0.7917329 0.4061765 1494 1 0 393 0 0 n/a
PTA Teacher ratio 1887 0.180955 0.1526263 1494 0.2285557 0.1361614 393 0 0 n/a
Log Pupil Teacher Ratio for TSC teacher 1887 3.758036 0.4572262 1494 3.801277 0.4459378 393 3.593656 0.462822 0.0000
Log Pupils per classroom 1887 3.639635 0.4082227 1494 3.642761 0.3963924 393 3.627751 0.4507172 0.5167
Village Characteristics and District Dummy
Electricity Infra is available in village (Dummy) 1887 0.427663 0.4948708 1494 0.4056225 0.4911765 393 0.5114504 0.5005061 0.0002
Road is tarmac in village (Dummy) 1887 0.154213 0.3612486 1494 0.1419009 0.3490653 393 0.2010178 0.4012722 0.0039
Percent of Unemployment (District Level) 1887 0.0605733 0.0482161 1494 0.0580445 0.0461341 393 0.0701865 0.054423 0.0000
Level of Unemployment rate (1 is the lowest and 4 is the highest) 1887 2.355591 1.10585 1494 2.292503 1.091027 393 2.59542 1.130143 0.0000
All schools Treated Schools Controlled Schools
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Descriptive Statistics in Common support samples for Standard grade below three
H0: Diff=0
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. (P-value)
Dependent Variables
Average Test Score of Kiswahili 1720 2.952054 0.8969595 1371 2.91174 0.8914024 349 3.110423 0.9024505 0.0002
Average Test Score of English 1720 2.919097 0.8275752 1371 2.882853 0.8144723 349 3.061475 0.8637394 0.0003
Average Test Score of Numeracy 1720 4.694302 1.516378 1371 4.671458 1.503788 349 4.78404 1.563829 0.2157
Independent Variables
Household and Individual Characteristics
Total Number of family (School average) 1720 6.596458 1.780762 1371 6.630485 1.787954 349 6.462787 1.748346 0.1163
Sex of Household Head (School average, 1 is Male) 1720 0.7917327 0.3022176 1371 0.7955257 0.2928241 349 0.7768321 0.3366352 0.3024
Type of House(School average, 1 is the lowest quality and 5 is the finest quality) 1720 2.197293 1.434143 1371 2.169003 1.427705 349 2.308429 1.455908 0.1049
Possession of telephone (School average, Dummy) 1720 0.6367892 0.3526677 1371 0.6334648 0.3499144 349 0.6498489 0.3635006 0.4386
Number of meal in one day (School average) 1720 2.715625 0.4447905 1371 2.720163 0.4429728 349 2.6978 0.4520616 0.4019
Age (School average) 1720 8.326783 1.209341 1371 8.337125 1.195061 349 8.286156 1.264831 0.4822
Age square (School average) 1720 72.91323 22.64777 1371 73.03283 22.29828 349 72.44339 23.9991 0.6644
Boy (School average, Dummy) 1720 0.5201871 0.2934888 1371 0.525176 0.2913417 349 0.5005891 0.3014022 0.1624
Mother Age (School average) 1720 34.25272 5.504335 1371 34.32356 5.557959 349 33.97441 5.286964 0.2902
Mother Education History (School average, Dummy 1 if graduated of primary) 1720 0.7983608 0.3398301 1371 0.7993519 0.3401934 349 0.7944675 0.3388582 0.8106
Grade in School (School average) 1720 2.050793 0.4647443 1371 2.056746 0.449175 349 2.027408 0.5214757 0.2925
Parents paid tuition (School average, Dummy) 1720 0.2660371 0.3787845 1371 0.2643525 0.3741058 349 0.2726548 0.3971173 0.7148
School Characteristics
Supplement for school material is available  at classroom (Dummy) 1720 0.7622093 0.4258541 1371 0.7374179 0.4401977 349 0.8595989 0.3479015 0.0000
Classroom is suitable for learning (Dummy) 1720 0.6616279 0.4732934 1371 0.6491612 0.4774067 349 0.7106017 0.4541342 0.0303
School is fenced (Dummy) 1720 0.6668605 0.471473 1371 0.6725018 0.4694719 349 0.6446991 0.4792915 0.3255
PTA Teacher Dummy (At least one PTA teacher exist in school) 1720 0.797093 0.4022808 1371 1 0 349 0 0 n/a
PTA Teacher ratio 1720 0.1847168 0.1533508 1371 0.2317381 0.1363912 349 0 0 n/a
Log Pupil Teacher Ratio for TSC teacher 1720 3.76627 0.458448 1371 3.809041 0.4461851 349 3.598252 0.4679027 0.0000
Log Pupils per classroom 1720 3.635846 0.4045139 1371 3.639205 0.3927561 349 3.622648 0.4480921 0.495
Village Characteristics and District Dummy
Electricity Infra is available in village (Dummy) 1720 0.4145349 0.4927848 1371 0.3924143 0.4884663 349 0.5014327 0.5007158 0.0002
Road is tarmac in village (Dummy) 1720 0.1494186 0.3566043 1371 0.134938 0.341782 349 0.2063037 0.4052321 0.0008
Percent of Unemployment (District Level) 1720 0.0609334 0.04887 1371 0.058783 0.0472281 349 0.0693809 0.0540972 0.0003
Level of Unemployment rate (1 is the lowest and 4 is the highest) 1720 2.361628 1.099756 1371 2.307805 1.084767 349 2.573066 1.133841 0.0001
All schools Treated Schools Controlled Schools
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Appendix 3 Figures  
 
Figure 4  Pupil TSC teacher ratio 
  
Figure 5  Log of Pupil TSC teacher ratio 
 
  
Figure 6 Pupil per class 
  
Figure 7 Log of Pupil per class size 
 
 
 
Figure 9 Propensity Score Distribution for 
Treated Group for Kiswahili for all grades 
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Figure 8 Propensity Score Distribution for Controlled 
Group for Kiswahili for all grades 
Figure 10 Propensity Score Distribution for 
Controlled Group for English grade below 3 
Figure 11 Propensity Score Distribution for 
Treated Group for English grade below 3 
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Appendix 4 Probit Model Estimation Result 
 
Independent Variable is PTA Teacher Dummy (0 or 1)
All grades Std <=3
Electricity Infra is available in village (Dummy) -0.2191 -0.23
[-2.50]** [-2.52]**
The road is tarmac in village (Dummy) -0.1389 -0.2117
[-1.32] [-1.90]*
Supplement for school material is available  at
classroom (Dummy)
-0.3598 -0.3285
[-3.56]*** [-3.18]***
Classroom is suitable for learning (Dummy) -0.0343 -0.0704
[-0.43] [-0.84]
School is fenced (Dummy) -0.0652 -0.0033
[-0.73] [-0.04]
Log Pupil Teacher Ratio for TSC teacher 0.7409 0.7768
[4.21]*** [4.21]***
Log Pupils per classroom -0.3049 -0.3334
[-2.36]** [-2.36]**
Total Number of family (School average) -0.0093 -0.009
[-0.37] [-0.40]
Sex of Household Head (School average, 1 is Male) 0.1371 0.1969
[0.95] [1.37]
Type of House(School average, 1 is lowest quality
and 5 is the finest quality)
-0.0429 -0.0001
[-1.12] [-0.00]
Possession of telephone (School average) 0.1101 0.0598
[0.74] [0.45]
Number of meal in one day (School average) 0.1283 0.1345
[1.24] [1.32]
Age (School average) 0.2754 0.2668
[1.14] [1.17]
Age square (School average) -0.0122 -0.015
[-1.10] [-1.28]
Boy (School average) 0.1857 0.1056
[1.14] [0.81]
Mother Age (School average) -0.0054 0.009
[-0.64] [1.20]
Mother Education History (School average) -0.1116 -0.1445
[-0.58] [-0.76]
Grade in School (School average) 0.0306 0.0566
[0.66] [0.63]
Parents paid tuition (School average) 0.0966 -0.0277
[0.79] [-0.25]
Constant -2.727 -2.8467
[-1.69]* [-1.98]**
Wald chi2(121)  =     313.79 Wald chi2(121)  =     301.93
Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 Prob > chi2     =     0.0000
Pseudo R2       =     0.1887 Pseudo R2       =     0.1984
N 1887 1720
Probit Estimation Reuslt
Robust standard errors are used for estimation and the estimated t-values are in parentheses. *, **, and *** are
indicated to show p-value to reject null hypothesis with p<0.1, p<0.05, p<0.01 respectively.
District Dummy is excluded from table, because it becomes long.
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Appendix 5 Regression Result Table 7  TOT (Nearest One to One Matching Estimation for school average) regressed on PTA teacher ratio 
Appendix 5 Estimation Result 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
PTA teacher ratio 0.4255 0.6372 0.6503 0.8627 1.2219 1.0604 0.2722 0.4006 0.614 0.6332 0.8428 1.203 0.9938 0.3047 0.9594 1.2884 1.2814 1.6972 2.2385 2.0143 0.8297
[2.01]** [2.95]*** [2.98]*** [3.82]*** [6.12]*** [4.72]*** [1.02] [1.97]** [2.98]*** [3.04]*** [3.92]*** [6.36]*** [4.62]*** [1.22] [2.91]*** [3.84]*** [3.78]*** [4.95]*** [7.12]*** [5.74]*** [1.97]**
Electricity infra is available in
village
0.1205 0.1215 0.0394 -0.002 -0.0032 -0.0276 0.1171 0.1162 0.0237 -0.0138 -0.0153 -0.056 0.1041 0.1088 -0.0391 -0.1095 -0.1112 -0.1658
[2.17]** [2.18]** [0.71] [-0.04] [-0.06] [-0.50] [2.18]** [2.15]** [0.44] [-0.28] [-0.32] [-1.08] [1.17] [1.22] [-0.44] [-1.33] [-1.35] [-1.85]*
The road is tarnac in village 0.0439 0.0433 -0.0171 -0.0156 -0.0131 -0.0796 0.0539 0.0523 -0.0172 -0.0101 -0.0068 -0.0816 0.0299 0.0333 -0.0616 -0.0463 -0.0428 -0.1029
[0.61] [0.60] [-0.23] [-0.24] [-0.20] [-1.16] [0.76] [0.74] [-0.24] [-0.16] [-0.11] [-1.25] [0.26] [0.29] [-0.52] [-0.43] [-0.40] [-0.86]
Unemployment Level (1-5) -0.0887 -0.0957 -0.0463 -0.0147 -0.0204 -0.1626 -0.0905 -0.0967 -0.0451 -0.0157 -0.023 -0.2613 -0.2252 -0.2328 -0.1426 -0.0847 -0.0926 -0.3418
[-3.65]*** [-3.89]*** [-1.75]* [-0.55] [-0.75] [-1.80]* [-3.86]*** [-4.07]*** [-1.77]* [-0.62] [-0.89] [-2.50]** [-5.73]*** [-5.86]*** [-3.35]*** [-1.92]* [-2.06]** [-1.95]*
Supplement for school material is
available at classroom (Dummy)
0.0402 -0.0256 0.0001 0.005 -0.0875 0.0579 -0.0151 0.0112 0.0176 -0.0773 -0.0548 -0.1382 -0.0766 -0.0698 -0.1848
[0.64] [-0.41] [0.00] [0.09] [-1.52] [0.95] [-0.25] [0.21] [0.32] [-1.40] [-0.56] [-1.42] [-0.84] [-0.77] [-1.90]*
Classroom is suitable for learning
(Dummy)
0.068 0.0669 0.0256 0.0274 0.0471 0.0578 0.0519 0.0092 0.0116 0.0246 0.143 0.1505 0.0875 0.09 0.1052
[1.23] [1.22] [0.52] [0.56] [0.95] [1.09] [0.99] [0.20] [0.25] [0.53] [1.59] [1.69]* [1.08] [1.11] [1.27]
School is fenced (Dummy) -0.0647 -0.0811 -0.1153 -0.1207 -0.1222 -0.0523 -0.0715 -0.1015 -0.1086 -0.1142 -0.0804 -0.1153 -0.155 -0.1626 -0.1833
[-1.11] [-1.40] [-2.19]** [-2.30]** [-2.22]** [-0.93] [-1.28] [-2.01]** [-2.16]** [-2.18]** [-0.87] [-1.26] [-1.82]* [-1.91]* [-2.01]**
Total Number of famly (School
average)
0.0087 0.0037 -0.0002 -0.005 -0.0109 -0.0193 -0.0244 -0.0275 0.0139 -0.0002 -0.0056 -0.02
[0.54] [0.25] [-0.01] [-0.32] [-0.66] [-1.22] [-1.52] [-1.70]* [0.53] [-0.01] [-0.23] [-0.77]
Sex if Household Head (School
average, 1 is Male)
0.1343 0.1018 0.1051 0.2146 0.1065 0.0759 0.0802 0.2059 0.29 0.2525 0.2571 0.4303
[1.25] [1.07] [1.11] [2.21]** [1.05] [0.87] [0.92] [2.25]** [1.82]* [1.76]* [1.80]* [2.74]***
Type of House (School average,
1 is lowest quality and 5 is the
finest quality)
0.1124 0.075 0.0781 0.0578 0.1166 0.0822 0.0862 0.071 0.1368 0.0873 0.0916 0.0673
[5.59]*** [3.99]*** [4.13]*** [2.12]** [5.97]*** [4.52]*** [4.71]*** [2.76]*** [4.15]*** [2.77]*** [2.88]*** [1.46]
Possession of telepohne (School
average)
0.2084 0.0807 0.0855 0.0915 0.2289 0.1071 0.1134 0.1058 0.6257 0.3858 0.3926 0.3508
[1.99]** [0.83] [0.89] [0.92] [2.31]** [1.17] [1.24] [1.16] [3.93]*** [2.57]** [2.61]*** [2.26]**
Number of meal in one day
(School average)
0.0795 0.0266 0.0306 0.0764 0.0682 0.013 0.0182 0.0571 0.0866 0.0059 0.0115 0.1002
[1.19] [0.45] [0.52] [1.17] [0.99] [0.22] [0.31] [0.90] [0.82] [0.06] [0.12] [0.94]
Age (School average) 1.0803 1.079 1.0423 0.9505 0.9488 0.9112 1.9581 1.9563 1.9225
[6.03]*** [6.00]*** [5.87]*** [5.34]*** [5.29]*** [5.19]*** [6.74]*** [6.70]*** [6.56]***
Age Square (School average) -0.0459 -0.046 -0.0445 -0.0395 -0.0395 -0.0374 -0.0826 -0.0827 -0.0805
[-5.81]*** [-5.79]*** [-5.60]*** [-5.02]*** [-4.99]*** [-4.74]*** [-6.35]*** [-6.34]*** [-6.10]***
Boy (School average) 0.067 0.0737 0.092 -0.0837 -0.075 -0.0909 0.0115 0.0208 0.0203
[0.52] [0.57] [0.72] [-0.68] [-0.60] [-0.77] [0.06] [0.10] [0.10]
Mother Age (School average) -0.0049 -0.0046 0.0024 -0.0025 -0.0022 0.0039 0.0034 0.0038 0.0103
[-0.91] [-0.86] [0.45] [-0.48] [-0.41] [0.75] [0.37] [0.42] [1.12]
Mother Education History (School
average)
0.0001 0.0036 -0.026 0.0015 0.0061 0.0321 0.1353 0.1402 0.032
[0.00] [0.04] [-0.20] [0.02] [0.06] [0.25] [0.78] [0.80] [0.14]
Grade in School (School average) 0.2719 0.2741 0.2693 0.262 0.2648 0.25 0.3329 0.3359 0.3434
[7.33]*** [7.32]*** [7.26]*** [7.50]*** [7.48]*** [7.33]*** [5.64]*** [5.64]*** [5.60]***
Parents paid tuition (School
average)
0.2323 0.2324 0.2092 0.1968 0.1969 0.1949 0.3509 0.3511 0.2738
[3.21]*** [3.21]*** [2.55]** [2.80]*** [2.81]*** [2.49]** [2.99]*** [2.99]*** [2.05]**
Log Pupil Teacher Ratio for TSC
teacher
0.1185 0.263 0.1535 0.2832 0.1645 0.3663
[1.79]* [3.45]*** [2.45]** [4.01]*** [1.52] [2.96]***
Constant 0.0018 0.1016 0.0838 -0.7465 -7.5625 -7.9666 -8.1744 0.0171 0.1207 0.0857 -0.5717 -6.727 -7.2506 -7.279 0.0786 0.4733 0.4912 -0.9323 -13.2135 -13.7746 -14.5351
[0.03] [1.19] [0.74] [-2.79]*** [-7.82]*** [-8.17]*** [-7.95]*** [0.34] [1.47] [0.79] [-2.11]** [-6.98]*** [-7.40]*** [-7.03]*** [0.96] [3.63]*** [2.82]*** [-2.31]** [-8.52]*** [-8.73]*** [-8.32]***
R-squared 0.0033 0.0181 0.0201 0.0525 0.2375 0.2394 0.3594 0.0031 0.0193 0.0213 0.0586 0.2492 0.2527 0.3785 0.0064 0.0312 0.0333 0.0679 0.2255 0.227 0.3268
Adj-R-squared 0.0027 0.0155 0.0155 0.0448 0.2277 0.2291 0.3029 0.0025 0.0167 0.0167 0.051 0.2395 0.2425 0.3237 0.0057 0.0286 0.0287 0.0603 0.2156 0.2165 0.2674
N 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494
Kiswahili for All Standard Grades English for All Standard Grades Numeracy for All Standard Grades
Robust standard errors are used for estimation and the estimated t-values are in parentheses. *, **, and *** are indicated to show p-value to reject null hypothesis with p<0.1, p<0.05, p<0.01 respectively.
District Dummy is excluded from table, because it becomes long.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
PTA teacher ratio 0.0396 0.336 0.3966 0.5201 0.5695 0.8853 0.955 -0.0472 0.2258 0.2707 0.3745 0.4191 0.6525 0.6457 0.2983 0.8036 0.8696 1.0975 1.1839 1.6111 1.1477
[0.18] [1.49] [1.75]* [2.24]** [2.42]** [3.35]*** [2.95]*** [-0.23] [1.03] [1.23] [1.66]* [1.84]* [2.59]*** [2.11]** [0.75] [1.92]* [2.05]** [2.54]** [2.69]*** [3.35]*** [1.97]**
Electricity infra is available in
village
0.3492 0.3372 0.2756 0.2552 0.2605 0.1515 0.311 0.3057 0.2393 0.2211 0.225 0.1193 0.3569 0.3376 0.23 0.1952 0.2024 0.1177
[4.86]*** [4.66]*** [3.68]*** [3.39]*** [3.47]*** [1.92]* [4.58]*** [4.45]*** [3.39]*** [3.11]*** [3.17]*** [1.63] [2.93]*** [2.76]*** [1.83]* [1.55] [1.60] [0.84]
The road is tarnac in village -0.0535 -0.0588 -0.1032 -0.1013 -0.1082 -0.149 -0.0722 -0.0751 -0.1247 -0.1189 -0.124 -0.1967 0.086 0.0787 0.0128 0.0378 0.0285 -0.0693
[-0.53] [-0.58] [-1.03] [-1.01] [-1.08] [-1.41] [-0.72] [-0.76] [-1.27] [-1.20] [-1.25] [-1.89]* [0.50] [0.46] [0.08] [0.22] [0.17] [-0.37]
Unemployment Level (1-5) -0.0005 -0.006 0.0299 0.0321 0.0428 0.0142 -0.0165 -0.0251 0.0061 0.0027 0.0105 0.0013 -0.1685 -0.168 -0.1191 -0.1176 -0.1032 0.283
[-0.02] [-0.20] [0.87] [0.86] [1.14] [0.13] [-0.58] [-0.85] [0.19] [0.08] [0.30] [0.02] [-3.26]*** [-3.13]*** [-2.03]** [-1.83]* [-1.60] [1.23]
Supplement for school material is
available at classroom (Dummy)
0.1869 0.1371 0.1297 0.1213 0.0503 0.156 0.1069 0.1004 0.0942 0.0259 0.1352 0.089 0.1271 0.1157 0.0922
[2.62]*** [1.90]* [1.79]* [1.68]* [0.63] [2.31]** [1.56] [1.46] [1.37] [0.34] [1.09] [0.71] [1.00] [0.91] [0.65]
Classroom is suitable for learning
(Dummy)
0.067 0.0587 0.0459 0.0445 0.0521 0.062 0.0487 0.0353 0.0343 0.0439 0.1205 0.1112 0.0925 0.0906 0.0528
[1.02] [0.89] [0.70] [0.68] [0.75] [0.99] [0.78] [0.57] [0.56] [0.68] [1.05] [0.97] [0.80] [0.79] [0.43]
School is fenced (Dummy) -0.0221 -0.0436 -0.0629 -0.052 -0.0053 -0.0601 -0.0816 -0.0977 -0.0896 -0.0445 0.0451 0.0083 0.0082 0.0231 -0.035
[-0.30] [-0.60] [-0.86] [-0.71] [-0.07] [-0.88] [-1.19] [-1.42] [-1.31] [-0.60] [0.36] [0.07] [0.07] [0.18] [-0.25]
Total Number of famly (School
average)
-0.0408 -0.039 -0.0312 -0.0323 -0.0608 -0.0607 -0.0549 -0.0531 -0.0837 -0.0926 -0.082 -0.0906
[-2.05]** [-1.92]* [-1.54] [-1.52] [-3.21]*** [-3.11]*** [-2.81]*** [-2.51]** [-2.39]** [-2.57]** [-2.28]** [-2.30]**
Sex if Household Head (School
average, 1 is Male)
0.1226 0.1441 0.1368 0.1428 0.0515 0.0784 0.0729 0.1164 0.1521 0.2199 0.21 0.2253
[0.97] [1.14] [1.08] [1.04] [0.43] [0.65] [0.60] [0.89] [0.68] [0.98] [0.93] [0.88]
Type of House (School average,
1 is lowest quality and 5 is the
finest quality)
0.0657 0.0529 0.0472 0.0902 0.0545 0.0454 0.0411 0.0846 0.037 0.044 0.0362 0.1064
[2.47]** [1.93]* [1.73]* [2.22]** [2.19]** [1.77]* [1.60] [2.21]** [0.84] [0.97] [0.80] [1.64]
Possession of telepohne (School
average)
0.1633 0.1406 0.1269 0.1377 0.2109 0.1968 0.1867 0.1576 0.6095 0.5236 0.505 0.4688
[1.33] [1.10] [1.00] [1.00] [1.81]* [1.61] [1.53] [1.21] [2.89]*** [2.38]** [2.29]** [1.96]**
Number of meal in one day
(School average)
-0.0112 -0.0094 -0.0176 -0.0303 -0.0434 -0.0378 -0.0439 -0.0418 -0.1741 -0.1545 -0.1656 -0.2119
[-0.14] [-0.11] [-0.21] [-0.32] [-0.56] [-0.47] [-0.54] [-0.47] [-1.30] [-1.11] [-1.19] [-1.29]
Age (School average) 0.5652 0.5619 0.5048 0.5932 0.5908 0.626 1.7787 1.7744 1.7799
[2.30]** [2.30]** [2.04]** [2.47]** [2.48]** [2.61]*** [3.96]*** [3.96]*** [3.82]***
Age Square (School average) -0.0279 -0.0274 -0.0251 -0.0288 -0.0284 -0.0293 -0.0796 -0.079 -0.0791
[-2.43]** [-2.39]** [-2.17]** [-2.56]** [-2.54]** [-2.60]*** [-3.82]*** [-3.80]*** [-3.64]***
Boy (School average) 0.2352 0.2262 0.2459 0.1194 0.1127 0.0862 -0.0257 -0.0378 -0.0249
[1.31] [1.26] [1.30] [0.71] [0.67] [0.49] [-0.08] [-0.12] [-0.08]
Mother Age (School average) -0.0005 -0.0009 -0.0064 0.0008 0.0005 -0.0052 0.0134 0.0129 0.0059
[-0.06] [-0.11] [-0.77] [0.11] [0.07] [-0.66] [0.97] [0.94] [0.40]
Mother Education History (School
average)
-0.1615 -0.1661 -0.1159 -0.1908 -0.1943 -0.0833 -0.1105 -0.1168 -0.109
[-1.16] [-1.20] [-0.61] [-1.44] [-1.47] [-0.47] [-0.45] [-0.48] [-0.33]
Grade in School (School average) 0.1257 0.1175 0.1086 0.1169 0.1108 0.0867 0.029 0.0179 0.0474
[2.65]*** [2.48]** [2.16]** [2.55]** [2.43]** [1.81]* [0.34] [0.21] [0.53]
Parents paid tuition (School
average)
0.1603 0.1584 0.1391 0.1266 0.1252 0.1349 0.1092 0.1066 0.0553
[1.58] [1.57] [1.23] [1.29] [1.29] [1.25] [0.62] [0.61] [0.29]
Log Pupil Teacher Ratio for TSC
teacher
-0.2377 -0.1948 -0.1756 -0.1155 -0.3214 -0.1719
[-2.88]*** [-2.04]** [-2.23]** [-1.24] [-2.27]** [-1.03]
Constant -0.0998 -0.297 -0.4593 -0.5229 -3.6863 -2.8517 -2.7425 0.0195 -0.1179 -0.2209 0.0089 -3.2675 -2.651 -3.2667 -0.0424 0.0778 -0.1385 0.2604 -9.5827 -8.4539 -9.535
[-1.58] [-2.92]*** [-3.38]*** [-1.56] [-2.98]*** [-2.23]** [-2.05]** [0.33] [-1.20] [-1.67]* [0.03] [-2.67]*** [-2.11]** [-2.51]** [-0.39] [0.44] [-0.59] [0.47] [-4.11]*** [-3.53]*** [-3.63]***
R-squared 0 0.0187 0.0244 0.0358 0.0512 0.0569 0.1701 0 0.0173 0.0222 0.0377 0.0534 0.0568 0.1902 0.0004 0.0183 0.0203 0.0328 0.0495 0.053 0.1364
Adj-R-squared -0.0007 0.0158 0.0194 0.0273 0.0378 0.0429 0.0897 -0.0007 0.0144 0.0172 0.0292 0.0401 0.0429 0.1117 -0.0003 0.0154 0.0152 0.0243 0.0361 0.039 0.0527
N 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371
Kiswahili for All Standard Grades English for All Standard Grades Numeracy for All Standard Grades
Robust standard errors are used for estimation and the estimated t-values are in parentheses. *, **, and *** are indicated to show p-value to reject null hypothesis with p<0.1, p<0.05, p<0.01 respectively.
District Dummy is excluded from table, because it becomes long.
Table 8 TOT (Nearest One to One Matching Estimation for Lower standard grade below three) regressed on PTA teacher ratio 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
PTA teacher ratio 0.2793 0.4695 0.4819 0.6434 1.0197 0.9472 0.3061 0.2122 0.407 0.4222 0.5811 0.957 0.8444 0.2451 0.7843 1.0621 1.0446 1.3867 1.9378 1.811 0.6752
[1.50] [2.48]** [2.54]** [3.31]*** [6.22]*** [5.35]*** [1.47] [1.16] [2.20]** [2.27]** [3.07]*** [6.01]*** [4.89]*** [1.21] [2.59]*** [3.46]*** [3.39]*** [4.47]*** [7.05]*** [5.99]*** [1.88]*
Electricity infra is available in
village
0.1088 0.1038 0.0353 -0.0044 -0.0049 -0.0499 0.1125 0.1066 0.0257 -0.0111 -0.0119 -0.0679 0.0788 0.0783 -0.0568 -0.126 -0.1269 -0.1979
[2.28]** [2.16]** [0.72] [-0.10] [-0.11] [-1.13] [2.40]** [2.26]** [0.54] [-0.27] [-0.29] [-1.63] [1.03] [1.01] [-0.73] [-1.81]* [-1.82]* [-2.69]***
The road is tarnac in village 0.0377 0.0374 -0.0135 -0.0125 -0.0113 -0.0534 0.0439 0.0429 -0.0186 -0.0125 -0.0107 -0.0673 0.0061 0.011 -0.0772 -0.0628 -0.0608 -0.1189
[0.60] [0.59] [-0.21] [-0.23] [-0.21] [-0.97] [0.70] [0.69] [-0.30] [-0.24] [-0.20] [-1.25] [0.06] [0.11] [-0.77] [-0.72] [-0.69] [-1.24]
Unemployment Level (1-5) -0.0797 -0.0794 -0.0359 -0.0015 -0.004 0.2731 -0.0791 -0.0781 -0.0316 0.0006 -0.0033 0.1625 -0.2042 -0.2019 -0.1214 -0.0622 -0.0666 0.5129
[-3.84]*** [-3.78]*** [-1.57] [-0.07] [-0.18] [3.93]*** [-3.89]*** [-3.79]*** [-1.43] [0.03] [-0.16] [2.45]** [-5.98]*** [-5.83]*** [-3.29]*** [-1.68]* [-1.77]* [4.43]***
Supplement for school material is
available at classroom (Dummy)
-0.0066 -0.0624 -0.0378 -0.0356 -0.1109 0.0065 -0.0572 -0.0316 -0.0282 -0.1166 -0.1354 -0.2105 -0.1501 -0.1463 -0.251
[-0.12] [-1.17] [-0.82] [-0.77] [-2.40]** [0.12] [-1.09] [-0.69] [-0.62] [-2.58]*** [-1.58] [-2.47]** [-1.93]* [-1.88]* [-3.13]***
Classroom is suitable for learning
(Dummy)
0.0701 0.0681 0.0287 0.0295 0.0453 0.0531 0.0456 0.0042 0.0054 0.0116 0.1281 0.13 0.0685 0.0699 0.0815
[1.46] [1.43] [0.71] [0.73] [1.14] [1.14] [0.99] [0.11] [0.14] [0.30] [1.63] [1.66]* [1.01] [1.03] [1.18]
School is fenced (Dummy) 0.0143 -0.0021 -0.0378 -0.0402 -0.0385 0.023 0.0029 -0.0289 -0.0328 -0.0328 0.0199 -0.0157 -0.0564 -0.0607 -0.09
[0.29] [-0.04] [-0.89] [-0.95] [-0.85] [0.48] [0.06] [-0.70] [-0.79] [-0.75] [0.25] [-0.20] [-0.79] [-0.85] [-1.17]
Total Number of famly (School
average)
-0.0015 -0.0063 -0.008 -0.011 -0.0246 -0.0325 -0.0352 -0.0357 -0.0164 -0.0298 -0.0328 -0.0417
[-0.11] [-0.52] [-0.65] [-0.87] [-1.69]* [-2.45]** [-2.62]*** [-2.63]*** [-0.70] [-1.44] [-1.57] [-1.92]*
Sex if Household Head (School
average, 1 is Male)
0.1084 0.0654 0.0669 0.1718 0.0752 0.0365 0.0388 0.1588 0.2474 0.2042 0.2068 0.3722
[1.16] [0.83] [0.85] [2.12]** [0.85] [0.50] [0.53] [2.04]** [1.76]* [1.65]* [1.67]* [2.79]***
Type of House (School average,
1 is lowest quality and 5 is the
finest quality)
0.0903 0.0524 0.0538 0.046 0.0939 0.0584 0.0606 0.0576 0.1116 0.0616 0.0641 0.04
[5.24]*** [3.39]*** [3.46]*** [2.04]** [5.53]*** [3.87]*** [4.00]*** [2.70]*** [3.91]*** [2.34]** [2.42]** [1.06]
Possession of telepohne (School
average)
0.1428 0.0123 0.0145 -0.0019 0.1714 0.0457 0.0491 0.0101 0.5473 0.3046 0.3084 0.2457
[1.55] [0.15] [0.18] [-0.02] [1.95]* [0.59] [0.64] [0.13] [3.82]*** [2.32]** [2.35]** [1.84]*
Number of meal in one day
(School average)
0.0996 0.0395 0.0413 0.1051 0.0895 0.0288 0.0315 0.083 0.0646 -0.0193 -0.0162 0.0865
[1.68]* [0.76] [0.80] [1.82]* [1.47] [0.56] [0.62] [1.48] [0.68] [-0.23] [-0.19] [0.93]
Age (School average) 0.9648 0.9642 0.9096 0.8809 0.88 0.8272 1.8859 1.8849 1.8423
[6.31]*** [6.29]*** [6.06]*** [5.86]*** [5.82]*** [5.62]*** [7.04]*** [7.01]*** [6.98]***
Age Square (School average) -0.0408 -0.0408 -0.0383 -0.0364 -0.0365 -0.0334 -0.0797 -0.0798 -0.0772
[-6.18]*** [-6.16]*** [-5.84]*** [-5.56]*** [-5.54]*** [-5.16]*** [-6.79]*** [-6.77]*** [-6.67]***
Boy (School average) 0.006 0.009 0.0605 -0.106 -0.1013 -0.091 0.0136 0.0189 0.0711
[0.05] [0.08] [0.56] [-1.01] [-0.97] [-0.92] [0.08] [0.11] [0.42]
Mother Age (School average) -0.0066 -0.0065 -0.003 -0.004 -0.0038 -0.0014 0.0035 0.0038 0.0065
[-1.43] [-1.41] [-0.65] [-0.85] [-0.81] [-0.30] [0.45] [0.47] [0.82]
Mother Education History (School
average)
0.0433 0.0449 -0.0128 0.0349 0.0374 0.0446 0.1717 0.1745 -0.016
[0.50] [0.51] [-0.11] [0.42] [0.44] [0.39] [1.14] [1.16] [-0.08]
Grade in School (School average) 0.2821 0.2831 0.276 0.2729 0.2744 0.2571 0.3401 0.3418 0.3443
[8.47]*** [8.45]*** [8.33]*** [9.00]*** [8.98]*** [8.52]*** [6.18]*** [6.19]*** [6.07]***
Parents paid tuition (School
average)
0.1915 0.1916 0.1713 0.1732 0.1733 0.1714 0.3106 0.3107 0.248
[3.10]*** [3.10]*** [2.60]*** [2.90]*** [2.90]*** [2.71]*** [3.08]*** [3.08]*** [2.35]**
Log Pupil Teacher Ratio for TSC
teacher
0.0531 0.2071 0.0826 0.2343 0.0931 0.3495
[0.98] [3.38]*** [1.58] [4.03]*** [1.04] [3.34]***
Constant -0.0008 0.089 0.0369 -0.6552 -6.8137 -6.995 -7.6337 0.0231 0.108 0.0497 -0.4492 -6.2176 -6.4992 -6.858 0.0536 0.4254 0.4267 -0.5608 -12.4633 -12.7808 -14.3098
[-0.02] [1.22] [0.39] [-2.79]*** [-8.07]*** [-8.24]*** [-8.68]*** [0.52] [1.53] [0.54] [-1.90]* [-7.45]*** [-7.70]*** [-7.94]*** [0.74] [3.76]*** [2.85]*** [-1.55] [-8.59]*** [-8.70]*** [-9.42]***
R-squared 0.002 0.0184 0.02 0.0492 0.297 0.2975 0.4277 0.0012 0.0186 0.0198 0.0557 0.3125 0.3138 0.4507 0.0057 0.0322 0.0356 0.069 0.2728 0.2734 0.3981
Adj-R-squared 0.0013 0.0157 0.0154 0.0415 0.2879 0.2879 0.3772 0.0005 0.016 0.0152 0.0481 0.3036 0.3045 0.4022 0.005 0.0296 0.0311 0.0615 0.2634 0.2635 0.345
N 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494
Kiswahili for All Standard Grades English for All Standard Grades Numeracy for All Standard Grades
Robust standard errors are used for estimation and the estimated t-values are in parentheses. *, **, and *** are indicated to show p-value to reject null hypothesis with p<0.1, p<0.05, p<0.01 respectively.
District Dummy is excluded from table, because it becomes long.
Table 9 TOT(Nearest One to two Matching Estimation for school average) regressed on PTA teacher ratio 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
PTA teacher ratio 0.2998 0.5682 0.6336 0.7575 0.8264 1.0567 0.9238 0.213 0.4652 0.5188 0.6132 0.6803 0.8242 0.6316 0.4637 0.8923 0.9675 1.2323 1.303 1.6625 1.0439
[1.55] [2.87]*** [3.19]*** [3.78]*** [4.07]*** [4.63]*** [3.28]*** [1.21] [2.58]*** [2.85]*** [3.37]*** [3.68]*** [4.01]*** [2.54]** [1.33] [2.44]** [2.62]*** [3.28]*** [3.42]*** [3.96]*** [2.07]**
Electricity infra is available in
village
0.2985 0.2798 0.2221 0.1937 0.1976 0.0892 0.2697 0.2553 0.1963 0.1715 0.1739 0.0674 0.2772 0.2456 0.1377 0.0884 0.0944 -0.0136
[4.85]*** [4.50]*** [3.47]*** [3.03]*** [3.09]*** [1.31] [4.87]*** [4.57]*** [3.43]*** [3.00]*** [3.04]*** [1.13] [2.59]*** [2.28]** [1.25] [0.80] [0.86] [-0.11]
The road is tarnac in village 0.0529 0.0453 0.0019 0.0132 0.0082 -0.0198 0.0535 0.0474 0.0007 0.0156 0.0124 -0.0446 0.2392 0.2276 0.1622 0.2009 0.1931 0.1248
[0.61] [0.53] [0.02] [0.15] [0.10] [-0.22] [0.64] [0.57] [0.01] [0.19] [0.15] [-0.53] [1.64] [1.57] [1.13] [1.41] [1.36] [0.79]
Unemployment Level (1-5) 0.0118 0.0137 0.0472 0.06 0.0678 0.0585 0.0022 0.003 0.0312 0.0362 0.041 -0.035 -0.1197 -0.1052 -0.0444 -0.0395 -0.0274 0.3598
[0.45] [0.52] [1.58] [1.85]* [2.08]** [0.99] [0.09] [0.13] [1.16] [1.26] [1.42] [-0.41] [-2.66]*** [-2.24]** [-0.87] [-0.72] [-0.49] [1.69]*
Supplement for school material is
available at classroom (Dummy)
0.1887 0.1352 0.1356 0.1295 0.0666 0.1688 0.1173 0.1198 0.116 0.0448 0.1506 0.0937 0.1368 0.1272 0.0774
[3.03]*** [2.16]** [2.15]** [2.06]** [0.97] [3.06]*** [2.11]** [2.15]** [2.08]** [0.73] [1.37] [0.84] [1.23] [1.15] [0.62]
Classroom is suitable for learning
(Dummy)
0.0226 0.0145 0.0046 0.0036 0.0021 0.0034 -0.0096 -0.0216 -0.0222 -0.0211 0.02 0.0158 0.0037 0.0021 -0.0378
[0.39] [0.25] [0.08] [0.06] [0.03] [0.07] [-0.19] [-0.42] [-0.43] [-0.40] [0.20] [0.16] [0.04] [0.02] [-0.36]
School is fenced (Dummy) 0.0509 0.032 0.01 0.018 0.0489 0.0327 0.014 -0.0031 0.0019 0.0196 0.1806 0.14 0.1411 0.1536 0.1159
[0.81] [0.51] [0.16] [0.29] [0.72] [0.58] [0.25] [-0.06] [0.03] [0.32] [1.63] [1.26] [1.27] [1.38] [0.93]
Total Number of famly (School
average)
-0.0333 -0.0333 -0.0276 -0.0304 -0.0534 -0.0563 -0.0527 -0.0491 -0.0654 -0.0751 -0.0662 -0.0714
[-1.89]* [-1.88]* [-1.57] [-1.69]* [-3.33]*** [-3.45]*** [-3.24]*** [-2.81]*** [-2.12]** [-2.37]** [-2.09]** [-2.07]**
Sex if Household Head (School
average, 1 is Male)
0.14 0.1504 0.1451 0.1625 0.0725 0.0938 0.0904 0.1531 0.2912 0.3648 0.3564 0.3956
[1.24] [1.36] [1.31] [1.36] [0.71] [0.93] [0.90] [1.45] [1.53] [1.92]* [1.87]* [1.85]*
Type of House (School average,
1 is lowest quality and 5 is the
finest quality)
0.079 0.0674 0.0633 0.1083 0.0654 0.0584 0.0558 0.1014 0.066 0.0776 0.0711 0.1431
[3.47]*** [2.88]*** [2.70]*** [3.11]*** [3.22]*** [2.81]*** [2.68]*** [3.33]*** [1.70]* [1.95]* [1.79]* [2.54]**
Possession of telepohne (School
average)
0.1177 0.0719 0.0619 0.0688 0.1404 0.1038 0.0976 0.0435 0.5291 0.4255 0.41 0.3204
[1.11] [0.65] [0.56] [0.58] [1.46] [1.03] [0.97] [0.41] [2.85]*** [2.22]** [2.14]** [1.57]
Number of meal in one day
(School average)
-0.0279 -0.0395 -0.0455 -0.0948 -0.0509 -0.056 -0.0598 -0.0911 -0.1331 -0.117 -0.1264 -0.2074
[-0.39] [-0.54] [-0.61] [-1.17] [-0.78] [-0.83] [-0.88] [-1.26] [-1.15] [-0.98] [-1.06] [-1.46]
Age (School average) 0.7385 0.7361 0.6713 0.7717 0.7702 0.7469 2.1048 2.1011 2.0189
[3.36]*** [3.37]*** [3.04]*** [3.75]*** [3.76]*** [3.66]*** [5.17]*** [5.18]*** [4.91]***
Age Square (School average) -0.0351 -0.0347 -0.0324 -0.0361 -0.0358 -0.0344 -0.0948 -0.0943 -0.0906
[-3.42]*** [-3.40]*** [-3.18]*** [-3.75]*** [-3.74]*** [-3.62]*** [-5.04]*** [-5.02]*** [-4.75]***
Boy (School average) -0.0552 -0.0617 -0.0473 -0.126 -0.1301 -0.1638 -0.3843 -0.3945 -0.4202
[-0.34] [-0.38] [-0.28] [-0.87] [-0.90] [-1.09] [-1.35] [-1.39] [-1.46]
Mother Age (School average) -0.0029 -0.0032 -0.0067 0.0014 0.0012 -0.0031 0.0165 0.0161 0.0109
[-0.43] [-0.47] [-0.96] [0.22] [0.19] [-0.49] [1.33] [1.30] [0.82]
Mother Education History (School
average)
-0.1361 -0.1395 -0.1831 -0.1591 -0.1612 -0.1668 -0.1503 -0.1555 -0.2657
[-1.12] [-1.15] [-1.10] [-1.44] [-1.47] [-1.13] [-0.72] [-0.75] [-0.94]
Grade in School (School average) 0.1154 0.1094 0.1133 0.1034 0.0997 0.0835 -0.0002 -0.0096 0.0308
[2.73]*** [2.59]*** [2.49]** [2.68]*** [2.60]*** [2.11]** [-0.00] [-0.13] [0.39]
Parents paid tuition (School
average)
0.2343 0.233 0.1932 0.1751 0.1742 0.1606 0.1988 0.1967 0.1556
[2.69]*** [2.69]*** [2.01]** [2.16]** [2.16]** [1.81]* [1.30] [1.29] [0.91]
Log Pupil Teacher Ratio for TSC
teacher
-0.1733 -0.1096 -0.1082 -0.0246 -0.2705 -0.0955
[-2.41]** [-1.33] [-1.62] [-0.32] [-2.14]** [-0.65]
Constant -0.1017 -0.3153 -0.5147 -0.5932 -4.4694 -3.8607 -3.5445 -0.0362 -0.2128 -0.3693 -0.159 -4.3013 -3.9212 -3.9696 -0.005 0.0309 -0.2516 -0.2383 -11.5156 -10.5657 -11.0663
[-1.85]* [-3.60]*** [-4.55]*** [-2.05]** [-4.01]*** [-3.36]*** [-2.98]*** [-0.74] [-2.68]*** [-3.53]*** [-0.62] [-4.08]*** [-3.61]*** [-3.49]*** [-0.05] [0.20] [-1.23] [-0.49] [-5.33]*** [-4.80]*** [-4.61]***
R-squared 0.0015 0.0208 0.028 0.0435 0.0692 0.0732 0.2025 0.001 0.0208 0.0273 0.0472 0.0772 0.079 0.2253 0.0012 0.017 0.0207 0.0361 0.0656 0.0688 0.1668
Adj-R-squared 0.0008 0.018 0.0231 0.035 0.0562 0.0595 0.1252 0.0002 0.0179 0.0223 0.0388 0.0642 0.0654 0.1503 0.0005 0.0142 0.0157 0.0276 0.0525 0.055 0.0861
N 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371
Kiswahili for All Standard Grades English for All Standard Grades Numeracy for All Standard Grades
Robust standard errors are used for estimation and the estimated t-values are in parentheses. *, **, and *** are indicated to show p-value to reject null hypothesis with p<0.1, p<0.05, p<0.01 respectively.
District Dummy is excluded from table, because it becomes long.
Table 10 TOT (Nearest One to two Matching Estimation for Lower standard grade below three) regressed on PTA teacher ratio 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
PTA teacher ratio 0.1767 0.3639 0.3839 0.5579 0.9463 0.8878 0.3806 0.113 0.3162 0.3412 0.5046 0.8836 0.8022 0.2939 0.6316 0.8944 0.8848 1.2199 1.8005 1.676 0.7192
[1.03] [2.09]** [2.20]** [3.11]*** [6.57]*** [5.57]*** [2.05]** [0.68] [1.88]* [2.02]** [2.93]*** [6.50]*** [5.30]*** [1.67]* [2.26]** [3.15]*** [3.10]*** [4.25]*** [7.40]*** [6.19]*** [2.28]**
Electricity infra is available in
village
0.1373 0.1305 0.0596 0.0212 0.0208 -0.0257 0.1447 0.1356 0.055 0.0199 0.0193 -0.0366 0.1034 0.0993 -0.0353 -0.103 -0.1039 -0.1867
[3.05]*** [2.88]*** [1.29] [0.54] [0.53] [-0.63] [3.33]*** [3.10]*** [1.24] [0.54] [0.53] [-0.99] [1.43] [1.35] [-0.47] [-1.60] [-1.61] [-2.72]***
The road is tarnac in village -0.0024 -0.0037 -0.0552 -0.0534 -0.0525 -0.0965 0.0128 0.0107 -0.0498 -0.0427 -0.0414 -0.102 -0.0489 -0.0454 -0.1328 -0.1182 -0.1162 -0.1728
[-0.04] [-0.06] [-0.89] [-1.06] [-1.04] [-1.85]* [0.21] [0.18] [-0.83] [-0.88] [-0.85] [-2.05]** [-0.50] [-0.46] [-1.35] [-1.41] [-1.38] [-1.88]*
Unemployment Level (1-5) -0.0629 -0.0625 -0.0174 0.0189 0.0168 0.1877 -0.0676 -0.0658 -0.0185 0.0139 0.011 0.096 -0.1833 -0.1786 -0.0983 -0.0336 -0.0379 0.3772
[-3.20]*** [-3.14]*** [-0.80] [0.92] [0.81] [3.18]*** [-3.55]*** [-3.41]*** [-0.89] [0.73] [0.58] [1.72]* [-5.68]*** [-5.44]*** [-2.79]*** [-1.00] [-1.12] [3.18]***
Supplement for school material is
available at classroom (Dummy)
0.0169 -0.0381 -0.0138 -0.0121 -0.0753 0.0267 -0.0354 -0.0094 -0.0069 -0.084 -0.1165 -0.1893 -0.1276 -0.1238 -0.2302
[0.33] [-0.76] [-0.33] [-0.28] [-1.79]* [0.54] [-0.73] [-0.23] [-0.17] [-2.08]** [-1.43] [-2.36]** [-1.78]* [-1.73]* [-3.12]***
Classroom is suitable for learning
(Dummy)
0.0648 0.0639 0.0238 0.0245 0.0361 0.0581 0.0517 0.0092 0.0101 0.0164 0.1087 0.1103 0.0472 0.0485 0.0567
[1.43] [1.43] [0.65] [0.67] [1.01] [1.34] [1.21] [0.27] [0.29] [0.49] [1.48] [1.51] [0.76] [0.79] [0.92]
School is fenced (Dummy) 0.0196 0.0025 -0.0334 -0.0354 -0.0329 0.0375 0.017 -0.0135 -0.0163 -0.0194 0.0505 0.0155 -0.0261 -0.0303 -0.0592
[0.43] [0.05] [-0.86] [-0.92] [-0.81] [0.83] [0.38] [-0.36] [-0.44] [-0.50] [0.68] [0.21] [-0.40] [-0.47] [-0.83]
Total Number of famly (School
average)
0.0004 -0.0054 -0.0068 -0.0121 -0.0226 -0.0318 -0.0338 -0.036 -0.0135 -0.0287 -0.0316 -0.0406
[0.03] [-0.47] [-0.58] [-1.04] [-1.58] [-2.47]** [-2.60]*** [-2.76]*** [-0.58] [-1.42] [-1.55] [-1.94]*
Sex if Household Head (School
average, 1 is Male)
0.1242 0.0772 0.0784 0.1622 0.0893 0.0502 0.0519 0.1604 0.1919 0.1386 0.1411 0.2816
[1.34] [1.02] [1.03] [2.10]** [1.02] [0.73] [0.76] [2.26]** [1.39] [1.17] [1.20] [2.25]**
Type of House (School average,
1 is lowest quality and 5 is the
finest quality)
0.0897 0.051 0.0521 0.0528 0.0918 0.0566 0.0581 0.0626 0.1057 0.0534 0.0558 0.0484
[5.51]*** [3.63]*** [3.70]*** [2.63]*** [5.88]*** [4.30]*** [4.40]*** [3.38]*** [3.97]*** [2.28]** [2.37]** [1.43]
Possession of telepohne (School
average)
0.1709 0.0402 0.042 0.0104 0.1805 0.058 0.0605 0.0092 0.5557 0.3092 0.313 0.2088
[1.96]** [0.54] [0.57] [0.14] [2.19]** [0.84] [0.88] [0.14] [4.16]*** [2.63]*** [2.66]*** [1.77]*
Number of meal in one day
(School average)
0.0928 0.028 0.0295 0.0719 0.089 0.0267 0.0287 0.0596 0.1038 0.0098 0.0128 0.0994
[1.64] [0.58] [0.61] [1.30] [1.55] [0.56] [0.60] [1.16] [1.15] [0.12] [0.16] [1.13]
Age (School average) 0.8715 0.871 0.7769 0.8114 0.8108 0.7255 1.7405 1.7395 1.6303
[6.12]*** [6.10]*** [5.67]*** [6.00]*** [5.96]*** [5.61]*** [7.23]*** [7.20]*** [6.93]***
Age Square (School average) -0.0363 -0.0363 -0.0323 -0.0328 -0.0329 -0.0287 -0.0723 -0.0724 -0.0671
[-5.98]*** [-5.97]*** [-5.44]*** [-5.66]*** [-5.64]*** [-5.10]*** [-6.98]*** [-6.96]*** [-6.61]***
Boy (School average) -0.0321 -0.0297 0.0236 -0.1343 -0.1309 -0.1238 -0.0339 -0.0288 0.048
[-0.31] [-0.29] [0.23] [-1.40] [-1.36] [-1.34] [-0.21] [-0.18] [0.30]
Mother Age (School average) -0.0069 -0.0068 -0.0041 -0.0042 -0.004 -0.0025 0.0014 0.0016 0.0019
[-1.52] [-1.50] [-0.91] [-0.94] [-0.91] [-0.59] [0.20] [0.23] [0.26]
Mother Education History (School
average)
0.0581 0.0594 -0.0082 0.0358 0.0376 0.0474 0.2096 0.2123 -0.0279
[0.73] [0.74] [-0.08] [0.48] [0.51] [0.48] [1.53] [1.54] [-0.15]
Grade in School (School average) 0.2874 0.2881 0.2879 0.2707 0.2718 0.2623 0.3517 0.3534 0.362
[8.53]*** [8.50]*** [8.73]*** [9.06]*** [9.02]*** [8.93]*** [6.23]*** [6.24]*** [6.40]***
Parents paid tuition (School
average)
0.1876 0.1876 0.1631 0.1728 0.1729 0.1631 0.3128 0.3129 0.2697
[3.28]*** [3.28]*** [2.74]*** [3.18]*** [3.18]*** [2.88]*** [3.37]*** [3.36]*** [2.81]***
Log Pupil Teacher Ratio for TSC
teacher
0.0429 0.159 0.0597 0.1776 0.0914 0.2936
[0.90] [2.93]*** [1.31] [3.52]*** [1.15] [3.24]***
Constant -0.0078 0.0383 -0.0323 -0.7544 -6.4535 -6.5998 -6.6626 0.0143 0.0624 -0.0265 -0.554 -5.9836 -6.1874 -6.1606 0.0593 0.3844 0.3581 -0.7044 -11.9058 -12.2173 -12.8544
[-0.18] [0.55] [-0.36] [-3.29]*** [-8.19]*** [-8.32]*** [-8.25]*** [0.35] [0.94] [-0.30] [-2.39]** [-8.00]*** [-8.18]*** [-8.14]*** [0.87] [3.53]*** [2.52]** [-1.97]** [-9.14]*** [-9.21]*** [-9.33]***
R-squared 0.0009 0.0166 0.0185 0.0531 0.3393 0.3397 0.4645 0.0004 0.0197 0.0219 0.0624 0.3628 0.3636 0.4991 0.0042 0.0296 0.0327 0.0693 0.313 0.3136 0.4379
Adj-R-squared 0.0002 0.014 0.0138 0.0454 0.3308 0.3307 0.4173 -0.0003 0.017 0.0173 0.0548 0.3546 0.3549 0.455 0.0035 0.027 0.0282 0.0617 0.3041 0.3043 0.3883
N 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494
Kiswahili for All Standard Grades English for All Standard Grades Numeracy for All Standard Grades
Robust standard errors are used for estimation and the estimated t-values are in parentheses. *, **, and *** are indicated to show p-value to reject null hypothesis with p<0.1, p<0.05, p<0.01 respectively.
District Dummy is excluded from table, because it becomes long.
Table 11  TOT (Nearest One to four Matching Estimation for school average) regressed on PTA teacher ratio 
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Table 12 TOT (Nearest One to four Matching Estimation for Lower standard grade below three) regressed on PTA teacher ratio 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
PTA teacher ratio 0.0268 0.2581 0.3277 0.4573 0.5281 0.8012 0.7149 -0.0401 0.1819 0.25 0.3409 0.4196 0.628 0.4113 0.0645 0.4421 0.5283 0.7987 0.8969 1.3027 0.8392
[0.15] [1.41] [1.79]* [2.48]** [2.81]*** [3.87]*** [2.86]*** [-0.25] [1.10] [1.49] [2.04]** [2.48]** [3.33]*** [1.82]* [0.20] [1.35] [1.59] [2.38]** [2.66]*** [3.55]*** [1.90]*
Electricity infra is available in
village
0.2594 0.2394 0.175 0.1512 0.1558 0.0416 0.2302 0.2113 0.1474 0.1248 0.1283 0.0226 0.2385 0.2079 0.0909 0.039 0.0459 -0.0717
[4.61]*** [4.22]*** [3.02]*** [2.61]*** [2.70]*** [0.68] [4.55]*** [4.15]*** [2.85]*** [2.41]** [2.49]** [0.42] [2.53]** [2.18]** [0.93] [0.40] [0.47] [-0.68]
The road is tarnac in village 0.0164 0.0083 -0.0417 -0.0343 -0.0403 -0.074 0.0609 0.0532 -0.0001 0.0123 0.0078 -0.0479 0.1376 0.1261 0.0486 0.0859 0.077 0.0312
[0.20] [0.10] [-0.53] [-0.45] [-0.53] [-0.94] [0.79] [0.70] [-0.00] [0.17] [0.11] [-0.63] [1.04] [0.96] [0.38] [0.68] [0.61] [0.23]
Unemployment Level (1-5) 0.0039 0.0059 0.0453 0.052 0.0612 -0.2516 -0.0007 0.0007 0.0339 0.037 0.044 -0.3155 -0.1311 -0.1223 -0.0584 -0.053 -0.0394 -0.1002
[0.16] [0.24] [1.66]* [1.76]* [2.08]** [-3.62]*** [-0.03] [0.03] [1.36] [1.39] [1.66]* [-4.03]*** [-3.28]*** [-2.96]*** [-1.29] [-1.08] [-0.80] [-0.57]
Supplement for school material is
available at classroom (Dummy)
0.1968 0.1318 0.1284 0.1211 0.0712 0.202 0.1377 0.1393 0.1338 0.0742 0.179 0.0984 0.1421 0.1313 0.0893
[3.59]*** [2.39]** [2.32]** [2.19]** [1.18] [4.07]*** [2.75]*** [2.77]*** [2.67]*** [1.34] [1.88]* [1.03] [1.48] [1.37] [0.83]
Classroom is suitable for learning
(Dummy)
0.0306 0.0202 0.0095 0.0083 0.004 0.0212 0.0051 -0.0066 -0.0075 -0.013 0.0823 0.0722 0.0603 0.0585 0.0101
[0.58] [0.39] [0.18] [0.16] [0.08] [0.44] [0.11] [-0.14] [-0.16] [-0.27] [0.90] [0.79] [0.67] [0.65] [0.11]
School is fenced (Dummy) 0.0544 0.0338 0.0119 0.0214 0.0647 0.0459 0.0263 0.009 0.0163 0.038 0.1338 0.0963 0.0953 0.1094 0.0971
[0.94] [0.59] [0.21] [0.37] [1.08] [0.89] [0.51] [0.18] [0.32] [0.69] [1.35] [0.97] [0.97] [1.12] [0.90]
Total Number of famly (School
average)
-0.0343 -0.0314 -0.0247 -0.0286 -0.0548 -0.0558 -0.0506 -0.0483 -0.0595 -0.0667 -0.0567 -0.0702
[-2.10]** [-1.91]* [-1.50] [-1.78]* [-3.72]*** [-3.71]*** [-3.37]*** [-3.06]*** [-2.21]** [-2.44]** [-2.07]** [-2.38]**
Sex if Household Head (School
average, 1 is Male)
0.1304 0.1351 0.1288 0.1317 0.0527 0.0666 0.0617 0.1032 0.2283 0.2943 0.2848 0.2724
[1.25] [1.31] [1.26] [1.19] [0.57] [0.73] [0.68] [1.08] [1.29] [1.68]* [1.63] [1.42]
Type of House (School average,
1 is lowest quality and 5 is the
finest quality)
0.0966 0.0841 0.0792 0.1164 0.0849 0.0769 0.0731 0.1118 0.1102 0.1191 0.1117 0.1546
[4.55]*** [3.83]*** [3.62]*** [3.47]*** [4.43]*** [3.93]*** [3.75]*** [3.99]*** [3.15]*** [3.36]*** [3.16]*** [3.10]***
Possession of telepohne (School
average)
0.0792 0.045 0.0331 0.0505 0.0747 0.0392 0.0302 -0.013 0.4393 0.324 0.3064 0.2651
[0.81] [0.44] [0.32] [0.47] [0.85] [0.43] [0.33] [-0.14] [2.66]*** [1.90]* [1.80]* [1.47]
Number of meal in one day
(School average)
0.0215 0.0148 0.0077 -0.0269 0.0089 0.0043 -0.0011 -0.0291 -0.0795 -0.065 -0.0756 -0.1558
[0.32] [0.22] [0.11] [-0.37] [0.15] [0.07] [-0.02] [-0.44] [-0.76] [-0.61] [-0.70] [-1.26]
Age (School average) 0.7142 0.7114 0.6763 0.7556 0.7534 0.7481 2.198 2.1938 2.1677
[3.50]*** [3.51]*** [3.34]*** [3.87]*** [3.89]*** [3.92]*** [6.00]*** [6.01]*** [5.94]***
Age Square (School average) -0.0343 -0.0339 -0.0328 -0.0357 -0.0354 -0.0347 -0.1001 -0.0994 -0.0982
[-3.60]*** [-3.58]*** [-3.50]*** [-3.93]*** [-3.92]*** [-3.92]*** [-5.87]*** [-5.85]*** [-5.78]***
Boy (School average) -0.0293 -0.0371 -0.0081 -0.1195 -0.1255 -0.1443 -0.3733 -0.3848 -0.4254
[-0.19] [-0.24] [-0.05] [-0.88] [-0.92] [-1.03] [-1.49] [-1.54] [-1.67]*
Mother Age (School average) -0.0087 -0.0091 -0.0096 -0.0017 -0.002 -0.0038 0.0151 0.0146 0.0122
[-1.40] [-1.47] [-1.54] [-0.30] [-0.35] [-0.67] [1.37] [1.34] [1.06]
Mother Education History (School
average)
-0.1588 -0.1628 -0.2072 -0.1441 -0.1472 -0.1546 -0.1199 -0.1258 -0.1133
[-1.39] [-1.43] [-1.29] [-1.42] [-1.46] [-1.11] [-0.64] [-0.67] [-0.43]
Grade in School (School average) 0.1431 0.1359 0.1289 0.1242 0.1187 0.0946 0.0359 0.0254 0.0607
[3.61]*** [3.44]*** [3.06]*** [3.36]*** [3.23]*** [2.54]** [0.52] [0.37] [0.86]
Parents paid tuition (School
average)
0.1541 0.1525 0.1509 0.1038 0.1026 0.1195 0.1226 0.1202 0.1277
[1.92]* [1.90]* [1.72]* [1.38] [1.37] [1.48] [0.89] [0.88] [0.84]
Log Pupil Teacher Ratio for TSC
teacher
-0.2055 -0.1562 -0.1568 -0.076 -0.3053 -0.1518
[-3.24]*** [-2.08]** [-2.63]*** [-1.10] [-2.85]*** [-1.21]
Constant -0.0737 -0.2402 -0.4536 -0.6661 -4.2571 -3.5354 -3.3104 -0.0321 -0.1805 -0.3846 -0.3088 -4.2879 -3.7372 -3.8742 0.0466 0.1495 -0.1526 -0.2994 -12.0301 -10.9579 -11.8832
[-1.44] [-2.99]*** [-4.43]*** [-2.52]** [-4.11]*** [-3.32]*** [-3.03]*** [-0.70] [-2.44]** [-3.99]*** [-1.31] [-4.31]*** [-3.67]*** [-3.67]*** [0.54] [1.10] [-0.86] [-0.70] [-6.22]*** [-5.52]*** [-5.63]***
R-squared 0 0.0169 0.0266 0.0505 0.0809 0.0876 0.2311 0 0.018 0.0297 0.059 0.0928 0.0975 0.2583 0 0.0166 0.0216 0.0427 0.0812 0.0864 0.2009
Adj-R-squared -0.0007 0.0141 0.0216 0.0421 0.068 0.074 0.1567 -0.0007 0.0151 0.0247 0.0507 0.0801 0.0842 0.1864 -0.0007 0.0137 0.0166 0.0343 0.0683 0.0729 0.1235
N 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371
Kiswahili for All Standard Grades English for All Standard Grades Numeracy for All Standard Grades
Robust standard errors are used for estimation and the estimated t-values are in parentheses. *, **, and *** are indicated to show p-value to reject null hypothesis with p<0.1, p<0.05, p<0.01 respectively.
District Dummy is excluded from table, because it becomes long.
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Table 13 regressed on PTA teacher ratio (Kernel Matching Estimation for school average) regressed on PTA teacher ratio 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
PTA teacher ratio -0.2688 -0.0678 -0.0113 0.144 0.4883 0.5704 0.2389 -0.3611 -0.1415 -0.0783 0.0579 0.3911 0.4373 0.069 -0.2216 0.1018 0.1567 0.4705 0.9857 1.0879 0.4182
[-1.84]* [-0.46] [-0.08] [0.95] [4.21]*** [4.29]*** [1.57] [-2.55]** [-1.00] [-0.56] [0.40] [3.60]*** [3.46]*** [0.47] [-0.93] [0.43] [0.67] [1.99]** [5.06]*** [4.78]*** [1.60]
Electricity infra is available in
village
0.1494 0.1347 0.0714 0.0398 0.0404 0.0015 0.1573 0.1397 0.0691 0.0407 0.0411 -0.0049 0.1663 0.1483 0.0229 -0.0333 -0.0326 -0.0828
[3.74]*** [3.36]*** [1.75]* [1.20] [1.22] [0.04] [4.13]*** [3.66]*** [1.79]* [1.35] [1.36] [-0.16] [2.65]*** [2.34]** [0.35] [-0.63] [-0.61] [-1.46]
The road is tarnac in village 0.0262 0.0205 -0.027 -0.025 -0.0263 -0.0457 0.0572 0.0506 -0.0049 0.0017 0.0009 -0.0335 0.03 0.0252 -0.0589 -0.0456 -0.0472 -0.0638
[0.47] [0.37] [-0.49] [-0.58] [-0.61] [-1.05] [1.06] [0.95] [-0.09] [0.04] [0.02] [-0.82] [0.35] [0.29] [-0.68] [-0.66] [-0.68] [-0.85]
Unemployment Level (1-5) -0.0571 -0.0588 -0.021 0.001 0.0039 0.059 -0.0591 -0.0594 -0.0215 -0.0037 -0.0021 0.0207 -0.1629 -0.1612 -0.0871 -0.0466 -0.043 0.0083
[-3.30]*** [-3.33]*** [-1.09] [0.06] [0.22] [1.67]* [-3.55]*** [-3.51]*** [-1.17] [-0.24] [-0.13] [0.63] [-5.80]*** [-5.59]*** [-2.85]*** [-1.68]* [-1.53] [0.12]
Supplement for school material is
available at classroom (Dummy)
0.1159 0.0636 0.0804 0.0779 0.0229 0.1266 0.0672 0.0858 0.0844 0.0173 0.0717 -0.0039 0.0444 0.0413 -0.0398
[2.64]*** [1.47] [2.37]** [2.30]** [0.67] [2.98]*** [1.61] [2.62]*** [2.58]*** [0.53] [1.06] [-0.06] [0.80] [0.75] [-0.69]
Classroom is suitable for learning
(Dummy)
0.0942 0.0921 0.0504 0.0495 0.0471 0.0937 0.0854 0.0408 0.0403 0.032 0.1285 0.1287 0.0618 0.0607 0.0406
[2.32]** [2.31]** [1.63] [1.60] [1.54] [2.43]** [2.26]** [1.42] [1.40] [1.14] [1.98]** [2.01]** [1.20] [1.17] [0.78]
School is fenced (Dummy) 0.0196 0.0065 -0.0258 -0.023 -0.0071 0.0394 0.0243 -0.0026 -0.0011 0.0056 0.0572 0.0267 -0.01 -0.0065 -0.0166
[0.48] [0.16] [-0.80] [-0.71] [-0.21] [1.00] [0.62] [-0.09] [-0.04] [0.18] [0.88] [0.42] [-0.19] [-0.12] [-0.29]
Total Number of famly (School
average)
0.0014 -0.0045 -0.0025 -0.0054 -0.0206 -0.0296 -0.0285 -0.0281 -0.0083 -0.023 -0.0205 -0.0269
[0.11] [-0.44] [-0.25] [-0.53] [-1.60] [-2.54]** [-2.44]** [-2.39]** [-0.41] [-1.30] [-1.16] [-1.48]
Sex if Household Head (School
average, 1 is Male)
0.1003 0.0684 0.0667 0.1105 0.0471 0.0247 0.0238 0.0947 0.1847 0.1569 0.1548 0.2196
[1.16] [1.01] [0.99] [1.63] [0.59] [0.42] [0.40] [1.58] [1.44] [1.48] [1.46] [1.95]*
Type of House (School average,
1 is lowest quality and 5 is the
finest quality)
0.0876 0.0529 0.0513 0.0466 0.0903 0.0588 0.0579 0.0571 0.1156 0.0687 0.0668 0.0428
[6.04]*** [4.43]*** [4.30]*** [2.71]*** [6.49]*** [5.28]*** [5.21]*** [3.65]*** [4.96]*** [3.54]*** [3.45]*** [1.54]
Possession of telepohne (School
average)
0.1426 0.0489 0.0464 0.0652 0.1337 0.0484 0.047 0.0402 0.4726 0.2867 0.2836 0.2632
[1.81]* [0.77] [0.73] [1.03] [1.79]* [0.82] [0.80] [0.70] [3.98]*** [2.88]*** [2.85]*** [2.66]***
Number of meal in one day
(School average)
0.0619 0.011 0.009 0.0275 0.0624 0.0155 0.0143 0.0248 0.0918 0.0216 0.019 0.0612
[1.23] [0.27] [0.22] [0.58] [1.24] [0.40] [0.37] [0.59] [1.17] [0.33] [0.29] [0.84]
Age (School average) 0.7945 0.7952 0.7136 0.7522 0.7526 0.6892 1.6115 1.6123 1.5111
[5.76]*** [5.78]*** [5.49]*** [5.85]*** [5.87]*** [5.71]*** [7.21]*** [7.24]*** [6.95]***
Age Square (School average) -0.0328 -0.0328 -0.0295 -0.0302 -0.0302 -0.0271 -0.0668 -0.0668 -0.0621
[-5.66]*** [-5.68]*** [-5.34]*** [-5.57]*** [-5.59]*** [-5.28]*** [-7.05]*** [-7.07]*** [-6.76]***
Boy (School average) -0.0636 -0.067 -0.0059 -0.1283 -0.1303 -0.1125 -0.025 -0.0292 0.0473
[-0.66] [-0.70] [-0.06] [-1.48] [-1.50] [-1.33] [-0.17] [-0.20] [0.32]
Mother Age (School average) -0.0078 -0.0079 -0.006 -0.0047 -0.0047 -0.0039 0.0007 0.0006 0.0012
[-2.00]** [-2.03]** [-1.51] [-1.20] [-1.22] [-1.00] [0.12] [0.09] [0.19]
Mother Education History (School
average)
-0.0688 -0.0706 -0.0588 -0.0933 -0.0944 -0.0196 0.0031 0.0008 -0.0677
[-0.98] [-1.00] [-0.63] [-1.48] [-1.49] [-0.24] [0.03] [0.01] [-0.43]
Grade in School (School average) 0.2819 0.2808 0.278 0.2651 0.2645 0.2522 0.3531 0.3517 0.3609
[8.41]*** [8.40]*** [8.56]*** [8.88]*** [8.86]*** [8.64]*** [6.31]*** [6.30]*** [6.57]***
Parents paid tuition (School
average)
0.18 0.1799 0.1773 0.1657 0.1657 0.1801 0.2839 0.2838 0.2846
[3.62]*** [3.62]*** [3.39]*** [3.52]*** [3.52]*** [3.60]*** [3.55]*** [3.55]*** [3.46]***
Log Pupil Teacher Ratio for TSC
teacher
-0.0603 0.0213 -0.0339 0.0552 -0.075 0.0693
[-1.53] [0.48] [-0.91] [1.33] [-1.18] [0.94]
Constant 0.0578 0.0785 -0.0841 -0.6734 -5.8329 -5.6274 -5.3716 0.0885 0.102 -0.0852 -0.4679 -5.4781 -5.3626 -5.1805 0.1811 0.409 0.225 -0.7875 -11.1568 -10.9011 -10.7932
[1.55] [1.29] [-1.08] [-3.33]*** [-7.76]*** [-7.48]*** [-7.21]*** [2.48]** [1.75]* [-1.13] [-2.29]** [-7.74]*** [-7.57]*** [-7.55]*** [3.06]*** [4.31]*** [1.88]* [-2.55]** [-9.28]*** [-8.99]*** [-8.78]***
R-squared 0.0026 0.0234 0.0334 0.0701 0.4102 0.4112 0.5214 0.005 0.0308 0.0434 0.086 0.4459 0.4463 0.5624 0.0007 0.0326 0.0372 0.0812 0.3802 0.3807 0.4838
Adj-R-squared 0.0019 0.0208 0.0288 0.0626 0.4026 0.4032 0.4791 0.0044 0.0282 0.0389 0.0786 0.4388 0.4388 0.5238 0 0.03 0.0327 0.0738 0.3722 0.3723 0.4383
N 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494
Kiswahili for All Standard Grades English for All Standard Grades Numeracy for All Standard Grades
Robust standard errors are used for estimation and the estimated t-values are in parentheses. *, **, and *** are indicated to show p-value to reject null hypothesis with p<0.1, p<0.05, p<0.01 respectively.
District Dummy is excluded from table, because it becomes long.
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Table 14  TOT (Kernel Estimation for Lower standard grade below three) regressed on PTA teacher ratio 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
PTA teacher ratio -0.0314 0.2163 0.2763 0.394 0.4676 0.711 0.5171 -0.106 0.1227 0.1848 0.2637 0.3418 0.519 0.2319 -0.1645 0.2158 0.2875 0.5886 0.6757 1.1113 0.6444
[-0.18] [1.24] [1.58] [2.22]** [2.60]*** [3.59]*** [2.22]** [-0.69] [0.78] [1.16] [1.66]* [2.13]** [2.88]*** [1.10] [-0.54] [0.69] [0.92] [1.87]* [2.14]** [3.22]*** [1.56]
Electricity infra is available in
village
0.2493 0.2369 0.1725 0.1483 0.1524 0.0396 0.2194 0.206 0.1446 0.1237 0.1267 0.026 0.2571 0.2359 0.1043 0.0535 0.0609 -0.0599
[4.71]*** [4.42]*** [3.18]*** [2.74]*** [2.83]*** [0.70] [4.58]*** [4.26]*** [2.98]*** [2.57]** [2.64]*** [0.52] [2.90]*** [2.62]*** [1.15] [0.59] [0.68] [-0.61]
The road is tarnac in village 0.0533 0.0478 -0.0044 0.0044 -0.0009 -0.0617 0.0614 0.0556 0.0017 0.0157 0.0119 -0.0551 0.0451 0.0369 -0.0493 -0.014 -0.0235 -0.1126
[0.72] [0.65] [-0.06] [0.06] [-0.01] [-0.84] [0.85] [0.78] [0.02] [0.23] [0.17] [-0.77] [0.36] [0.30] [-0.40] [-0.12] [-0.20] [-0.89]
Unemployment Level (1-5) -0.0119 -0.0165 0.0201 0.0291 0.0373 -0.5047 -0.0172 -0.021 0.0094 0.0094 0.0154 -0.4565 -0.1428 -0.1409 -0.0698 -0.0625 -0.0479 -0.2353
[-0.53] [-0.72] [0.79] [1.05] [1.35] [-6.04]*** [-0.83] [-1.00] [0.40] [0.38] [0.62] [-5.93]*** [-3.75]*** [-3.58]*** [-1.61] [-1.35] [-1.03] [-1.55]
Supplement for school material is
available at classroom (Dummy)
0.1871 0.1195 0.1161 0.1096 0.0624 0.1998 0.1333 0.1339 0.1291 0.0631 0.1704 0.0808 0.1171 0.1055 0.0405
[3.60]*** [2.28]** [2.22]** [2.10]** [1.10] [4.20]*** [2.79]*** [2.81]*** [2.72]*** [1.21] [1.95]* [0.92] [1.33] [1.21] [0.41]
Classroom is suitable for learning
(Dummy)
0.0551 0.0422 0.0308 0.0298 0.0267 0.039 0.0213 0.0072 0.0064 -0.0043 0.0835 0.0721 0.0593 0.0574 0.025
[1.10] [0.85] [0.63] [0.61] [0.54] [0.86] [0.48] [0.16] [0.15] [-0.10] [0.97] [0.84] [0.70] [0.68] [0.29]
School is fenced (Dummy) -0.0141 -0.0334 -0.0569 -0.0485 -0.0174 -0.0062 -0.0243 -0.0416 -0.0354 -0.0191 0.058 0.0185 0.0123 0.0274 0.0138
[-0.26] [-0.62] [-1.06] [-0.90] [-0.31] [-0.13] [-0.50] [-0.87] [-0.74] [-0.38] [0.62] [0.20] [0.13] [0.30] [0.14]
Total Number of famly (School
average)
-0.0397 -0.038 -0.0319 -0.0315 -0.0573 -0.0599 -0.0555 -0.0505 -0.0575 -0.064 -0.0533 -0.0547
[-2.61]*** [-2.50]** [-2.10]** [-2.11]** [-4.10]*** [-4.22]*** [-3.92]*** [-3.40]*** [-2.27]** [-2.51]** [-2.09]** [-2.03]**
Sex if Household Head (School
average, 1 is Male)
0.1034 0.1067 0.1011 0.0869 0.0442 0.0628 0.0587 0.0798 0.1896 0.2509 0.2408 0.1622
[1.05] [1.10] [1.04] [0.83] [0.51] [0.74] [0.69] [0.89] [1.14] [1.53] [1.47] [0.91]
Type of House (School average,
1 is lowest quality and 5 is the
finest quality)
0.0996 0.0867 0.0822 0.1273 0.0894 0.0824 0.0792 0.1155 0.1229 0.1285 0.1206 0.1687
[4.96]*** [4.22]*** [4.03]*** [4.16]*** [4.94]*** [4.48]*** [4.33]*** [4.49]*** [3.71]*** [3.81]*** [3.60]*** [3.71]***
Possession of telepohne (School
average)
0.0643 0.0295 0.0189 0.0246 0.0428 0.0148 0.0071 -0.0333 0.4928 0.3895 0.3706 0.3231
[0.69] [0.30] [0.20] [0.24] [0.52] [0.17] [0.08] [-0.37] [3.15]*** [2.41]** [2.29]** [1.90]*
Number of meal in one day
(School average)
0.01 -0.0001 -0.0065 -0.0434 -0.0032 -0.0061 -0.0107 -0.0435 -0.0386 -0.0279 -0.0393 -0.1047
[0.17] [-0.00] [-0.10] [-0.65] [-0.06] [-0.11] [-0.19] [-0.71] [-0.40] [-0.28] [-0.39] [-0.91]
Age (School average) 0.6877 0.6852 0.6543 0.7479 0.7461 0.737 2.0463 2.0418 2.0036
[3.55]*** [3.56]*** [3.38]*** [4.01]*** [4.02]*** [4.03]*** [6.01]*** [6.01]*** [5.87]***
Age Square (School average) -0.0328 -0.0324 -0.0315 -0.035 -0.0347 -0.0339 -0.0931 -0.0924 -0.0905
[-3.63]*** [-3.62]*** [-3.52]*** [-4.04]*** [-4.04]*** [-4.00]*** [-5.86]*** [-5.84]*** [-5.69]***
Boy (School average) -0.0624 -0.0693 -0.0373 -0.1466 -0.1516 -0.1676 -0.3493 -0.3617 -0.3254
[-0.43] [-0.48] [-0.25] [-1.12] [-1.16] [-1.26] [-1.44] [-1.50] [-1.34]
Mother Age (School average) -0.0089 -0.0092 -0.0083 -0.0011 -0.0013 -0.0016 0.0108 0.0102 0.0081
[-1.52] [-1.58] [-1.39] [-0.20] [-0.24] [-0.29] [0.99] [0.95] [0.73]
Mother Education History (School
average)
-0.1628 -0.1664 -0.2288 -0.1766 -0.1792 -0.2019 -0.1659 -0.1723 -0.2287
[-1.51] [-1.55] [-1.51] [-1.84]* [-1.88]* [-1.56] [-0.93] [-0.97] [-0.91]
Grade in School (School average) 0.1423 0.1359 0.1345 0.1266 0.122 0.102 0.0493 0.0379 0.0668
[3.88]*** [3.73]*** [3.43]*** [3.63]*** [3.52]*** [2.84]*** [0.77] [0.59] [1.01]
Parents paid tuition (School
average)
0.1897 0.1883 0.2054 0.1081 0.1071 0.1498 0.2053 0.2027 0.2698
[2.48]** [2.47]** [2.49]** [1.50] [1.49] [1.93]* [1.58] [1.57] [1.88]*
Log Pupil Teacher Ratio for TSC
teacher
-0.1832 -0.1284 -0.1333 -0.0523 -0.3277 -0.1812
[-3.02]*** [-1.83]* [-2.38]** [-0.83] [-3.21]*** [-1.52]
Constant -0.0483 -0.1834 -0.3453 -0.4536 -3.9161 -3.273 -2.7958 0.0013 -0.1063 -0.2745 -0.1212 -4.0948 -3.6265 -3.5787 0.1009 0.2353 0.005 -0.3072 -11.1577 -10.0068 -10.7931
[-1.01] [-2.41]** [-3.58]*** [-1.83]* [-3.93]*** [-3.21]*** [-2.63]*** [0.03] [-1.51] [-3.08]*** [-0.55] [-4.28]*** [-3.73]*** [-3.57]*** [1.22] [1.82]* [0.03] [-0.76] [-6.25]*** [-5.47]*** [-5.59]***
R-squared 0 0.0202 0.03 0.0587 0.0962 0.1022 0.2473 0.0003 0.0202 0.0326 0.0672 0.1089 0.1127 0.2719 0.0002 0.0203 0.0242 0.0523 0.0927 0.0994 0.2189
Adj-R-squared -0.0007 0.0173 0.025 0.0504 0.0834 0.0889 0.1744 -0.0004 0.0173 0.0276 0.059 0.0964 0.0996 0.2014 -0.0005 0.0175 0.0192 0.044 0.0799 0.0861 0.1432
N 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371
Kiswahili for All Standard Grades English for All Standard Grades Numeracy for All Standard Grades
Robust standard errors are used for estimation and the estimated t-values are in parentheses. *, **, and *** are indicated to show p-value to reject null hypothesis with p<0.1, p<0.05, p<0.01 respectively.
District Dummy is excluded from table, because it becomes long.
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Table 15 TOT (Kernel Normal Matching Estimation for school average) regressed on PTA teacher ratio 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
PTA teacher ratio 0.4255 0.6372 0.6503 0.8627 1.2219 1.0604 0.2722 0.4006 0.614 0.6332 0.8428 1.203 0.9938 0.3047 0.9594 1.2884 1.2814 1.6972 2.2385 2.0143 0.8297
[2.01]** [2.95]*** [2.98]*** [3.82]*** [6.12]*** [4.72]*** [1.02] [1.97]** [2.98]*** [3.04]*** [3.92]*** [6.36]*** [4.62]*** [1.22] [2.91]*** [3.84]*** [3.78]*** [4.95]*** [7.12]*** [5.74]*** [1.97]**
Electricity infra is available in village 0.1205 0.1215 0.0394 -0.002 -0.0032 -0.0276 0.1171 0.1162 0.0237 -0.0138 -0.0153 -0.056 0.1041 0.1088 -0.0391 -0.1095 -0.1112 -0.1658
[2.17]** [2.18]** [0.71] [-0.04] [-0.06] [-0.50] [2.18]** [2.15]** [0.44] [-0.28] [-0.32] [-1.08] [1.17] [1.22] [-0.44] [-1.33] [-1.35] [-1.85]*
The road is tarnac in village 0.0439 0.0433 -0.0171 -0.0156 -0.0131 -0.0796 0.0539 0.0523 -0.0172 -0.0101 -0.0068 -0.0816 0.0299 0.0333 -0.0616 -0.0463 -0.0428 -0.1029
[0.61] [0.60] [-0.23] [-0.24] [-0.20] [-1.16] [0.76] [0.74] [-0.24] [-0.16] [-0.11] [-1.25] [0.26] [0.29] [-0.52] [-0.43] [-0.40] [-0.86]
Unemployment Level (1-5) -0.0887 -0.0957 -0.0463 -0.0147 -0.0204 -0.1626 -0.0905 -0.0967 -0.0451 -0.0157 -0.023 -0.2613 -0.2252 -0.2328 -0.1426 -0.0847 -0.0926 -0.3418
[-3.65]*** [-3.89]*** [-1.75]* [-0.55] [-0.75] [-1.80]* [-3.86]*** [-4.07]*** [-1.77]* [-0.62] [-0.89] [-2.50]** [-5.73]*** [-5.86]*** [-3.35]*** [-1.92]* [-2.06]** [-1.95]*
Supplement for school material is
available at classroom (Dummy)
0.0402 -0.0256 0.0001 0.005 -0.0875 0.0579 -0.0151 0.0112 0.0176 -0.0773 -0.0548 -0.1382 -0.0766 -0.0698 -0.1848
[0.64] [-0.41] [0.00] [0.09] [-1.52] [0.95] [-0.25] [0.21] [0.32] [-1.40] [-0.56] [-1.42] [-0.84] [-0.77] [-1.90]*
Classroom is suitable for learning
(Dummy)
0.068 0.0669 0.0256 0.0274 0.0471 0.0578 0.0519 0.0092 0.0116 0.0246 0.143 0.1505 0.0875 0.09 0.1052
[1.23] [1.22] [0.52] [0.56] [0.95] [1.09] [0.99] [0.20] [0.25] [0.53] [1.59] [1.69]* [1.08] [1.11] [1.27]
School is fenced (Dummy) -0.0647 -0.0811 -0.1153 -0.1207 -0.1222 -0.0523 -0.0715 -0.1015 -0.1086 -0.1142 -0.0804 -0.1153 -0.155 -0.1626 -0.1833
[-1.11] [-1.40] [-2.19]** [-2.30]** [-2.22]** [-0.93] [-1.28] [-2.01]** [-2.16]** [-2.18]** [-0.87] [-1.26] [-1.82]* [-1.91]* [-2.01]**
Total Number of famly (School
average)
0.0087 0.0037 -0.0002 -0.005 -0.0109 -0.0193 -0.0244 -0.0275 0.0139 -0.0002 -0.0056 -0.02
[0.54] [0.25] [-0.01] [-0.32] [-0.66] [-1.22] [-1.52] [-1.70]* [0.53] [-0.01] [-0.23] [-0.77]
Sex if Household Head (School
average, 1 is Male)
0.1343 0.1018 0.1051 0.2146 0.1065 0.0759 0.0802 0.2059 0.29 0.2525 0.2571 0.4303
[1.25] [1.07] [1.11] [2.21]** [1.05] [0.87] [0.92] [2.25]** [1.82]* [1.76]* [1.80]* [2.74]***
Type of House (School average, 1 is
lowest quality and 5 is the finest
quality)
0.1124 0.075 0.0781 0.0578 0.1166 0.0822 0.0862 0.071 0.1368 0.0873 0.0916 0.0673
[5.59]*** [3.99]*** [4.13]*** [2.12]** [5.97]*** [4.52]*** [4.71]*** [2.76]*** [4.15]*** [2.77]*** [2.88]*** [1.46]
Possession of telepohne (School
average)
0.2084 0.0807 0.0855 0.0915 0.2289 0.1071 0.1134 0.1058 0.6257 0.3858 0.3926 0.3508
[1.99]** [0.83] [0.89] [0.92] [2.31]** [1.17] [1.24] [1.16] [3.93]*** [2.57]** [2.61]*** [2.26]**
Number of meal in one day (School
average)
0.0795 0.0266 0.0306 0.0764 0.0682 0.013 0.0182 0.0571 0.0866 0.0059 0.0115 0.1002
[1.19] [0.45] [0.52] [1.17] [0.99] [0.22] [0.31] [0.90] [0.82] [0.06] [0.12] [0.94]
Age (School average) 1.0803 1.079 1.0423 0.9505 0.9488 0.9112 1.9581 1.9563 1.9225
[6.03]*** [6.00]*** [5.87]*** [5.34]*** [5.29]*** [5.19]*** [6.74]*** [6.70]*** [6.56]***
Age Square (School average) -0.0459 -0.046 -0.0445 -0.0395 -0.0395 -0.0374 -0.0826 -0.0827 -0.0805
[-5.81]*** [-5.79]*** [-5.60]*** [-5.02]*** [-4.99]*** [-4.74]*** [-6.35]*** [-6.34]*** [-6.10]***
Boy (School average) 0.067 0.0737 0.092 -0.0837 -0.075 -0.0909 0.0115 0.0208 0.0203
[0.52] [0.57] [0.72] [-0.68] [-0.60] [-0.77] [0.06] [0.10] [0.10]
Mother Age (School average) -0.0049 -0.0046 0.0024 -0.0025 -0.0022 0.0039 0.0034 0.0038 0.0103
[-0.91] [-0.86] [0.45] [-0.48] [-0.41] [0.75] [0.37] [0.42] [1.12]
Mother Education History (School
average)
0.0001 0.0036 -0.026 0.0015 0.0061 0.0321 0.1353 0.1402 0.032
[0.00] [0.04] [-0.20] [0.02] [0.06] [0.25] [0.78] [0.80] [0.14]
Grade in School (School average) 0.2719 0.2741 0.2693 0.262 0.2648 0.25 0.3329 0.3359 0.3434
[7.33]*** [7.32]*** [7.26]*** [7.50]*** [7.48]*** [7.33]*** [5.64]*** [5.64]*** [5.60]***
Parents paid tuition (School average) 0.2323 0.2324 0.2092 0.1968 0.1969 0.1949 0.3509 0.3511 0.2738
[3.21]*** [3.21]*** [2.55]** [2.80]*** [2.81]*** [2.49]** [2.99]*** [2.99]*** [2.05]**
Log Pupil Teacher Ratio for TSC
teacher
0.1185 0.263 0.1535 0.2832 0.1645 0.3663
[1.79]* [3.45]*** [2.45]** [4.01]*** [1.52] [2.96]***
Constant 0.0018 0.1016 0.0838 -0.7465 -7.5625 -7.9666 -8.1744 0.0171 0.1207 0.0857 -0.5717 -6.727 -7.2506 -7.279 0.0786 0.4733 0.4912 -0.9323 -13.2135 -13.7746 -14.5351
[0.03] [1.19] [0.74] [-2.79]*** [-7.82]*** [-8.17]*** [-7.95]*** [0.34] [1.47] [0.79] [-2.11]** [-6.98]*** [-7.40]*** [-7.03]*** [0.96] [3.63]*** [2.82]*** [-2.31]** [-8.52]*** [-8.73]*** [-8.32]***
R-squared 0.0033 0.0181 0.0201 0.0525 0.2375 0.2394 0.3594 0.0031 0.0193 0.0213 0.0586 0.2492 0.2527 0.3785 0.0064 0.0312 0.0333 0.0679 0.2255 0.227 0.3268
Adj-R-squared 0.0027 0.0155 0.0155 0.0448 0.2277 0.2291 0.3029 0.0025 0.0167 0.0167 0.051 0.2395 0.2425 0.3237 0.0057 0.0286 0.0287 0.0603 0.2156 0.2165 0.2674
N 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494
English for All Standard Grades Numeracy for All Standard Grades
District Dummy is excluded from table, because it becomes long.
Robust standard errors are used for estimation and the estimated t-values are in parentheses. *, **, and *** are indicated to show p-value to reject null hypothesis with p<0.1, p<0.05, p<0.01 respectively.
Kiswahili for All Standard Grades
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Table 16 TOT (Kernel Normal Matching Estimation for Lower standard grade below three) regressed on PTA teacher ratio 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
PTA teacher ratio 0.0396 0.336 0.3966 0.5201 0.5695 0.8853 0.955 -0.0472 0.2258 0.2707 0.3745 0.4191 0.6525 0.6457 0.2983 0.8036 0.8696 1.0975 1.1839 1.6111 1.1477
[0.18] [1.49] [1.75]* [2.24]** [2.42]** [3.35]*** [2.95]*** [-0.23] [1.03] [1.23] [1.66]* [1.84]* [2.59]*** [2.11]** [0.75] [1.92]* [2.05]** [2.54]** [2.69]*** [3.35]*** [1.97]**
Electricity infra is available in
village
0.3492 0.3372 0.2756 0.2552 0.2605 0.1515 0.311 0.3057 0.2393 0.2211 0.225 0.1193 0.3569 0.3376 0.23 0.1952 0.2024 0.1177
[4.86]*** [4.66]*** [3.68]*** [3.39]*** [3.47]*** [1.92]* [4.58]*** [4.45]*** [3.39]*** [3.11]*** [3.17]*** [1.63] [2.93]*** [2.76]*** [1.83]* [1.55] [1.60] [0.84]
The road is tarnac in village -0.0535 -0.0588 -0.1032 -0.1013 -0.1082 -0.149 -0.0722 -0.0751 -0.1247 -0.1189 -0.124 -0.1967 0.086 0.0787 0.0128 0.0378 0.0285 -0.0693
[-0.53] [-0.58] [-1.03] [-1.01] [-1.08] [-1.41] [-0.72] [-0.76] [-1.27] [-1.20] [-1.25] [-1.89]* [0.50] [0.46] [0.08] [0.22] [0.17] [-0.37]
Unemployment Level (1-5) -0.0005 -0.006 0.0299 0.0321 0.0428 0.0142 -0.0165 -0.0251 0.0061 0.0027 0.0105 0.0013 -0.1685 -0.168 -0.1191 -0.1176 -0.1032 0.283
[-0.02] [-0.20] [0.87] [0.86] [1.14] [0.13] [-0.58] [-0.85] [0.19] [0.08] [0.30] [0.02] [-3.26]*** [-3.13]*** [-2.03]** [-1.83]* [-1.60] [1.23]
Supplement for school material is
available at classroom (Dummy)
0.1869 0.1371 0.1297 0.1213 0.0503 0.156 0.1069 0.1004 0.0942 0.0259 0.1352 0.089 0.1271 0.1157 0.0922
[2.62]*** [1.90]* [1.79]* [1.68]* [0.63] [2.31]** [1.56] [1.46] [1.37] [0.34] [1.09] [0.71] [1.00] [0.91] [0.65]
Classroom is suitable for learning
(Dummy)
0.067 0.0587 0.0459 0.0445 0.0521 0.062 0.0487 0.0353 0.0343 0.0439 0.1205 0.1112 0.0925 0.0906 0.0528
[1.02] [0.89] [0.70] [0.68] [0.75] [0.99] [0.78] [0.57] [0.56] [0.68] [1.05] [0.97] [0.80] [0.79] [0.43]
School is fenced (Dummy) -0.0221 -0.0436 -0.0629 -0.052 -0.0053 -0.0601 -0.0816 -0.0977 -0.0896 -0.0445 0.0451 0.0083 0.0082 0.0231 -0.035
[-0.30] [-0.60] [-0.86] [-0.71] [-0.07] [-0.88] [-1.19] [-1.42] [-1.31] [-0.60] [0.36] [0.07] [0.07] [0.18] [-0.25]
Total Number of famly (School
average)
-0.0408 -0.039 -0.0312 -0.0323 -0.0608 -0.0607 -0.0549 -0.0531 -0.0837 -0.0926 -0.082 -0.0906
[-2.05]** [-1.92]* [-1.54] [-1.52] [-3.21]*** [-3.11]*** [-2.81]*** [-2.51]** [-2.39]** [-2.57]** [-2.28]** [-2.30]**
Sex if Household Head (School
average, 1 is Male)
0.1226 0.1441 0.1368 0.1428 0.0515 0.0784 0.0729 0.1164 0.1521 0.2199 0.21 0.2253
[0.97] [1.14] [1.08] [1.04] [0.43] [0.65] [0.60] [0.89] [0.68] [0.98] [0.93] [0.88]
Type of House (School average,
1 is lowest quality and 5 is the
finest quality)
0.0657 0.0529 0.0472 0.0902 0.0545 0.0454 0.0411 0.0846 0.037 0.044 0.0362 0.1064
[2.47]** [1.93]* [1.73]* [2.22]** [2.19]** [1.77]* [1.60] [2.21]** [0.84] [0.97] [0.80] [1.64]
Possession of telepohne (School
average)
0.1633 0.1406 0.1269 0.1377 0.2109 0.1968 0.1867 0.1576 0.6095 0.5236 0.505 0.4688
[1.33] [1.10] [1.00] [1.00] [1.81]* [1.61] [1.53] [1.21] [2.89]*** [2.38]** [2.29]** [1.96]**
Number of meal in one day
(School average)
-0.0112 -0.0094 -0.0176 -0.0303 -0.0434 -0.0378 -0.0439 -0.0418 -0.1741 -0.1545 -0.1656 -0.2119
[-0.14] [-0.11] [-0.21] [-0.32] [-0.56] [-0.47] [-0.54] [-0.47] [-1.30] [-1.11] [-1.19] [-1.29]
Age (School average) 0.5652 0.5619 0.5048 0.5932 0.5908 0.626 1.7787 1.7744 1.7799
[2.30]** [2.30]** [2.04]** [2.47]** [2.48]** [2.61]*** [3.96]*** [3.96]*** [3.82]***
Age Square (School average) -0.0279 -0.0274 -0.0251 -0.0288 -0.0284 -0.0293 -0.0796 -0.079 -0.0791
[-2.43]** [-2.39]** [-2.17]** [-2.56]** [-2.54]** [-2.60]*** [-3.82]*** [-3.80]*** [-3.64]***
Boy (School average) 0.2352 0.2262 0.2459 0.1194 0.1127 0.0862 -0.0257 -0.0378 -0.0249
[1.31] [1.26] [1.30] [0.71] [0.67] [0.49] [-0.08] [-0.12] [-0.08]
Mother Age (School average) -0.0005 -0.0009 -0.0064 0.0008 0.0005 -0.0052 0.0134 0.0129 0.0059
[-0.06] [-0.11] [-0.77] [0.11] [0.07] [-0.66] [0.97] [0.94] [0.40]
Mother Education History (School
average)
-0.1615 -0.1661 -0.1159 -0.1908 -0.1943 -0.0833 -0.1105 -0.1168 -0.109
[-1.16] [-1.20] [-0.61] [-1.44] [-1.47] [-0.47] [-0.45] [-0.48] [-0.33]
Grade in School (School average) 0.1257 0.1175 0.1086 0.1169 0.1108 0.0867 0.029 0.0179 0.0474
[2.65]*** [2.48]** [2.16]** [2.55]** [2.43]** [1.81]* [0.34] [0.21] [0.53]
Parents paid tuition (School
average)
0.1603 0.1584 0.1391 0.1266 0.1252 0.1349 0.1092 0.1066 0.0553
[1.58] [1.57] [1.23] [1.29] [1.29] [1.25] [0.62] [0.61] [0.29]
Log Pupil Teacher Ratio for TSC
teacher
-0.2377 -0.1948 -0.1756 -0.1155 -0.3214 -0.1719
[-2.88]*** [-2.04]** [-2.23]** [-1.24] [-2.27]** [-1.03]
Constant -0.0998 -0.297 -0.4593 -0.5229 -3.6863 -2.8517 -2.7425 0.0195 -0.1179 -0.2209 0.0089 -3.2675 -2.651 -3.2667 -0.0424 0.0778 -0.1385 0.2604 -9.5827 -8.4539 -9.535
[-1.58] [-2.92]*** [-3.38]*** [-1.56] [-2.98]*** [-2.23]** [-2.05]** [0.33] [-1.20] [-1.67]* [0.03] [-2.67]*** [-2.11]** [-2.51]** [-0.39] [0.44] [-0.59] [0.47] [-4.11]*** [-3.53]*** [-3.63]***
R-squared 0 0.0187 0.0244 0.0358 0.0512 0.0569 0.1701 0 0.0173 0.0222 0.0377 0.0534 0.0568 0.1902 0.0004 0.0183 0.0203 0.0328 0.0495 0.053 0.1364
Adj-R-squared -0.0007 0.0158 0.0194 0.0273 0.0378 0.0429 0.0897 -0.0007 0.0144 0.0172 0.0292 0.0401 0.0429 0.1117 -0.0003 0.0154 0.0152 0.0243 0.0361 0.039 0.0527
N 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371
Kiswahili for All Standard Grades English for All Standard Grades Numeracy for All Standard Grades
Robust standard errors are used for estimation and the estimated t-values are in parentheses. *, **, and *** are indicated to show p-value to reject null hypothesis with p<0.1, p<0.05, p<0.01 respectively.
District Dummy is excluded from table, because it becomes long.
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Table 17 TOT (Radius 0.05 Matching Estimation for school average) regressed on PTA teacher ratio 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
PTA teacher ratio -0.3153 -0.109 -0.0486 0.1056 0.4475 0.541 0.2229 -0.4034 -0.1792 -0.1119 0.0235 0.3544 0.4101 0.0527 -0.3094 0.0241 0.0861 0.3981 0.9088 1.0312 0.3838
[-2.17]** [-0.74] [-0.34] [0.70] [3.88]*** [4.08]*** [1.46] [-2.87]*** [-1.27] [-0.80] [0.16] [3.29]*** [3.25]*** [0.36] [-1.31] [0.10] [0.37] [1.70]* [4.70]*** [4.54]*** [1.46]
Electricity infra is available in
village
0.1537 0.1382 0.075 0.0437 0.0444 0.0059 0.1607 0.1423 0.0717 0.0435 0.0439 -0.0018 0.1741 0.1547 0.0295 -0.0259 -0.025 -0.0747
[3.85]*** [3.45]*** [1.84]* [1.32] [1.34] [0.18] [4.22]*** [3.73]*** [1.86]* [1.44] [1.46] [-0.06] [2.78]*** [2.44]** [0.46] [-0.49] [-0.47] [-1.32]
The road is tarnac in village 0.0279 0.0217 -0.026 -0.0239 -0.0254 -0.0428 0.0584 0.0513 -0.0045 0.0021 0.0013 -0.0319 0.0357 0.0301 -0.0544 -0.0409 -0.0428 -0.0568
[0.50] [0.39] [-0.47] [-0.55] [-0.59] [-0.98] [1.08] [0.96] [-0.08] [0.05] [0.03] [-0.78] [0.41] [0.35] [-0.63] [-0.59] [-0.62] [-0.75]
Unemployment Level (1-5) -0.058 -0.06 -0.0227 -0.0014 0.0019 0.057 -0.0602 -0.0607 -0.0231 -0.0061 -0.0041 0.0184 -0.1642 -0.163 -0.0897 -0.0509 -0.0466 0.011
[-3.34]*** [-3.39]*** [-1.18] [-0.08] [0.11] [1.60] [-3.61]*** [-3.57]*** [-1.25] [-0.39] [-0.26] [0.57] [-5.85]*** [-5.65]*** [-2.93]*** [-1.84]* [-1.66]* [0.16]
Supplement for school material is
available at classroom (Dummy)
0.1272 0.0745 0.0906 0.0878 0.0346 0.1378 0.0778 0.0957 0.094 0.0281 0.0916 0.0154 0.0623 0.0586 -0.0197
[2.90]*** [1.73]* [2.68]*** [2.60]*** [1.01] [3.25]*** [1.87]* [2.92]*** [2.88]*** [0.86] [1.36] [0.23] [1.13] [1.06] [-0.34]
Classroom is suitable for learning
(Dummy)
0.0974 0.0949 0.0532 0.0521 0.0485 0.0966 0.088 0.0434 0.0428 0.0334 0.1344 0.1342 0.067 0.0656 0.0433
[2.40]** [2.38]** [1.72]* [1.68]* [1.58] [2.51]** [2.33]** [1.51] [1.49] [1.18] [2.07]** [2.10]** [1.30] [1.27] [0.83]
School is fenced (Dummy) 0.0186 0.0058 -0.0266 -0.0234 -0.007 0.0392 0.0243 -0.0027 -0.0008 0.0065 0.0561 0.0261 -0.0105 -0.0063 -0.0148
[0.45] [0.14] [-0.82] [-0.72] [-0.21] [0.99] [0.62] [-0.09] [-0.03] [0.20] [0.86] [0.41] [-0.20] [-0.12] [-0.25]
Total Number of famly (School
average)
0.0012 -0.0048 -0.0025 -0.0052 -0.0208 -0.0299 -0.0285 -0.028 -0.0086 -0.0232 -0.0203 -0.0263
[0.09] [-0.46] [-0.24] [-0.51] [-1.62] [-2.57]** [-2.45]** [-2.37]** [-0.42] [-1.31] [-1.14] [-1.44]
Sex if Household Head (School
average, 1 is Male)
0.0964 0.0651 0.0632 0.1026 0.0438 0.0222 0.021 0.0877 0.1804 0.1542 0.1517 0.2089
[1.11] [0.96] [0.94] [1.51] [0.55] [0.37] [0.35] [1.46] [1.40] [1.45] [1.43] [1.85]*
Type of House (School average,
1 is lowest quality and 5 is the
finest quality)
0.0883 0.0537 0.0519 0.0476 0.0913 0.0598 0.0588 0.058 0.1171 0.0704 0.0681 0.0442
[6.09]*** [4.49]*** [4.34]*** [2.76]*** [6.54]*** [5.35]*** [5.26]*** [3.69]*** [5.02]*** [3.62]*** [3.51]*** [1.59]
Possession of telepohne (School
average)
0.1402 0.0487 0.0458 0.0664 0.1313 0.0481 0.0464 0.0422 0.4673 0.286 0.2823 0.2657
[1.78]* [0.76] [0.72] [1.04] [1.76]* [0.82] [0.79] [0.73] [3.93]*** [2.88]*** [2.85]*** [2.69]***
Number of meal in one day
(School average)
0.0596 0.0092 0.0069 0.0218 0.0608 0.0144 0.013 0.0204 0.0871 0.0182 0.0151 0.0516
[1.18] [0.23] [0.17] [0.46] [1.21] [0.37] [0.33] [0.49] [1.11] [0.28] [0.23] [0.70]
Age (School average) 0.7855 0.7862 0.7032 0.7445 0.7449 0.68 1.5952 1.5962 1.4927
[5.67]*** [5.69]*** [5.38]*** [5.76]*** [5.78]*** [5.60]*** [7.11]*** [7.14]*** [6.83]***
Age Square (School average) -0.0325 -0.0324 -0.0291 -0.0299 -0.0299 -0.0268 -0.0661 -0.0661 -0.0614
[-5.57]*** [-5.59]*** [-5.23]*** [-5.49]*** [-5.50]*** [-5.17]*** [-6.96]*** [-6.98]*** [-6.64]***
Boy (School average) -0.07 -0.0739 -0.0119 -0.1333 -0.1356 -0.1179 -0.032 -0.0371 0.0399
[-0.73] [-0.77] [-0.13] [-1.54] [-1.57] [-1.40] [-0.22] [-0.26] [0.27]
Mother Age (School average) -0.0077 -0.0079 -0.0059 -0.0047 -0.0048 -0.0038 0.0007 0.0005 0.0013
[-1.99]** [-2.03]** [-1.49] [-1.20] [-1.23] [-0.98] [0.12] [0.09] [0.21]
Mother Education History (School
average)
-0.0775 -0.0796 -0.0577 -0.1022 -0.1034 -0.0192 -0.0142 -0.0169 -0.0666
[-1.10] [-1.13] [-0.62] [-1.62] [-1.64] [-0.24] [-0.12] [-0.15] [-0.42]
Grade in School (School average) 0.2823 0.281 0.2789 0.2656 0.2649 0.2533 0.3542 0.3526 0.3623
[8.41]*** [8.39]*** [8.54]*** [8.88]*** [8.87]*** [8.64]*** [6.32]*** [6.30]*** [6.56]***
Parents paid tuition (School
average)
0.1821 0.182 0.1819 0.1684 0.1683 0.1845 0.2856 0.2855 0.2901
[3.66]*** [3.66]*** [3.47]*** [3.58]*** [3.58]*** [3.68]*** [3.57]*** [3.58]*** [3.53]***
Log Pupil Teacher Ratio for TSC
teacher
-0.0686 0.0083 -0.0409 0.0435 -0.0898 0.0469
[-1.76]* [0.19] [-1.11] [1.05] [-1.43] [0.64]
Constant 0.0647 0.0841 -0.088 -0.6649 -5.7672 -5.5331 -5.2592 0.0955 0.1088 -0.0883 -0.4616 -5.422 -5.2826 -5.0816 0.1958 0.4204 0.2189 -0.7729 -11.0418 -10.7355 -10.6022
[1.74]* [1.38] [-1.13] [-3.29]*** [-7.63]*** [-7.32]*** [-7.01]*** [2.69]*** [1.87]* [-1.18] [-2.26]** [-7.63]*** [-7.43]*** [-7.36]*** [3.32]*** [4.43]*** [1.83]* [-2.50]** [-9.14]*** [-8.82]*** [-8.57]***
R-squared 0.0036 0.0253 0.0366 0.0733 0.4119 0.4132 0.5207 0.0063 0.033 0.0471 0.0899 0.4482 0.4487 0.562 0.0013 0.0344 0.0398 0.0837 0.3817 0.3825 0.4818
Adj-R-squared 0.0029 0.0227 0.0321 0.0658 0.4044 0.4053 0.4784 0.0056 0.0304 0.0426 0.0826 0.4411 0.4412 0.5233 0.0007 0.0318 0.0353 0.0762 0.3737 0.3741 0.4361
N 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494
Kiswahili for All Standard Grades English for All Standard Grades Numeracy for All Standard Grades
Robust standard errors are used for estimation and the estimated t-values are in parentheses. *, **, and *** are indicated to show p-value to reject null hypothesis with p<0.1, p<0.05, p<0.01 respectively.
District Dummy is excluded from table, because it becomes long.
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Table 18 TOT (Radius 0.05 Matching Estimation for Lower standard grade below three) regressed on PTA teacher ratio 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
PTA teacher ratio -0.0433 0.2033 0.2618 0.3789 0.4519 0.6891 0.4907 -0.1191 0.1071 0.1688 0.2479 0.3246 0.499 0.2065 -0.1991 0.1845 0.2546 0.5555 0.6363 1.0783 0.612
[-0.25] [1.17] [1.50] [2.14]** [2.52]** [3.49]*** [2.11]** [-0.77] [0.68] [1.06] [1.56] [2.02]** [2.77]*** [0.98] [-0.66] [0.59] [0.81] [1.76]* [2.01]** [3.12]*** [1.47]
Electricity infra is available in
village
0.2486 0.2368 0.1728 0.1489 0.1529 0.0408 0.217 0.2039 0.1427 0.122 0.125 0.0249 0.2612 0.2409 0.11 0.0596 0.067 -0.0524
[4.70]*** [4.42]*** [3.18]*** [2.76]*** [2.84]*** [0.72] [4.53]*** [4.22]*** [2.95]*** [2.54]** [2.61]*** [0.50] [2.95]*** [2.69]*** [1.22] [0.66] [0.75] [-0.54]
The road is tarnac in village 0.0547 0.0495 -0.0025 0.0062 0.001 -0.059 0.0606 0.0548 0.0011 0.0151 0.0113 -0.0545 0.0478 0.0399 -0.0455 -0.0102 -0.0199 -0.1068
[0.74] [0.67] [-0.03] [0.09] [0.02] [-0.81] [0.84] [0.77] [0.02] [0.22] [0.17] [-0.77] [0.39] [0.32] [-0.37] [-0.09] [-0.17] [-0.84]
Unemployment Level (1-5) -0.0108 -0.0157 0.021 0.0299 0.0379 -0.5222 -0.0171 -0.0211 0.0093 0.009 0.0149 -0.4631 -0.1417 -0.1404 -0.0702 -0.0642 -0.0493 -0.2617
[-0.48] [-0.69] [0.82] [1.08] [1.37] [-6.24]*** [-0.83] [-1.00] [0.40] [0.36] [0.60] [-6.03]*** [-3.73]*** [-3.57]*** [-1.62] [-1.38] [-1.07] [-1.74]*
Supplement for school material is
available at classroom (Dummy)
0.1845 0.1169 0.1129 0.1066 0.061 0.2003 0.1338 0.1337 0.1291 0.0637 0.1695 0.0806 0.1151 0.1033 0.0408
[3.55]*** [2.23]** [2.16]** [2.04]** [1.08] [4.21]*** [2.80]*** [2.81]*** [2.72]*** [1.22] [1.94]* [0.92] [1.31] [1.18] [0.41]
Classroom is suitable for learning
(Dummy)
0.0543 0.0415 0.0301 0.029 0.0269 0.0385 0.0208 0.0067 0.0059 -0.0044 0.0808 0.0696 0.0565 0.0546 0.0226
[1.09] [0.84] [0.62] [0.60] [0.54] [0.85] [0.47] [0.15] [0.14] [-0.10] [0.94] [0.81] [0.67] [0.65] [0.26]
School is fenced (Dummy) -0.0176 -0.0369 -0.0607 -0.0524 -0.0226 -0.0088 -0.0269 -0.0442 -0.0382 -0.0227 0.0522 0.0137 0.0072 0.0226 0.0082
[-0.33] [-0.68] [-1.13] [-0.98] [-0.40] [-0.18] [-0.55] [-0.92] [-0.80] [-0.45] [0.56] [0.15] [0.08] [0.25] [0.08]
Total Number of famly (School
average)
-0.0394 -0.0378 -0.0319 -0.031 -0.0569 -0.0596 -0.0552 -0.05 -0.0547 -0.0613 -0.0504 -0.0521
[-2.58]** [-2.48]** [-2.10]** [-2.07]** [-4.06]*** [-4.19]*** [-3.89]*** [-3.38]*** [-2.17]** [-2.40]** [-1.97]** [-1.94]*
Sex if Household Head (School
average, 1 is Male)
0.1053 0.1087 0.1031 0.0897 0.0459 0.0649 0.0609 0.0833 0.179 0.2421 0.2318 0.1538
[1.07] [1.12] [1.06] [0.86] [0.53] [0.76] [0.72] [0.94] [1.08] [1.48] [1.42] [0.86]
Type of House (School average,
1 is lowest quality and 5 is the
finest quality)
0.0996 0.0866 0.0823 0.1272 0.0898 0.0827 0.0795 0.1148 0.1229 0.1284 0.1204 0.1668
[4.97]*** [4.22]*** [4.03]*** [4.16]*** [4.97]*** [4.51]*** [4.35]*** [4.47]*** [3.71]*** [3.80]*** [3.59]*** [3.67]***
Possession of telepohne (School
average)
0.0603 0.0266 0.0163 0.0214 0.0407 0.0142 0.0066 -0.0326 0.4936 0.395 0.3758 0.329
[0.65] [0.28] [0.17] [0.21] [0.49] [0.16] [0.08] [-0.37] [3.15]*** [2.44]** [2.33]** [1.93]*
Number of meal in one day
(School average)
0.0126 0.0022 -0.004 -0.0417 -0.0027 -0.0056 -0.0102 -0.0441 -0.0371 -0.0254 -0.037 -0.1026
[0.21] [0.03] [-0.06] [-0.62] [-0.05] [-0.10] [-0.18] [-0.72] [-0.38] [-0.26] [-0.37] [-0.90]
Age (School average) 0.6686 0.6661 0.6354 0.7322 0.7304 0.7223 2.0215 2.017 1.9831
[3.45]*** [3.47]*** [3.28]*** [3.93]*** [3.95]*** [3.95]*** [5.94]*** [5.94]*** [5.80]***
Age Square (School average) -0.032 -0.0316 -0.0307 -0.0343 -0.034 -0.0333 -0.092 -0.0914 -0.0897
[-3.54]*** [-3.53]*** [-3.42]*** [-3.97]*** [-3.96]*** [-3.93]*** [-5.80]*** [-5.77]*** [-5.64]***
Boy (School average) -0.0631 -0.0699 -0.0385 -0.1465 -0.1515 -0.1682 -0.3472 -0.3598 -0.3227
[-0.44] [-0.48] [-0.26] [-1.12] [-1.17] [-1.27] [-1.43] [-1.49] [-1.33]
Mother Age (School average) -0.0088 -0.009 -0.0081 -0.0009 -0.0011 -0.0013 0.0109 0.0103 0.0082
[-1.49] [-1.55] [-1.36] [-0.17] [-0.21] [-0.24] [1.00] [0.96] [0.74]
Mother Education History (School
average)
-0.1647 -0.1682 -0.2275 -0.1808 -0.1833 -0.2029 -0.1837 -0.1902 -0.2485
[-1.53] [-1.57] [-1.50] [-1.89]* [-1.93]* [-1.57] [-1.04] [-1.08] [-0.99]
Grade in School (School average) 0.1425 0.1363 0.1346 0.1266 0.1221 0.1018 0.0492 0.0377 0.0678
[3.91]*** [3.76]*** [3.44]*** [3.63]*** [3.52]*** [2.84]*** [0.77] [0.59] [1.02]
Parents paid tuition (School
average)
0.1922 0.1908 0.2094 0.1117 0.1106 0.154 0.2168 0.2141 0.2865
[2.51]** [2.50]** [2.55]** [1.56] [1.55] [1.99]** [1.68]* [1.66]* [1.99]**
Log Pupil Teacher Ratio for TSC
teacher
-0.1785 -0.1235 -0.1312 -0.0503 -0.3326 -0.1906
[-2.94]*** [-1.77]* [-2.35]** [-0.80] [-3.26]*** [-1.60]
Constant -0.0456 -0.1826 -0.339 -0.4559 -3.8249 -3.198 -2.7091 0.0048 -0.1015 -0.2674 -0.1194 -4.0159 -3.555 -3.5091 0.1061 0.2354 0.0125 -0.314 -11.0273 -9.8594 -10.6345
[-0.96] [-2.40]** [-3.53]*** [-1.84]* [-3.84]*** [-3.14]*** [-2.55]** [0.11] [-1.44] [-3.00]*** [-0.54] [-4.21]*** [-3.66]*** [-3.50]*** [1.29] [1.82]* [0.08] [-0.78] [-6.17]*** [-5.39]*** [-5.51]***
R-squared 0 0.0201 0.0297 0.0584 0.0957 0.1015 0.247 0.0004 0.0199 0.0324 0.0671 0.1087 0.1124 0.2724 0.0003 0.0206 0.0244 0.0522 0.0922 0.0991 0.2183
Adj-R-squared -0.0007 0.0173 0.0247 0.0501 0.083 0.0882 0.1741 -0.0003 0.0171 0.0274 0.0588 0.0961 0.0992 0.2019 -0.0004 0.0178 0.0193 0.0438 0.0794 0.0858 0.1425
N 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371
Kiswahili for All Standard Grades English for All Standard Grades Numeracy for All Standard Grades
Robust standard errors are used for estimation and the estimated t-values are in parentheses. *, **, and *** are indicated to show p-value to reject null hypothesis with p<0.1, p<0.05, p<0.01 respectively.
District Dummy is excluded from table, because it becomes long.
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Table 19  TOT (Radius 0.01 Matching Estimation for school average) regressed on PTA teacher ratio 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
PTA teacher ratio -0.5234 -0.3104 -0.2463 -0.0955 0.2427 0.3809 0.1561 -0.5948 -0.3635 -0.2939 -0.1625 0.1651 0.2581 -0.0015 -0.7411 -0.3911 -0.321 -0.0166 0.4848 0.6929 0.2639
[-3.66]*** [-2.15]** [-1.73]* [-0.65] [2.14]** [2.94]*** [1.03] [-4.29]*** [-2.62]*** [-2.14]** [-1.15] [1.56] [2.10]** [-0.01] [-3.20]*** [-1.69]* [-1.41] [-0.07] [2.59]*** [3.16]*** [1.01]
Electricity infra is available in
village
0.1689 0.1526 0.0892 0.0588 0.0598 0.0246 0.1765 0.1576 0.0872 0.0599 0.0605 0.0178 0.2053 0.1842 0.0598 0.0066 0.0081 -0.0371
[4.29]*** [3.87]*** [2.22]** [1.80]* [1.84]* [0.73] [4.72]*** [4.21]*** [2.31]** [2.03]** [2.06]** [0.59] [3.35]*** [2.98]*** [0.96] [0.13] [0.16] [-0.66]
The road is tarnac in village 0.0266 0.0199 -0.0278 -0.0248 -0.027 -0.0397 0.0559 0.0485 -0.0071 0.0004 -0.001 -0.0298 0.0343 0.0277 -0.0559 -0.0403 -0.0436 -0.0507
[0.48] [0.36] [-0.51] [-0.58] [-0.63] [-0.92] [1.05] [0.92] [-0.14] [0.01] [-0.03] [-0.75] [0.40] [0.32] [-0.65] [-0.59] [-0.64] [-0.68]
Unemployment Level (1-5) -0.0513 -0.0535 -0.0151 0.0054 0.0103 0.0584 -0.0537 -0.0544 -0.0159 0.0005 0.0038 0.0196 -0.1528 -0.1523 -0.0766 -0.0405 -0.0333 -0.0051
[-3.00]*** [-3.07]*** [-0.80] [0.32] [0.60] [1.68]* [-3.27]*** [-3.26]*** [-0.88] [0.03] [0.24] [0.62] [-5.59]*** [-5.43]*** [-2.56]** [-1.50] [-1.21] [-0.08]
Supplement for school material is
available at classroom (Dummy)
0.1369 0.0843 0.1002 0.096 0.0513 0.1444 0.0847 0.1027 0.0999 0.0431 0.1141 0.0386 0.0847 0.0784 0.0242
[3.18]*** [1.99]** [3.01]*** [2.90]*** [1.51] [3.48]*** [2.07]** [3.21]*** [3.13]*** [1.33] [1.75]* [0.60] [1.58] [1.47] [0.42]
Classroom is suitable for learning
(Dummy)
0.101 0.0985 0.0571 0.0556 0.051 0.0994 0.0908 0.0465 0.0455 0.0359 0.1428 0.1429 0.0758 0.0735 0.0523
[2.52]** [2.50]** [1.88]* [1.83]* [1.67]* [2.63]*** [2.45]** [1.66]* [1.62] [1.28] [2.26]** [2.30]** [1.51] [1.46] [1.01]
School is fenced (Dummy) 0.0184 0.0044 -0.027 -0.0223 -0.0007 0.038 0.0221 -0.0039 -0.0007 0.0117 0.0535 0.0209 -0.0135 -0.0064 -0.0027
[0.46] [0.11] [-0.85] [-0.70] [-0.02] [0.98] [0.57] [-0.13] [-0.02] [0.37] [0.84] [0.34] [-0.26] [-0.12] [-0.05]
Total Number of famly (School
average)
-0.0018 -0.0082 -0.0049 -0.0058 -0.0236 -0.033 -0.0308 -0.0281 -0.0141 -0.0297 -0.0247 -0.0267
[-0.15] [-0.80] [-0.47] [-0.57] [-1.87]* [-2.89]*** [-2.69]*** [-2.39]** [-0.70] [-1.70]* [-1.42] [-1.47]
Sex if Household Head (School
average, 1 is Male)
0.1004 0.0697 0.0669 0.0986 0.0494 0.0282 0.0263 0.0847 0.2017 0.1788 0.1745 0.2087
[1.18] [1.05] [1.00] [1.46] [0.63] [0.49] [0.45] [1.42] [1.61] [1.72]* [1.69]* [1.87]*
Type of House (School average,
1 is lowest quality and 5 is the
finest quality)
0.0864 0.0528 0.0501 0.0484 0.0894 0.0589 0.0571 0.0595 0.113 0.0683 0.0643 0.0491
[6.04]*** [4.48]*** [4.27]*** [2.83]*** [6.55]*** [5.40]*** [5.25]*** [3.87]*** [4.96]*** [3.59]*** [3.40]*** [1.80]*
Possession of telepohne (School
average)
0.135 0.0453 0.0411 0.0623 0.1237 0.0417 0.0389 0.0327 0.4482 0.2727 0.2664 0.2467
[1.74]* [0.71] [0.65] [0.98] [1.68]* [0.72] [0.67] [0.57] [3.87]*** [2.80]*** [2.75]*** [2.53]**
Number of meal in one day
(School average)
0.0685 0.0183 0.0149 0.0244 0.0688 0.0226 0.0203 0.0237 0.1055 0.0383 0.0332 0.0575
[1.38] [0.46] [0.37] [0.52] [1.39] [0.60] [0.53] [0.57] [1.36] [0.60] [0.52] [0.79]
Age (School average) 0.7589 0.76 0.6789 0.7231 0.7239 0.6609 1.5435 1.5452 1.4421
[5.40]*** [5.44]*** [5.11]*** [5.55]*** [5.59]*** [5.35]*** [6.98]*** [7.03]*** [6.61]***
Age Square (School average) -0.0313 -0.0312 -0.028 -0.0289 -0.0289 -0.0258 -0.0638 -0.0637 -0.059
[-5.29]*** [-5.31]*** [-4.94]*** [-5.26]*** [-5.28]*** [-4.90]*** [-6.82]*** [-6.86]*** [-6.39]***
Boy (School average) -0.0978 -0.1035 -0.0469 -0.1582 -0.1621 -0.149 -0.0814 -0.09 -0.0278
[-1.01] [-1.07] [-0.49] [-1.83]* [-1.87]* [-1.75]* [-0.56] [-0.63] [-0.19]
Mother Age (School average) -0.0072 -0.0074 -0.0059 -0.0042 -0.0043 -0.0039 0.0024 0.002 0.0016
[-1.83]* [-1.89]* [-1.47] [-1.07] [-1.12] [-0.99] [0.40] [0.34] [0.27]
Mother Education History (School
average)
-0.0762 -0.0792 -0.0225 -0.0984 -0.1005 0.0127 -0.0217 -0.0263 -0.0201
[-1.09] [-1.14] [-0.24] [-1.58] [-1.61] [0.16] [-0.19] [-0.23] [-0.13]
Grade in School (School average) 0.278 0.2761 0.2736 0.2608 0.2596 0.2473 0.3461 0.3433 0.3511
[8.33]*** [8.32]*** [8.41]*** [8.79]*** [8.78]*** [8.47]*** [6.25]*** [6.23]*** [6.38]***
Parents paid tuition (School
average)
0.1712 0.1711 0.1792 0.1568 0.1567 0.1802 0.2627 0.2625 0.2824
[3.49]*** [3.49]*** [3.43]*** [3.40]*** [3.40]*** [3.61]*** [3.37]*** [3.37]*** [3.45]***
Log Pupil Teacher Ratio for TSC
teacher
-0.1014 -0.0376 -0.0683 0.0041 -0.1527 -0.047
[-2.64]*** [-0.86] [-1.88]* [0.10] [-2.49]** [-0.65]
Constant 0.0873 0.0838 -0.0976 -0.6747 -5.6238 -5.278 -4.9834 0.1103 0.101 -0.1017 -0.4742 -5.3109 -5.0781 -4.8596 0.2294 0.4115 0.1902 -0.8128 -10.8016 -10.2809 -10.0632
[2.37]** [1.40] [-1.27] [-3.39]*** [-7.35]*** [-6.90]*** [-6.56]*** [3.13]*** [1.76]* [-1.38] [-2.36]** [-7.42]*** [-7.10]*** [-6.93]*** [3.93]*** [4.45]*** [1.63] [-2.68]*** [-9.07]*** [-8.58]*** [-8.17]***
R-squared 0.01 0.0325 0.0454 0.082 0.416 0.4189 0.5145 0.0139 0.0419 0.0574 0.1008 0.457 0.4584 0.556 0.008 0.0414 0.0483 0.0927 0.3907 0.3933 0.4697
Adj-R-squared 0.0094 0.0299 0.0409 0.0746 0.4085 0.411 0.4717 0.0133 0.0393 0.0529 0.0936 0.45 0.4511 0.5168 0.0073 0.0389 0.0438 0.0853 0.3829 0.385 0.4229
N 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494
Kiswahili for All Standard Grades English for All Standard Grades Numeracy for All Standard Grades
Robust standard errors are used for estimation and the estimated t-values are in parentheses. *, **, and *** are indicated to show p-value to reject null hypothesis with p<0.1, p<0.05, p<0.01 respectively.
District Dummy is excluded from table, because it becomes long.
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Table 20 TOT (Radius 0.1 Matching Estimation for Lower standard grade below three) regressed on PTA teacher ratio 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
PTA teacher ratio -0.2549 0.006 0.0697 0.1816 0.2497 0.5399 0.4149 -0.238 -0.0026 0.0627 0.1396 0.2168 0.4089 0.1865 -0.199 0.1861 0.258 0.5558 0.6386 1.0499 0.5968
[-1.49] [0.03] [0.40] [1.02] [1.38] [2.74]*** [1.78]* [-1.54] [-0.02] [0.40] [0.89] [1.36] [2.30]** [0.89] [-0.66] [0.60] [0.83] [1.78]* [2.04]** [3.06]*** [1.45]
Electricity infra is available in
village
0.2654 0.2529 0.1895 0.1654 0.1703 0.0618 0.228 0.2142 0.1533 0.1322 0.1354 0.0393 0.26 0.2391 0.1093 0.0569 0.0639 -0.0528
[5.00]*** [4.72]*** [3.49]*** [3.07]*** [3.18]*** [1.09] [4.80]*** [4.48]*** [3.20]*** [2.77]*** [2.86]*** [0.79] [2.95]*** [2.68]*** [1.22] [0.64] [0.72] [-0.54]
The road is tarnac in village 0.0693 0.0637 0.0115 0.0202 0.0139 -0.0446 0.0693 0.0633 0.0096 0.0237 0.0195 -0.0453 0.0463 0.0382 -0.046 -0.0111 -0.0201 -0.1037
[0.93] [0.86] [0.16] [0.28] [0.20] [-0.60] [0.96] [0.89] [0.14] [0.35] [0.29] [-0.64] [0.38] [0.31] [-0.38] [-0.09] [-0.17] [-0.82]
Unemployment Level (1-5) -0.0061 -0.012 0.0227 0.0317 0.0414 -0.5509 -0.0141 -0.0186 0.0113 0.0121 0.0186 -0.4809 -0.1448 -0.1437 -0.0757 -0.0669 -0.053 -0.3612
[-0.27] [-0.52] [0.89] [1.14] [1.50] [-6.71]*** [-0.69] [-0.89] [0.49] [0.49] [0.75] [-6.36]*** [-3.81]*** [-3.65]*** [-1.74]* [-1.44] [-1.14] [-2.28]**
Supplement for school material is
available at classroom (Dummy)
0.1975 0.13 0.1241 0.1164 0.0799 0.208 0.1417 0.1418 0.1367 0.0755 0.1677 0.0815 0.1158 0.1048 0.0393
[3.79]*** [2.47]** [2.37]** [2.23]** [1.40] [4.40]*** [2.99]*** [3.00]*** [2.90]*** [1.45] [1.92]* [0.93] [1.32] [1.20] [0.40]
Classroom is suitable for learning
(Dummy)
0.0696 0.0559 0.0448 0.0435 0.0414 0.0491 0.0312 0.0174 0.0166 0.0073 0.0951 0.0838 0.071 0.0692 0.0367
[1.39] [1.13] [0.92] [0.90] [0.83] [1.09] [0.71] [0.40] [0.38] [0.16] [1.11] [0.98] [0.84] [0.82] [0.43]
School is fenced (Dummy) -0.0244 -0.0427 -0.0672 -0.0571 -0.0194 -0.0112 -0.0293 -0.047 -0.0404 -0.0188 0.0519 0.0149 0.0067 0.021 0.012
[-0.45] [-0.79] [-1.26] [-1.07] [-0.34] [-0.23] [-0.61] [-0.99] [-0.85] [-0.37] [0.56] [0.16] [0.07] [0.23] [0.12]
Total Number of famly (School
average)
-0.0408 -0.039 -0.0318 -0.03 -0.0583 -0.0609 -0.0561 -0.0491 -0.053 -0.0593 -0.0491 -0.0494
[-2.65]*** [-2.56]** [-2.09]** [-2.01]** [-4.20]*** [-4.33]*** [-4.01]*** [-3.34]*** [-2.09]** [-2.31]** [-1.92]* [-1.82]*
Sex if Household Head (School
average, 1 is Male)
0.0892 0.0918 0.085 0.0551 0.0462 0.064 0.0595 0.0644 0.1553 0.2171 0.2075 0.1228
[0.90] [0.95] [0.87] [0.53] [0.53] [0.76] [0.71] [0.73] [0.94] [1.33] [1.27] [0.69]
Type of House (School average,
1 is lowest quality and 5 is the
finest quality)
0.0993 0.0859 0.0806 0.1294 0.0888 0.0815 0.078 0.1173 0.1189 0.123 0.1156 0.1654
[4.94]*** [4.18]*** [3.96]*** [4.24]*** [4.96]*** [4.48]*** [4.31]*** [4.62]*** [3.59]*** [3.63]*** [3.44]*** [3.62]***
Possession of telepohne (School
average)
0.0599 0.0293 0.0167 0.0255 0.041 0.0129 0.0046 -0.0381 0.5052 0.4018 0.384 0.3365
[0.65] [0.30] [0.17] [0.25] [0.50] [0.15] [0.05] [-0.43] [3.22]*** [2.49]** [2.39]** [1.98]**
Number of meal in one day
(School average)
0.004 -0.0071 -0.0147 -0.0617 -0.0084 -0.0125 -0.0175 -0.0538 -0.0397 -0.0302 -0.0409 -0.1133
[0.07] [-0.11] [-0.23] [-0.91] [-0.15] [-0.22] [-0.31] [-0.87] [-0.41] [-0.30] [-0.41] [-0.99]
Age (School average) 0.6331 0.6301 0.6096 0.7258 0.7238 0.7167 2.033 2.0287 2.002
[3.25]*** [3.26]*** [3.11]*** [3.93]*** [3.95]*** [3.94]*** [6.01]*** [6.01]*** [5.86]***
Age Square (School average) -0.0304 -0.03 -0.0295 -0.034 -0.0337 -0.0329 -0.0927 -0.092 -0.0908
[-3.35]*** [-3.33]*** [-3.25]*** [-3.98]*** [-3.97]*** [-3.92]*** [-5.88]*** [-5.85]*** [-5.71]***
Boy (School average) -0.0747 -0.083 -0.0599 -0.1508 -0.1563 -0.1762 -0.3225 -0.3342 -0.3011
[-0.51] [-0.57] [-0.40] [-1.15] [-1.20] [-1.33] [-1.33] [-1.38] [-1.23]
Mother Age (School average) -0.0093 -0.0097 -0.0094 -0.001 -0.0012 -0.0022 0.0106 0.0101 0.0082
[-1.57] [-1.65]* [-1.55] [-0.19] [-0.23] [-0.40] [0.98] [0.94] [0.75]
Mother Education History (School
average)
-0.1766 -0.1809 -0.212 -0.176 -0.1788 -0.1896 -0.1783 -0.1843 -0.2385
[-1.63] [-1.68]* [-1.38] [-1.85]* [-1.88]* [-1.46] [-1.00] [-1.04] [-0.93]
Grade in School (School average) 0.1431 0.1355 0.135 0.1258 0.1208 0.1017 0.0519 0.0412 0.0723
[3.95]*** [3.78]*** [3.47]*** [3.57]*** [3.45]*** [2.79]*** [0.82] [0.65] [1.09]
Parents paid tuition (School
average)
0.2102 0.2085 0.2381 0.1202 0.119 0.1683 0.2457 0.2433 0.3127
[2.76]*** [2.75]*** [2.91]*** [1.69]* [1.68]* [2.19]** [1.91]* [1.90]* [2.18]**
Log Pupil Teacher Ratio for TSC
teacher
-0.2184 -0.1802 -0.1445 -0.0716 -0.3096 -0.1705
[-3.61]*** [-2.58]*** [-2.60]*** [-1.14] [-3.05]*** [-1.43]
Constant -0.0241 -0.184 -0.3538 -0.4188 -3.5702 -2.8034 -2.2414 0.0036 -0.1173 -0.2935 -0.1176 -3.9758 -3.4682 -3.3479 0.0941 0.2308 0.0004 -0.308 -11.0905 -10.0035 -10.6467
[-0.50] [-2.42]** [-3.69]*** [-1.69]* [-3.54]*** [-2.73]*** [-2.08]** [0.08] [-1.68]* [-3.31]*** [-0.53] [-4.19]*** [-3.60]*** [-3.35]*** [1.15] [1.78]* [0.00] [-0.76] [-6.27]*** [-5.51]*** [-5.50]***
R-squared 0.0015 0.0242 0.0356 0.0639 0.1012 0.1098 0.2485 0.0016 0.0231 0.0371 0.0722 0.114 0.1185 0.2699 0.0003 0.0211 0.0251 0.0522 0.0932 0.0992 0.2165
Adj-R-squared 0.0008 0.0214 0.0306 0.0557 0.0886 0.0966 0.1757 0.0009 0.0203 0.0321 0.064 0.1015 0.1055 0.1991 -0.0004 0.0183 0.0201 0.0438 0.0804 0.0859 0.1406
N 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371
Kiswahili for All Standard Grades English for All Standard Grades Numeracy for All Standard Grades
Robust standard errors are used for estimation and the estimated t-values are in parentheses. *, **, and *** are indicated to show p-value to reject null hypothesis with p<0.1, p<0.05, p<0.01 respectively.
District Dummy is excluded from table, because it becomes long.
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